dissenting.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. As such, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. I disagree with the Court’s opinion and judgment because it refuses to follow precedent. I would hold that the attractive-nuisance doctrine applies to this case and that Timmons has raised fact issues about whether Texas Utilities Electric Company breached its duty of reasonable care to the child. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I
For the trial court’s summary judgment to withstand Timmons’s appeal, Texas Utilities must have conclusively disproved at least one element of her claim. See Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476 (Tex.1995). In determining whether summary judgment was proper, we must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to Timmons and resolve any doubts in her favor. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). *197Before proceeding further, I will review the facts essential to deciding the present case under this standard
The Texas Utilities tower Billy climbed is located on the comer of Hall and Davis Streets in a residential area of Hillsboro. It appears as follows:
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Many families and children live nearby. The tower is easy to climb, and several other children in the area did so routinely before Billy’s death. Billy himself had climbed it many times without injury.
Billy was fourteen years old when he was killed. He had difficulty functioning in a regular classroom and had attended special education classes for the previous three years. Even in special education classes, he made poor grades. On average, he was less intelligent than other children his age. Billy was aware of the general dangers associated with touching a power line. Although several people advised him against climbing the tower, no one told him about the possibility that electricity could arc or jump from the wire and harm him. Neither Billy’s mother nor anyone with him the night of his death knew about the phenomenon of electrical arcing. As he climbed the tower, he came close to the power lines, but he did not touch them. A lethal jolt of electricity arced through the air and hit Billy as he began to descend.
II
A landowner may be liable for injury to a trespassing child under the attractive-nuisance doctrine when the evidence shows that the defendant should have known or foreseen that the victim would be attracted to an artificial condition or instrumentality located' on the property. See Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843, 847 (1948). Whether an artificial condition or instrumentality is an attractive nuisance is a question of law. Massie v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 319, 233 S.W.2d 449, 454 (1950). In determining whether the attractive-nuisance doctrine applies to a particular ease, the reviewing court must consider the character of the danger and the age and maturity of the child. Id. at 453. The doctrine applies when the danger is latent, but not when it is patent or obvious. See Stimpson v. Bartex Pipe Line Co., 120 Tex. 232, 36 S.W.2d 473, 476 (1931).
A
At the outset, Texas Utilities contends that the court of appeals erred simply because Billy was too old to be protected by the attractive-nuisance doctrine. Although the Court disagrees, it does not fully explain its reasoning.
*198Texas Utilities relies on our decision in Massie v. Copeland to support its argument that the attractive-nuisance doctrine never applies to a fourteen-year-old child. Massie was a suit to recover damages for the drowning death of a fourteen-year-old boy. Massie, 233 S.W.2d at 449. The Court denied recovery based on the following holding:
It is our opinion that the dangers of swimming in the pond or pit of water described in the petition were open and patent to a normal, healthy and robust boy fourteen years of age, and that ‘in the very nature of things’ he was capable of understanding and appreciating the dangers.
The foregoing conclusion, that the protection of the attractive nuisance doctrine is not to be extended to a normal boy fourteen years of age in such a case as this case, is well supported by the authorities.
Id. at 452-53.
At first blush, Massie would appear to support Texas Utilities’ argument that attractive nuisance is unavailable to fourteen-year-olds. Upon a closer reading, however, it appears from our refusal to apply the doctrine to “such a case as this case” that we intended to limit the Massie decision to its facts. Thus, despite contrary interpretations, Texas law does not clearly establish age fourteen as a rigid boundary outside which a minor is not entitled to the benefit of the attractive-nuisance doctrine. Other jurisdictions are split on this issue, although the majority have refused to set arbitrary age limits, and the rules in states setting such fixed limits have been subjected to increasing criticism. See Comment Note, Age and Mentality of Child as Affecting Application of Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 16 A.L.R.3D 25, 81 (1967 & Supp.1996); Restatement (Second) of ToRTS § 339 cmt. c (1965).
