concurring.
In this case, applicant presents various challenges to the constitutionality of Article 11.071, V.A.C.C.P.1 I join the Court’s opinion *222rejecting these challenges with the understanding that the Court effectively holds that Article 11.071 contains the exclusive procedures for the exercise of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction under Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution, to grant habeas corpus relief to an applicant seeking relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death. I write separately to more fully address the contentions contained in the briefs that were filed in this case.
Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in March 1985. This Court affirmed applicant’s conviction and death sentence in September 1989, and the United States Supreme Court denied applicant’s petition for writ of certiorari in May 1990. Davis v. State, 782 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940, 110 S.Ct. 2193, 109 L.Ed.2d 520 (1990).
In June 1990, applicant filed his first application for state habeas corpus relief in this Court under former Article 11.07, Y.A.C.C.P.2 This Court denied habeas corpus relief in June 1992.
In September 1992, applicant sought federal habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. In November 1993, this federal district court conditionally granted applicant relief from his death sentence. In April 1995, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the federal district court and reinstated applicant’s death sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied applicant’s petition for writ of certiorari in November 1995. Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 525, 133 L.Ed.2d 432 (1995).
In December 1995, applicant filed his second application for state habeas corpus relief in this Court. In January 1996, this Court filed and set this case for submission to address applicant’s constitutional challenges to Article 11.071.
I
I set out a brief overview of Article 11.071. The 1995 Legislature added Article 11.071 and made it effective September 1, 1995.3 Article 11.071 sets out the procedures for the filing of all original habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases in which conviction occurred after September 1, 1995. See Article 11.071, Section 4(a), V.A.C.C.P. Article 11.071, Section 4(a), also sets out the procedures for the filing of an original habeas corpus application by an applicant “who was convicted before September 1,1995, does not have an original application for a writ of habeas corpus under [former] Article 11.07 pending on September 1, 1995, and has not previously filed an application under [former] Article 11.07.” (Emphasis Supplied).
Article 11.071, Section 4(a), sets out when an original habeas corpus application is considered timely filed. If an applicant has previously filed a habeas corpus application, or if an applicant has not timely filed an original habeas corpus application under Article 11.071, Section 4(a), an applicant must establish one of the exceptions contained in Article 11.071, Section 5(a), to permit this Court to consider the merits of a successive habeas corpus petition or the merits of an untimely filed original habeas corpus petition. See Article 11.071, Sections 5(a)(1), (2), (3). The only exception to this is a successive habeas corpus petition “pending on September 1, 1995.” See Article 11.071, Section 4(a) (sets out when an original habeas corpus petition must be filed for an applicant who “does not have an original application for a writ of habeas corpus under [former] Article 11.07 pending on September 1,1995, and has not previously filed an application under [former] Article 11.07”).
The 1995 Legislature also amended Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., to set out the habeas corpus procedures when an applicant “seeks [habeas corpus] relief from a felony judg-*223merit imposing a penalty other than death.” See Article 11.07, Section 1, V.A.C.C.P.4 Pri- or to September 1,1995, former Article 11.07 set out the procedures for the filing of habe-as corpus petitions in death penalty and non-death penalty cases.
II
Applicant argues Article 11.071 violates the separation of powers provisions of Article 2, Section 1, of the Texas Constitution. He claims Article 11.071 infringes “upon the inherent judicial powers of the Court of Criminal Appeals” to exercise its original habeas corpus jurisdiction by making Article 11.071 the exclusive means by which this Court may exercise that jurisdiction in death penalty cases. (Emphasis in Applicant’s brief). This is one of applicant’s main contentions under his separation of powers arguments.
The analysis begins with an examination of the constitutional grant of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction to “issue” writs of habeas corpus. Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution, in relevant part, provides:
“Subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, _” (Emphasis Supplied).
Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution, expressly empowers the Legislature to regulate the exercise of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction. And that is what Article 11.071 does when an applicant invokes this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction in death penalty cases. See Ex parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex.Cr. App.1987) (Teague, J., dissenting):
“[Former] Arts. 11.06 and 11.07, Secs. 1 and 2, V.A.C.C.P., are procedural rules governing the exercise of original habeas corpus jurisdiction by this Court, the district courts, and the county courts. They are not a grant of statutory authority distinct from it. (Footnote Omitted). Original jurisdiction is to be distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, not from the statutes intended to regulate the exercise of it. All of our habeas corpus cases, other than those which have come to us on direct appeal from the refusal of another court to grant relief or by discretionary review, invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court, the exercise of which is regulated in part by the provisions of [former] Chapter 11, V.A.C.C.P.” (Emphasis Supplied).
It is clear that since at least 1978 “the Legislature may limit by statute the exercise of this Court’s power to determine issues raised by petition for writ of habeas corpus.” See Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 361 (Teague, J., dissenting) (discussing the 1977 and 1978 amendments to Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution, expressly empowering the Legislature to do this). And, the Legislature clearly has intended for Article 11.071 to provide the exclusive means by which this Court may exercise its original habeas corpus jurisdiction in death penalty cases. See Article 11.071, Section 1. Any other construction of Article 11.071 would defeat its clear legislative intent of reducing the delays between conviction and execution of sentence in death penalty cases.
The reader might note that this Court’s 1967 opinion in Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), suggests former Article 11.07 provided this Court with “statutory” habeas corpus jurisdiction distinct from this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction set out in Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution. But see Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 362 fn. 16 (Teague, J., dissenting) (this statement has no precedent in the case law of Texas). Although this arguably was true when Young was decided in 1967, since at least 1978 this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction has been subject to regulation by the Legislature and former Article 11.07 was a valid regulation of that jurisdiction in death penalty cases. See Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 360-62 (Teague, J., dissenting). Moreover, this Court never departed from the procedures set out in former Article 11.07 in exercising its original habeas corpus jurisdiction in death penalty cases.
*224Article 11.071 now contains the exclusive procedures for the exercise of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction in death penalty cases. See id. Since it is clear the Legislature intends for Article 11.071 to provide the exclusive procedures by which this Court may exercise its original habeas corpus jurisdiction in death penalty cases, Article 11.071 has effectively overruled Young at least with respect to granting habeas corpus relief to an applicant seeking relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death. Therefore, to this extent, Young is expressly overruled.
This discussion answers most of the contentions advanced under applicant’s separation of powers claim. Article 11.071 does not violate separation of powers principles because it is a valid legislative “regulation” of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction as permitted by the “plain” language of Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution.
Applicant also claims Article 11.071 violates separation of powers principles because it affects the “judiciary’s rights” to hear evidence, decide issues of fact raised by the pleadings, decide relevant questions of law, enter a final judgment on the facts and the law, and to execute a final judgment or sentence. See Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, 239-40 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (core judicial power embraces the power to do these things). Applicant seems to be arguing Article 11.071 unduly interferes “with the [core] judicial function under the guise of establishing rules of court.” See Armadillo Bail Bonds, 802 S.W.2d at 240-41 (Legislature may not unduly interfere with the judicial function pursuant to its constitutional power to establish “rules of court” under Article 5, Section 31, Tex. Const.); Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 255-68 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Legislature may not unduly interfere with the prosecutorial function pursuant to its constitutional power to establish “rules of court” under Article 5, Section 25, Tex. Const.).5
Article 11.071 does not interfere with “core judicial functions.” Article 11.071, Section 4(a), merely regulates the “means, manner, and mode” of an applicant’s assertion of his substantive right to seek habeas corpus relief in this Court. See Article 1, Section 12, Tex. Const, (providing that the writ of habeas corpus is a “writ of right”); Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 255 (pursuant to repealed Article 5, Section 25, Tex. Const.,6 Legislature has complete authority to pass any law regulating the means, manner and mode of the assertion of a defendant’s rights in court). Article 11.071, Section 4(a), does not tell this Court how to decide the substantive claims an applicant raises in a timely filed original habeas corpus application; Article 11.071, Section 4(a), merely regulates when those substantive claims must be raised. See Meshell, 739 S.W.2d at 255. Therefore, Article 11.071, Section 4(a), does not interfere with “core judicial functions.”
