OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We overrule Dr. Diaz’s motion for rehearing and motion for rehearing en banc. Since we issued our opinion in this case, the Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the minors’ tolling provision of the Medical Liability Act. See Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 39 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 286, — S.W.2d -[1996 WL 51168] (February 9, 1996) (per curiam). Because our decision in this case is based on our interpretation of the same tolling provision, we write briefly to address Baptist Memorial Hospital.
The Baptist Memorial Hospital case involved parents who sued the hospital after their newborn baby died. As in our case, their wrongful death claim was governed by the statute of limitations from the Medical Liability Act:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care *556treatment that is the subject of the claim or hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed; “provided that, minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their Uth birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1996) (emphasis supplied). The language italicized above is the minors’ tolling provision, which the Arredondos tried to apply to their wrongful death suit. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the adult wrongful death claimants could use the minors’ tolling provision because the decedent was a minor. See Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754, 760-61 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1995), rev’d sub nom. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 39 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 286, — S.W.2d - (February 9, 1996) (per curiam).
The supreme court disagreed:
This provision tolls a claim’s accrual only when it is filed by a minor or on a minor’s behalf. A statutory beneficiary files a wrongful death action to recover her own damages based on a minor’s death. Therefore, the tolling provision of section 10.01 that applies to a minor does not apply to an adult’s wrongful death claim.
Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 39 Tex.Sup. Ct.J. at 287, — S.W.2d at - (citation omitted).
In our ease, we applied the minors’ tolling provision to Eric Westphal’s statutory claims because he is a minor with a wrongful death claim filed on his behalf. We expressly distinguished between Eric’s claim and his mother’s claim because Carolyn Westphal could not make use of the minors’ tolling provision. Accordingly, we applied the same interpretation of this tolling provision that the supreme court approved by rejecting the San Antonio court’s contrary interpretation.
Furthermore, the Baptist Memorial Hospital decision shows the importance of analyzing the statutory wrongful death claim separately from the underlying common law claim for malpractice. See id. Because the wrongful death claim is a derivative claim, a defendant moving for summary judgment based on limitations may argue that the claim is barred because
(1) the claimant’s statutory wrongful death claim was not filed within two years from the date the wrongful death claim accrued, or
(2) the decedent’s common law personal injury claim would not have been filed within two years from the date the personal injury claim accrued if the claim had been filed immediately before the decedent died.
Longoria v. United Blood Services, 907 S.W.2d 605, 613-14 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ requested); see generally Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.1992). If the defendant-movant prevails on either limitations argument, the court should grant summary judgment.
This two-track statute of limitations analysis becomes more complicated in a wrongful death suit based on a health care liability claim. In such cases, the limitations provision from the Medical Liability Act governs both the claimant’s statutory wrongful death claim and the decedent’s hypothetical common law negligence claim for malpractice. Although both claims are governed by the same limitations statute, the court of appeals cannot avoid the two-track limitations analysis: this is the mistake that the San Antonio court of appeals made in Arredondo v. Hilliard, 904 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1995), rev’d sub nom. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 39 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 286, — S.W.2d - (February 9, 1996) (per curiam).
The San Antonio court correctly held that the baby’s common law medical malpractice claim would have been timely if it had been filed on the date of the baby’s death, i.e., two days after he was injured. Id. at 760-61. However, the court did not complete the two-track analysis by determining whether the parents’ statutory wrongful death suit was filed within the two-year limitations period set by the Medical Liability Act. Instead, the court held that the statute of limitations on the adults’ claims was subject to the minors’ tolling provision.
In the instant case, we employed the two-track limitations analysis to the claims of *557both Eric Westphal and his mother. First, we sought to ascertain whether the claimants’ statutory wrongful death claims were filed within the period prescribed under the Medical Liability Act. Carolyn Westphal’s wrongful death claim is barred because it was not “filed within two years from ... the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim” was'completed. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01. However, Eric Westphal has until his “14th birthday in which to file, or have filed on [his] behalf, the claim” because he is “under the age of 12 years.” Id. This is exactly consistent with the Baptist Memorial Hospital interpretation of the tolling provision.
Next, we asked whether the summary judgment proof conclusively established that the decedent’s hypothetical negligence claim would have been barred if it had been filed on the day he died. The leading case regarding a defendant-doctor’s burden when moving for summary judgment based on limitations under the Medical Liability Act is Hellman v. Mateo, 772 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.1989). Hellman provides:
Having determined that [the plaintiff-patient] alleged and expressly presented the facts necessary to challenge the constitutionality of article 4590i, we must now consider whether [the defendant-doctor] carried his burden of establishing his limitations defense as a matter of law. In other words, [the defendant-doctor] must conclusively establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the time when [the plaintiff-patient] discovered or should have discovered the nature of the injury and cause of action.
Id. at 66 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted). The language italicized above is the discovery rule, which the defendant must negate as part of its summary judgment burden of proof.
Under Heilman, Dr. Diaz had the burden of conclusively negating the discovery rule. He did not meet his burden of proof because he failed to present any expert testimony to resolve the disputed issue regarding when the decedent should have discovered the nature of his injury. The supreme court’s recent Baptist Memorial Hospital decision does not overrule Heilman. Accordingly, the Baptist Memorial Hospital decision does not suggest any different analysis of the limitations provision applicable to the decedent’s hypothetical health care liability claim based on common law negligence.
Having considered the arguments in both of his motions for rehearing as well as the recent supreme court authority relevant to this case, we overrule Dr. Diaz’s two motions for rehearing.
SEERDEN, C.J., dissents.