delivered opinion of the Court.
This is a suit between appropriators and riparians. It is a class action to determine whether, in the absence of specific grants of irrigation waters, Spanish and Mexican grants along the Rio Grande River have appurtenant riparian irrigation rights.
The State and numerous water districts assert rights of the appropriators, and the owners of lands out of the original grants assert rights similar to those commonly called riparian rights.
The trial court held that although it was of the opinion that the grants did not carry with them riparian rights of irrigation, it was bound by the case of Motl v. Boyd, 116 Texas 82, 286 S.W. 458, and held that the grants along the lower Rio Grande did carry with them the implied rights of irrigation.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered judgment for the appropriators, hold*383ing that the original Spanish and Mexican grants in question did not carry with them implied rights of irrigation. 346 S.W. 2d 853. In so holding that court determined that statements made by way of dicta in Motl v. Boyd to the contrary were not stare decisis of the question. We affirm.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Pope of the Court of Civil Appeals is exhaustive and well documented. We believe it would serve no good purpose to write further on the subject other than to point out that the question of the binding effect of certain statements contained in Motl v. Boyd presents a different problem when applied to a Court of Civil Appeals than it does when applied to this Court. The dissent of Chief Justice Murray is largely based upon the proposition that the Court of Civil Appeals is bound to follow the dicta contained in Motl v. Boyd, which he regards as being judicial in nature. We find text statements which are similar in purport to the thesis asserted by the Chief Justice. It is pointed out in Corpus Juris Secundum that:
“It is commonly held that a decision is authoritative only on questions which it was necessary to decide, and were involved, or in issue, in the case. However, inferior courts have been held bound by a decision on a question actually determined by an appellate court even though the decision thereof was not necessary to the determination of the case.” 21 C.J.S., Courts, Sec. 190, p. 382.
See also, 21 C.J.S., Courts, Sec. 209, p. 316, as to statements made by way of dicta for the guidance of lower courts.
With the granting of the writ of error in this case the question of whether the Court of Civil Appeals should have followed the dicta of Motl v. Boyd became academic. The question now relates to the action which should be taken by this court with reference to such dicta. When we apply the reasoning of Mr. Justice Pope relating to the doctrine of stare decisis (346 S.W. 2d 878) to the Supreme Court, the answer is inescapable. Such dicta should not control our disposition of this case. In Vidal v. Girard’s Executors, 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205, the Supreme Court of the United States (opinion by Mr. Justice Story) reexamined a point of chancery jurisdiction as “strong additional light had been thrown upon the subject” through historical research.
As further discussion is unnecessary it will be pretermitted. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed and the *384opinion of that court is adopted as the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Opinion delivered February 14, 1962.