Moreover, pursuant to its constitutional power to “regulate” the exercise of this Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction under Article 5, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution, and pursuant to its general plenary power under Article 3, of the Texas Constitution, the Legislature also has not exceeded its authority in providing the “exceptions” contained in Article 11.071, Section 5(a), for successive writ applications and untimely filed original writ applications. See Meshell, 739 5.W.2d at 255 fn. 13 (Legislature has power to establish a new right under its general plenary power if that right does not infringe upon another department’s separate power). These “exceptions” do not tell this Court how to determine whether any of them apply in a particular case. See Armadillo Bail Bonds, 802 S.W.2d at 239-40. Therefore, the “exceptions” in Article 11.071, Section 5(a), do not interfere with “core judicial functions.”
Ill
Applicant also argues Article 11.071 is unconstitutional because it effectively “suspends” the writ of habeas corpus. Article 1, *225Section 12, of the Texas Constitution provides:
“The writ of habeas corpus is a writ of right, and shall never be suspended. The Legislature shall enact laws to render the remedy speedy and effectual.” (Emphasis Supplied).
Although the Legislature may validly “regulate” the exercise of this Court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction and enact laws “to render the remedy speedy and effectual,” it is clear the Legislature may not enact laws that “suspend” the writ. Article 11.071 does not “suspend” the writ. At common law this Court exercised its original habeas corpus jurisdiction to grant relief in very limited situations — those where illegalities rendered an inferior court’s judgment “void.” See Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 fn. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (at common law judgment of inferior courts could only be attacked by writ of habeas corpus for such illegalities as render them void); Ex parte McKay, 82 Tex.Crim. 221, 199 S.W. 637, 639 (1917) (ha-beas corpus relief is available against only a void order of a court); Ex parte Martinez, 66 Tex.Crim. 1, 145 S.W. 959, 963 (1912) (writ of habeas corpus lies to secure a release where the proceedings are absolutely void); Ex parte Branch, 36 Tex.Crim. 384, 37 S.W. 421 (1896) (writ of habeas corpus lies only where the judgment of conviction is absolutely void for want of jurisdiction in the court to act in the particular case); compare Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (under English common law, “which informed American courts’ understanding of the scope of the writ,” claims reviewable by the writ were limited).
Mostly because of “federal demands” on state courts, the Legislature since about 1967 has “reworked and expanded procedural requisites” which have greatly expanded an applicant’s opportunity to obtain habeas corpus relief than what formerly existed at common law. See Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at 812-13 (constitutional provisions guarantee availability of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to legislative enactments designed to enable an applicant to make a collateral attack and to obtain relief against a final judgment of conviction rendered void not only for reasons under common law but also for want of jurisdiction in the convicting court to enter it where conviction was had in violation of due process).7 So, it has not been uncommon for the Legislature to “enact laws to render the remedy speedy and effectual.” See id.
The most recent legislative effort in Article 11.071 does not eliminate in any substantive way an applicant’s opportunity to seek habe-as corpus relief than what existed under former law. See Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 362 (Teague, J., dissenting) (Legislature may not pass laws that make the writ unavailable to persons confined or restrained in their liberty or eliminate altogether the power of courts to employ it). Article 11.071 merely regulates when an applicant must seek this relief. Article 11.071 is a valid exercise of the Legislature’s power under Article 1, Section 12, of the Texas Constitution, to “enact laws to render the remedy speedy and effectual.” See Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at 812-13; Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 362 (Teague, J., dissenting); compare Felker, 518 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2340 (judgments about the proper scope of the writ are normally for Congress to make). Article 11.071 continues to provide an applicant a greater opportunity to obtain habeas corpus relief in death penalty cases than what existed at common law.
IV
Applicant also contends Article 11.071 violates the “retroactive laws” provision of Article 1, Section 16, of the Texas Constitution. Article 1, Section 16, of the Texas Constitution, provides:
“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.”
