On Petition to Rehear
Counsel for the plaintiffs in error have filed a dignified and respectful petition to rehear in this cause. The basis of this petition is purely a re-argument of what was heretofore forcefully and ably argued at the Bar of this Court and in the briefs originally filed. Primarily this petition is based upon the fact that some of the jurors (quoting again in the petition to rehear the evidence of certain of the jurors which was quoted in the original brief) had an opportunity and did read certain newspaper reports published during the trial of the cause.
We gave this and all questions raised in this petition very serious and careful study, and thought, before preparing our original opinion. It is true we did not take up each of these specific items as argued because in our judgment they were all covered by what we said in our opinion specifically from pages 16 to 24 [327 S.W.2d 319 to 323]. We did not overlook any of these things and *545were clearly convinced that the questions raised were not prejudicial to the plaintiffs in error for the reasons therein stated.
Some additional anthorities in support of these contentions are now cited, one in particular is Marshall v United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250. We had read the advance opinion before releasing our opinion but did not mention it in the opinion because the opinion had been prepared prior to our receipt of this opinion. This opinion recognizes that in such matters as here presented the trial judge has a very large discretion in ruling on the issue of prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles concerning the trial. The Court cites Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021, as its authority for this recognition. The Holt case was read by us prior to our preparation of the original opinion. We for the reasons expressed in our opinion held that there was no abuse of discretion of the trial judge in his action herein and further held by reason of the proof offered on the motion for a new trial that there was no prejudice, in our judgment, to the plaintiffs in error by reason of these facts. The Marshall case is really authority for nothing more than that the Supreme Court of the United States says:
“In the exercise of our supervisory power to formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the federal courts (Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819) we think a new trial should be granted.” [360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1173.]
*546This Court likewise recognizes a supervisory power over trial courts in the interest of fairness and justice to defendants who are there tried. In exercising this thought and jurisdiction we concluded under this record that there was no error herein.
We are firmly convinced that there is no violation of the right of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or of Article 1 of the Constitution of Tennessee to these defendants.
For the reasons herein stated, the petition to rehear is accordingly denied.