dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The statute at hand, properly construed, does not allow the filing of a petition before the decision of the Commission becomes final. I do not agree that this strict construction leads to a “harsh and absurd” result, rather, I conclude that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and that the prohibition of premature filing indicates a rational legislative intent to preserve the jurisdiction of the Commission, as well as to protect the rights of other parties to the administrative proceeding.
The court’s holding, as stated by the opinion of the Chief Justice, is that the words “and not before” in the statute are not jurisdictional, but rather merely reflect the legislature’s intention to preclude post-filing procedures in the reviewing court. By this analysis, the court fails to recognize the legislature’s clear intent to avoid such a result, and construes the statute to render the words “and not before” a useless and vestigial appendage.
This interpretation is contrary to established rules of statutory construction. Although Texas Employment Commission v. Stewart Oil Co.„ 153 Tex. 247, 267 S.W.2d 137 (1954) superficially supports Crosland’s claim that the court had jurisdiction to entertain her premature claim, article 5221b-4(i) was amended at the next session of the legislature to insert the words “and not before.” A presumption exists that the legislature is familiar with prior decisions of our supreme court and that if it is not satisfied with the law as declared by the courts, the legislature will enact statutory change to reflect a contrary intention. Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Tex. 21, 52 S.W.2d 56 (1932); State v. Anderson, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174 (1930); State v. Duke, 104 Tex. 355, 137 S.W. 654 (1911). Courts are obligated to give effect to statutory modification, and legislative annulment of judicial action demonstrates a clear intent to change the law. Smith v. State, 420 S.W.2d 204 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1967) aff’d 434 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.1968).
Unemployment compensation is a right granted by a statute, and legislative grants of rights or privileges must be construed strictly in favor of the state on grounds of public policy. Whatever is not unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld. State v. Standard, 414 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex.1967); Gilbert v. State, 437 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.). In granting the right to unemployment compensation, the State has also prescribed terms and conditions for its enforcement, and statutes creating rights of action against the State must be strictly construed. State v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 311 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1957, no writ) . In this instance, the right of appeal has been expressly limited by a mandatory provision, and these statutory proceedings are strictly governed by the statute of their creation. Texas Employment Commission v. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local No. 782, 163 Tex. 135, 352 S.W.2d 252, 254 (1961).
Adherence to the terms of the statute does not lead to unjust formality. This court recognizes that premature filing threatens to pre-emp jurisdiction of the Commission by potentially precluding revision of the Commission order. Moreover, such premature filing may also prejudice the rights of other parties to the administrative action by preventing the filing of motions for rehearing under subdivision (h). To rectify these problems, the legislature amended the statute to preclude judicial review before the Commission’s order becomes final. Supposedly, the majority opinion does not construe this prohibition as jurisdictional; however, it goes on to say that “the petition on file in court has no effect on the administrative process, and the court has no power to proceed until that process is complete.” The difference between this limitation and a lack of jurisdiction evades me. Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine the contro*320versy between the parties, Mitchell v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 35 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex.Com.App. — 1931, holding approved), and if a court has no power to proceed in the adjudication of a dispute, as the majority holds, it seems clear that it lacks jurisdiction within the accepted meaning of the term. If we were capable of reviewing the wisdom of legislature enactments, the court could perhaps conclude that the legislature may have had only post-filing activities in mind however, this would not be a proper judicial function. We may not invade the legislative field. The rule which permits departure from the literal meaning of an act does not apply when a statute clearly and unambiguously demonstrates the legislative intent, Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99, 109 (1961), and refusal to enforce the statute in accord with that intent is an unwarranted interference with the exercise of lawful legislative authority and an inexcusable breach of judicial duty. Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515 (1930); Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 81 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex.Com.App. — 1935, holding adopted). The harshness of a literal construction’s result is no excuse for judicial improvisation. An unambiguous statute should be applied and enforced as it reads, regardless of its policy or purpose or the justice of its effect. Franklin v. Pietzsch, 334 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex.Civ.App. —Dallas 1960, writ ref’d n. r. e.). If the legislature wished to qualify its words, it would have done so. Absent such an indication, however, we should not supply judicial provisos.
Moreover, I feel that even if the court was somehow justified to constructively qualify the statute, the new interpretation contravenes accepted authority regarding the jurisdiction of Texas courts. The court seems to conclude that the premature filing of the petition invokes some power of the court to hold the cause in abeyance until its jurisdiction is properly applicable. When the Commission’s order becomes final, the action then spontaneously arises and is then properly before the court. Such a holding fails to recognize that the first consideration of any court is to determine its own jurisdiction of a case, and if a lack of jurisdiction appears, the court should dismiss the case as a matter of law. Hager v. State Ex Rel. TeVault, 446 S.W.2d 43, 52 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Lone Star Finance Corp. v. Davis, 77 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1934, no writ). The trial court is not authorized to hold causes in abeyance until its jurisdiction is satisfied, nor is it empowered to give later effect to an original filing which was, because of lack of jurisdiction, a nullity.
I am not convinced that forcing a party to refile to meet jurisdictional standards is either unjust or absurd. The legislature evidently was seriously concerned with preventing jurisdictional conflicts and preserving the rights of other parties. It is, not unreasonable to assume that they deemed these considerations of such importance to motivate a strict qualification of the right of appeal. Such a restriction is not absurd and certainly outweighs the fiction that a trial court may retroactively exert its jurisdiction to effectuate that which was originally void. The legislature has acted in a clear and unambiguous manner, and it is not the role of this court to impose its view of the proper procedure in derogation of a manifest legislative intent.
As a personal matter, I am not entirely unsympathetic with the attitude of the majority of the court. My proposed strict construction will result in Crosland’s loss of the right to appeal for lack of timely filing. Despite this hardship, the law is clear, and I cannot decide this case on some vague intuitive feeling of natural justice. I fully share the convictions of the late Justice Roberts, formerly of the Texas Supreme Court, who, in Duncan v. Magette, 25 Tex. 245, 253-54 (1860), said:
Whoever undertakes to determine a case solely by his own notions of abstract justice, breaks down the barriers by which rules of justice are erected into a system, and thereby annihilates law . To follow the dictates of jus*321tice, when in harmony with the law, must be a pleasure; but to follow the rules of law, in their true spirit, to whatever consequences they may lead, is a duty.
For these reasons, I am unable to concur in the judgment of the court.