*226Under Article 11.071, Section 5(a), this Court may not consider the merits of a successive habeas corpus application that was not “pending on September 1, 1995” unless the applicant establishes one of the exceptions contained in Article 11.071, Section 5(a). One of these exceptions is that “the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely original application.” See Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1).8
Applicant argues the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a), violate the “retroactive laws” provision of Article 1, Section 16, by disturbing “vested and substantial” rights. The State argues this constitutional provision applies only to retroactive civil legislation. See Grimes v. State, 807 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). What the issue essentially boils down to is whether the Legislature may now bar an applicant from raising in a successive writ application a claim he had an opportunity but failed to raise in a prior writ application. See Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1).
As this Court did in Grimes, I will assume that Article 1, Section 16’s, prohibition against retroactive laws is applicable to criminal cases. See Grimes, 807 S.W.2d at 587. As this Court observed in’ Grimes, the retroactive laws provision in Article 1, Section 16, “has never been made applicable to statutes merely affecting matters of procedure which do not disturb vested, substantive rights.” See Grimes, 807 S.W.2d at 587 & at 590 (Baird, J., dissenting) (civil definition of “retroactive law”). As I have observed earlier, Article 11.071 is a statute “merely affecting matters of procedure.” Moreover, an applicant seeking habeas corpus relief from a death penalty has no vested right to “abuse” the writ by filing successive writ applications containing claims he had an opportunity to raise earlier. See, e.g., Ex parte Carr, 511 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (if petitioner has grounds which would justify granting habeas corpus relief, he should present them with dispatch for determination, rather than doling them out one-by-one in repeated attempts to have both the benefits of relief and the fleeting pleasures of harassing those who confine him).
Moreover, under former Article 11.07, this Court validly could have adopted and applied these procedural rules of “waiver” and “forfeiture” to successive writ applications containing claims an applicant had an opportunity to raise earlier under either this Court’s statutory power to adopt procedural rules or as a matter of common law.9 See Carr, 511 S.W.2d at 525; V.T.C.A., Texas Government Code, Section 22.108(a). This is because this Court validly could have determined the State’s (and society’s) valid and legitimate interest in the finality of an applicant’s conviction and death sentence outweigh the applicant’s interest in raising in a successive writ application a claim he had an opportunity to raise earlier. See Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring); Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 375-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d 76, 78-79 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Clinton, J., concurring). The successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a), for the most part are merely a legislative codification of the judicially created “abuse of the writ doctrine.” See Carr, 511 S.W.2d at 525; compare Felker, 518 U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2335 (doctrine of abuse of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions).
Moreover, that this Court may not have consistently applied these rules of “waiver” and “forfeiture” under prior law did not create a vested and substantive right for an *227applicant to file successive writ applications containing claims he could have raised earlier. See Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 261-61 (Tex.1981) (that which constitutes a mere expectancy based upon anticipated continuance of existing law is not a vested right); see also Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (Clinton, J., concurring) (another example of this Court’s ad hoc approach to the question of what issues will be entertained in collateral attack of a conviction suffering “no jurisdictional defect as to render it void”). The successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a), do not work a “grievous wrong,” and they do not violate the “retroactive laws” provision of Article 1, Section 16, of the Texas Constitution. Compare Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 687, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1721, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (historic meaning of habe-as corpus is to afford relief to those whom society has “grievously wronged”).
V
Applicant also contends his equal protection rights under Article 1, Section 3, of the Texas Constitution, and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are violated by disparate application of the successive writ provisions to capital and noncapital habeas corpus petitions. Compare Article 11.07, Section 4(a), V.A.C.C.P., with Article 11.071, Section 5(a). Applicant’s brief states:
“However, as we have previously seen, non-capital habeas corpus felony litigants in the State of Texas are not being ‘retroactively’ penalized for having previously filed post-conviction habeas corpus actions, whereas capital murder litigants are. (Citations Omitted).” (Emphasis in Applicant’s Brief).