Even if age fourteen were the cutoff point, well-established authorities support an exception to that rule upon proof of “a lack of mental development ... ordinarily found in children of that age.” 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(86); see Massie, 233 S.W.2d at 453 (refusing to apply doctrine to “normal” fourteen-year-old boy). Under such circumstances, recovery is allowable “where the child is of high school age, ranging in a few instances as high as sixteen or seventeen years.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, cmt. e (1965). A rule allowing recovery to a child who lacks ordinary mental development and intellectual capacity is particularly appropriate in cases involving such a little-known, dormant, and latent instrumentality as electrical arcing. See Massie, 233 S.W.2d at 454 (citing McCoy, 239 S.W. at 1105; Johns, 30 S.W.2d at 549). Viewed in the light most favorable to Timmons, the summary judgment record raises a fact issue about whether Billy had the mental capacity of a normal fourteen-year-old boy. See Massie, 233 S.W.2d at 453; Soledad v. Lara, 762 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1988, no writ). The Court does not adequately address the mental-capacity issue before deciding that Billy was old enough and mature enough to appreciate the danger.
B
Texas Utilities also asserts that, regardless of whether fourteen is the absolute age limit for attractive nuisance, the doctrine does not apply under the facts of this case. For the reasons explained below, this argument is without merit.
Since 1922, Texas courts have applied the attractive-nuisance doctrine to a fourteen-year-old child injured by electrical arcing while climbing an electric transmission tower. The Texas Commission of Appeals, in McCoy v. Texas Power & Light Co., 239 S.W. 1105 (Tex. Comm’n App.1922, holding approved), was the first court in this state to consider the issue. In McCoy, the boy knew that power lines were dangerous, but like Billy, he was unaware that he could be harmed without actually touching the wires. McCoy, 239 S.W. at 1107. Nothing indicated that the boy climbed the tower for any purpose other than curiosity or adventure. Relying on several Texas authorities on attractive nuisance, the Commission of Appeals concluded that the factual allegations in the plaintiffs petition stated a cause of action against the defendant electric company and were sufficient to sustain the lawsuit against a general demurrer. Id. at 1108-10. In *199imposing a duty of reasonable care on the defendant, the court stated:
The public knows that it is dangerous to touch a live wire, but very few know that there exists danger of death from this powerful current by near approach to the wire so charged, without actually coming in contact with the wire. Only those who are engaged in the business, and those who have stood beside some inanimate form whose scorched and burned flesh bears mute evidence to its tremendous power, know this.
Id. at 1110. Our Court approved the Commission of Appeals’ holding and adopted its judgment.
Eight years later, in Johns v. Fort Worth Power & Light Co., 30 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Civ. App. — Fort Worth 1930, writ ref d), the court analyzed whether the attractive-nuisance doctrine applied to a fifteen-year-old boy who was electrocuted while climbing an electrical tower to retrieve a kite. The evidence in that case did not indicate whether the boy touched the wires or, like Billy, met his death by the obscure phenomenon of arcing. Johns, 30 S.W.2d at 551. Relying in part on McCoy, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s directed verdict for the defendant. Id. at 557. In concluding that the trial court had properly submitted the case to the jury, the court stated:
The fact [that] children had habitually played in the vicinity of and on this tower, and that such tower constitutes an attractive nuisance (see McCoy v. Tex. Power & Light Co. [Tex. Com.App.] 239 S.W. 1105), which was reasonably calculated to attract children to its vicinity, and had so attracted them for many years, was pleaded and sustained by the evidence. The tower was not only peculiarly attractive to boys of immature age by reason of its construction, but we think the fact that steps were placed thereon, so that boys could easily and conveniently climb it, made it more attractive, and we think that, under all the circumstances, the defendant should have anticipated that some boy would have climbed it, either for the purpose of extricating a kite, or for some other youthful purpose.
Id. This Court, by assigning Johns a “writ refused” notation, adopted the court of civil appeals’ opinion and judgment as its own. See Tex.R.App. P. 133(a).
The rule derived from McCoy and Johns is clear: as a matter of law, the attractive-nuisance doctrine imposes a duty on commercial electric companies to use reasonable care to protect a fourteen-year-old child from the dangers of electrical arcing. Nevertheless, the Court attempts to divert attention from these eases by concluding that, under Texas Power & Light Co. v. Burt, 104 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1937, writ ref'd), Billy need only have appreciated the general nature of electricity to be excluded from the doctrine’s protection. I disagree.