Relying on Section 7(e) of the Amendatory Act,10 which makes the change in law made by the amendments to Article 11.07 applicable “to an application for writ of habeas corpus filed on or after” September 1, 1995, applicant further argues:
“In other words, while the statute does contain certain limitations even on non-capital habeas corpus applicants, those non-capital litigants are given notice, as of the effective date of the Act (9/1/95), that thereafter they will be limited to one application for writ of habeas corpus, whereas capital murder litigants’ previous habeas efforts are included within this ‘counting mechanism’, to render any applications filed after September 1,1995, to be limited in their scope for merit, which directly implicates the Petitioner’s case herein.” (Emphasis in Applicant’s Brief).
The State claims the successive writ provisions of Article 11.07, Section 4(a), do not “operate differently” from the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a). The State argues:
“In any event, there is no difference between the application of the successive writ provisions of Articles 11.07 and 11.071. After September 1, 1995, any successive writ, whether it challenges a capital or other felony conviction, is subject to virtually identical limitations. (Footnote Omitted). Section 7 of Senate Bill 440 states that the amendatory provisions relevant to Article 11.07 apply to an application filed after the effective date. Section 4 of Article 11.07 makes it clear that the successive writ provisions are applicable if the defendant has previously filed an action under 11.07. There is no provision for an applicant to file a second initial application before being subject to the successive writ provisions. This is precisely the manner in which the successive writ provisions apply to capital cases under Article 11.071.”
I agree with the State that the successive writ provisions of Articles 11.07 and 11.071 are “subject to virtually identical limitations.” Once a nondeath penalty applicant and a death penalty applicant become subject to the applicable successive writ provisions, they are treated “virtually identical.” Compare Article 11.07, Section 4(a), (successive writ provisions become applicable when “a subsequent writ of habeas corpus is filed after final disposition of an initial application”) with Article 11.071, Section 5(a), (successive writ provisions become applicable when “an original application for a writ of *228habeas corpus is untimely or if a subsequent application is filed after filing an original application”).
However, what applicant really seems to be complaining about is that nondeath penalty and death penalty applicants who have successive writ applications pending on September 1, 1995, are not subject to the applicable statutory successive writ provisions. Compare Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, Section 7(c), (change in law made by the 1995 amendments to Article 11.07 applies only to a writ application filed on or after September I, 1995, and a writ application filed before September 1, 1995, is covered by the law in effect when the application was filed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose) with Article 11.071, Section 4(a) (expressly applying to an applicant who does “not have an original application for a writ of habeas corpus under [former] Article 11.07 pending on September 1, 1995, and has not previously filed an application under [former] Article 11.07”). But, a death penalty applicant, like the one here, who files a successive writ application after September 1, 1995, is subject to the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a).
I understand applicant to be claiming that his equal protection rights are violated because nondeath penalty and death penalty applicants with successive writ applications pending on September 1, 1995, are treated differently from death penalty applicants who file successive writ applications after September 1, 1995. This Court has held that “differing procedures” to capital and noncapital litigants do not violate equal protection principles. See Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838, 847-48 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). Applicant also is treated the same as other death penalty and nondeath penalty litigants who file successive writ applications after September 1, 1995.
That applicant is treated differently from nondeath penalty and death penalty applicants with successive writ applications pending on September 1, 1995, does not implicate equal protection principles. Those applicants are governed by a separate statutory scheme than the one which governs applicant’s case. Applicant receives equal protection of the laws under the statutory scheme that applies to him. Applicant has failed to establish Article 11.071 has been unconstitutionally applied to him as he can make no threshold showing of disparate treatment between himself and other similarly situated death penalty and nondeath penalty applicants. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 363 (Tex. Cr.App.1995) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (when all similarly situated capital murder defendants are treated the same, there simply is no colorable equal protection claim).11
*229VI
Applicant also contends various provisions of Article 11.071 violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due course of law provisions of Article 1, Section 19, of the Texas Constitution. I, like the State, am not really able to discern applicant’s arguments under this point. I simply point out that an applicant has no “substantive due process” right to file successive writ applications, and that applicants, like the one here, have been on notice that successive writ applications could be dismissed for abuse of the writ. See Carr, 511 S.W.2d at 525. This sufficiently disposes of applicant’s due process and due course of law claims.
VII
Applicant contends the provisions of Article 11.071 violate Article 1, Section 10, of the Texas Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because “said law retroactively renders [applicant] without the ‘full and effective assistance of counsel’ during the first habeas corpus case.” Article 11.071, Section 2, V.A.C.C.P., provides for the appointment of “competent” counsel for an indigent applicant to file an original habeas corpus application in death penalty cases. Former Article 11.07 did not automatically provide for the appointment of counsel in such circumstances. Applicant argues:
“Since the statutes now provide for the absolute appointment for all capital murder defendants/habeas litigants, the Legislature has made the habeas corpus remedy a ‘critical stage ’ of the proceedings, which it clearly is, when a death penalty is involved. As such, the right to counsel now clearly attaches to such proceedings. Thus, counsel for these proceedings must be competent and ‘effective’, otherwise, the proceeding is constitutionally ‘tainted’.” (Citations Omitted). (Emphasis in Applicant’s Brief)
Applicant seems to be arguing that since the Legislature now provides for the appointment of counsel for indigent applicants to file an original habeas corpus application in death penalty cases, the failure to appoint counsel for him when he filed his original habeas corpus application violated his constitutional right to counsel.12 Indigent criminals have no constitutional right to the appointment of counsel to pursue state post-conviction relief. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2769, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). The “matter is one of legislative choice based on difficult policy considerations and the allocation of scarce legal resources.” Murray, 492 U.S. at 13, 109 S.Ct. at 2772 (O’Connor, J., concurring). We have rightly deferred to our Legislature on the matter presented here. See id. Since applicant was not constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel when he filed his original habeas corpus application, then the failure to appoint counsel to do so cannot form the basis of any claim asserting a violation of the constitutional right to counsel.
VIII
Applicant contends Article 11.071 violates the “open courts” provision of Article 1, Section 13, of the Texas Constitution, by denying a “full and fair ‘remedy’ for applicant’s new habeas claims.” The State claims the “open courts” provision is not applicable to criminal cases.
I will assume that Article 1, Section 13’s, “open courts” provision is applicable to criminal cases. See Grimes, 807 S.W.2d at 587. In order to prevail on his “open courts” claim, applicant must show, among other things, that his “right to bring a well-established common law cause of action” has been “effectively abrogated by the legislature.” See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex.1983). Applicant has not shown that filing successive writ applications is a well-established common law right. Moreover, the successive writ provisions of Article *23011.071, Section 5(a), provides an “exception” for “new habeas claims.” See Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1). Therefore, applicant’s “open courts” claim is without merit. Cf. Murray, 492 U.S. at 14, 109 S.Ct. at 2772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (as a matter of federal constitutional law, the requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways, and the intricacies and range of options are of sufficient complexity that state legislatures must be given wide discretion to select appropriate solutions).
IX
I now address what I perceive to be the main contention raised by the amici and applicant that I have not previously addressed in this concurring opinion. The contention is that Article 11.071’s procedural requirement that an applicant’s original habeas corpus application run almost parallel with the applicant’s direct appeal creates an unacceptable risk that an innocent person might be executed. See Article 11.071, Section 4(a). The claim is that this procedure and its possible effect amount to a “suspension” of the writ in violation of Article 1, Section 12, of the Texas Constitution.13
This claim must be considered in the light of all that has gone on before a death penalty applicant files an original application for ha-beas corpus relief. The federal constitution “does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.” See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399, 113 S.Ct. 853, 860, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). A conviction from a state criminal trial that complies with constitutionally required procedural safeguards is the most reliable indicator of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403-04 and 416-17, 113 S.Ct. at 862 and 869 (in state criminal proceedings the trial is the paramount event for determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence). And, it should be noted that applicant “is not innocent, in any sense of the word.” See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419, 113 S.Ct. at 870 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Davis, 782 S.W.2d at 219-20 (in March 1984 applicant murdered three children, one of whom he sexually assaulted, during a burglary).