In Burt, the plaintiff, age eighteen at the time, climbed the defendant’s transmission tower to get a better view of the surrounding countryside. To reach the structure’s upper portion, the plaintiff climbed one of two “ladders” made from steel spikes attached to corner posts. The ladders did not begin at ground level but about fourteen feet above it. Burt, 104 S.W.2d at 942. While descending the tower, the plaintiff passed within thirty inches of a power line, at which time he received a non-fatal shock without touching the wire. The plaintiff sued the defendant power company under an attractive-nuisance theory. A jury awarded damages, and the trial court rendered judgment on the verdict. Id. Without citing McCoy or Johns, the court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant. The appellate court’s opinion turns on two holdings: (1) that the tower was not attractive to children; and (2) that “the injured boy was not of such tender age as to bring him within the attractive nuisance doctrine.” Id. at 943.
Based on factual distinctions, the Burt court’s first holding is inapposite. There, the plaintiff climbed the first fourteen feet without a ladder or other similar means, whether such means were intended to facilitate climbing or not. In refusing to apply the attractive-nuisance doctrine, the court “consider[ed] the manner in which this tower was constructed and the natural and apparent danger that would have to be overcome before one could reach the zone where he might *200be injured by the electric current.” Burt, 104 S.W.2d at 943. According to the summary judgment evidence in this case, Billy faced no similar obstacle in scaling the Texas Utilities tower. Children could climb it with ease from the ground up, despite a barbed-wire barrier. Because of these factual differences, the Burt court’s conclusion that the tower was not attractive to children does not govern here. The basic rule of McCoy and Johns still applies.
In its second holding, the Burt court merely refused to apply the attractive-nuisance doctrine to a person eighteen years of age. Importantly, the court did not rely on an arbitrary age limit in reaching its conclusion. See Burt, 104 S.W.2d at 943. Whether correct or not, the court’s resolution of the age issue was essential to its judgment. But it does not affect the outcome here because Billy was only fourteen years old when he died.
Thus, while Burt is a “writ refused” case, it does hot overrule McCoy and Johns, as it can be read consistently with them. Burt does not hold, as the Court suggests, that the attractive-nuisance doctrine does not apply “to a young person injured by electrical arcing who realized the risk of being near electrical wires, even if he was not aware of arcing.” 947 S.W.2d 195.
The Court also attempts to distinguish McCoy and Johns based on what it says are three “critical” facts. In both of those cases, (1) a “ladder” made of foot pegs attached to a corner post extended from the ground to the top of the structure, (2) no warning signs were posted at the tower’s base, and (3) no barricade inhibited access to the area near the power lines. These facts are not essential to a determination that an electrical tower is an attractive nuisance.
Although the Texas Utilities tower did not have a ladder similar to the foot pegs found in McCoy and Johns, it was constructed in such a manner that children could easily climb it. See supra Figure 1. David Cougha-nor, Billy’s cousin, testified by affidavit that the tower was as “easy [to climb] as monkey bars_■ That’s basically what [the tower] was to all the kids around there, a jungle gym.” By scaling up the criss-crossed support beams, Billy was able to climb the tower as easily as if a ladder had been there.
Moreover, the Court’s emphasis on the warning sign posted on one corner of the tower is misleading. According to the summary judgment record, the sign was located in back of the tower and away from most foot traffic. As Figure 2 indicates, it was much smaller and harder to read than the Court’s large, boldface depiction implies. With a total size of three by ten inches, the sign was not much larger than a dollar bill (as Figure 2 shows), and the warning portion itself was much smaller. Even still, as the Court acknowledges, parts of the sign were illegible, as its print was faded. The sign’s gray background was the same color as the tower, making it even less noticeable. The sign warned only that the wires were heavily electrified. It did not warn that danger existed whether or not one touched the wires.
Furthermore, even though Texas Utilities had installed a steel and barbed-wire “barricade” on the tower, this device did not significantly hinder the neighborhood children who desired to climb above it. Coughanor testified that at least two ways of maneuvering around the barricade existed. The barbed wire holding the barricade together was loose from children doing just that. Tim-mons’s expert testified that the guard was insufficient to accomplish its intended purpose. The expert also declared that a proper barricade would have prevented Billy and other children from scaling the tower.
Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to Timmons, the summary judgment evidence shows that the tower’s construction and the ease with which it could be climbed made the structure particularly attractive to children. See Johns, 30 S.W.2d at 557. The factual distinctions the Court emphasizes make no meaningful difference for attractive-nuisance purposes. Without question, electrical arcing is a latent danger of which, even today, few people are aware.1 See Massie, 233 *201S.W.2d at 454; McCoy, 239 S.W. at 1110. The focus in McCoy and Johns was on the dangerousness and deceptiveness of electrical arcing as seen through the eyes of a fourteen-year-old boy, not on the physical characteristics of the towers at issue. I am not convinced that these minor differences justify the Court’s departure from established precedent.
C
In 1948, this Court adopted the version of the attractive-nuisance doctrine articulated in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts. See Banker, 208 S.W.2d at 847. Since then, our Court has decided only two attractive-nuisance cases under the Restatement rule. See Eaton v. R.B. George Invs., Inc., 152 Tex. 523, 260 S.W.2d 587, 589 (1953); Massie, 233 S.W.2d at 451-52. None of these three cases involve facts similar to those before us today.
Texas Utilities’ principal argument and the Court’s opinion each focus on the Restatement’s third element: whether Billy, because of his youth, did “not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in in-termeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it.” See Restatement (Seoond) of Torts § 339 (1965); Banker, 208 S.W.2d at 847. Supported by its inaccurate characterization of McCoy and Johns, the Court determines that the Restatement precludes application of the attractive-nuisance doctrine .under the facts of this case. I disagree.
In large part, our Court adopted section 339 to prevent defendants from escaping liability in attractive-nuisance cases simply by establishing that an artificial condition or instrumentality was not unusually attractive to children. See Eaton, 260 S.W.2d at 589. While Banker also clarified the elements of proof in an attractive-nuisance case, nowhere in that opinion or in our two related writings since then did we express an intention to limit recovery in a manner inconsistent with existing common law. To accept the Court’s position in the instant case, however, one must conclude that Banker overruled our previous determination that a fourteen-year-old child may recover when a utility company fails to use reasonable care to protect him from the dangers of electrical arcing. See McCoy, 239 S.W. at 1110; Johns, 30 S.W.2d at 557. A close reading of the Banker opinion shows that we did not do so. Immediately after adopting the Restatement, we cited McCoy as authority for overruling the petitioner’s points of error. See Banker, 208 S.W.2d at 847. By relying on McCoy, Banker reaffirmed its holding. Therefore, the McCoy/Johns rule should remain intact today.
Ill
As a matter of law, the attractive-nuisance doctrine applies to this case. Based upon Billy’s age, intellectual capacity, and mental development, as well as the fact that electrical arcing is a serious, hidden danger of which most people are unaware, Texas Utilities failed to conclusively establish that Billy appreciated the risk involved in going near the power lines. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Accordingly, I dissent.
. While most persons, including children, know that electricity is dangerous, very few people outside the trade know about the arcing phenomenon. While certainly not dispositive or scienti*201fic, an informal survey of our Court and its personnel confirmed my suspicion that very few people know about this phenomenon. I am not prepared to hold as a matter of law that the general public, much less a youngster with diminished mental capacity, is aware that just being close to electrical power lines can result in serious injury or death. See Klingensmith v. Scioto Valley Traction Co., 18 Ohio App. 290 (1924) (stating that, “if the dead boy knew of the possibility that disruptive discharges from high-voltage wires such as those upon the tower might cause death without contact with the wires, then he knew more of the qualities of electricity than any member of the court prior to the information obtained in [this] case”), in Comment Note, Age and Mentality of Child as Affecting Application of Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 16 A.L.R.3d 25, 100 (1967).