In this country, criminal defendants are entitled to a multitude of strict procedural protections before the State may convict and insist upon execution of sentence. These rights include a presumption of innocence and the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398-99, 113 S.Ct. at 859-60. Other federal constitutional protections mostly of a procedural nature include the right to adequate notice of the charges to prepare a defense, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the right to compulsory process, the right to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the prosecution’s possession, and the right to a fair and public trial before a neutral tribunal. See id. The Eighth Amendment also “requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be' imposed.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405, 113 S.Ct. at 863.
In addition, the Sixth Amendment requires a State to provide counsel to an indigent capital defendant through trial and the first rounds of appeal as of right. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). This Sixth Amendment right to counsel also includes the right to “effective” assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). An indigent criminal defendant also is entitled to the appointment of experts in some situations. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). These important procedural rights are “unparalleled” in their contribution to the reliability and “fairness” of the fact-finding process especially in capital cases. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 420, 113 S.Ct. at 871 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent).
*231By the time a death penalty applicant exercises another important right afforded him by filing an original habeas corpus application, the presumption of innocence is gone and a presumption of the regularity and validity of the prior proceedings applies. See Murray, 492 U.S at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 2769 (contrasting the trial stage of a criminal proceeding with the appellate stage of a criminal proceeding). This applicant bears a heavy burden to establish his right to habeas corpus relief, and any “standard for deciding what claims to entertain in a collateral proceeding should be rigorous.” See Goodman, 816 S.W.2d at 387 (Clinton, J., concurring); cf. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399-401, 416-18, 113 S.Ct. at 860-61, 869.
Against this backdrop, it is not difficult for this Court to reject the contention that the filing requirements of Article 11.071, Section 4(a), create an unacceptable risk that an innocent person might be executed. The procedural protections attendant to trial greatly eliminate this risk. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 421-22, 113 S.Ct. at 871 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Article 11.071 also affords more protection than what the federal constitution requires by providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent applicant to file an original habeas corpus application. See Article 11.071, Section 2. And, Article 11.071 also provides “exceptions” to the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a). See Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1), (2), (3).14
Moreover, as I observed earlier, Article 11.071 does not eliminate in any substantive way an applicant’s opportunity to seek habe-as corpus relief than what existed under former law. See Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at 812 fn. 2. Article 11.071 does not make the writ unavailable to death penalty applicants or eliminate altogether the power of this Court to employ it. See Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 362 (Teague, J., dissenting). Therefore, we must defer to our Legislature on the contentions advanced here.
X
Having resolved applicant’s constitutional challenges to Article 11.071 adversely to him, it now becomes necessary to dispose of his application for habeas corpus relief. This is applicant’s second application for habeas corpus relief. It was filed in December 1995; therefore, the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5, apply. In the instant cause, applicant presents two claims upon which he challenges the validity of his conviction and death sentence. These claims are based upon the United States Supreme Court’s 1981 decisions in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). The application for habeas corpus relief fails to establish any of the “exceptions” contained in Article 11.071, Section 5(a). Therefore, I agree with the majority that our stay of execution ordered January 2, 1996, should be vacated, and the instant application should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ. See Article 11.071, Section 5(c), V.A.C.C.P.
With these comments, I join Judge Over-street’s opinion.
WHITE, MEYERS and KELLER, JJ., join this concurring opinion.. An amici curiae brief also has been filed by The Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, The Texas Civil Rights Project, and The Criminal Justice Clinic of St. Mary's University School of *222Law. They also claim Article 11.071 is unconstitutional.
. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., Ch. 722, p. 317, as amended by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., Ch. 659, Section 7, effective August 28, 1967, as amended by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., Ch. 465, Section 2, effective June 14, 1973, as amended by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., Ch. 789, Section 1, effective August 29, 1977, as amended by Acts 1979, 66th leg., Ch. 451, Section 1, effective September 1, 1979.
. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, Section 1.
. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, Section 5, effective September 1, 1995.
. Article 5, Section 25, of the Texas Constitution, was repealed in 1985 by Acts 1985, 69th leg., S.J.R. No. 14, Section 9, which was approved by the voters on November 5, 1985.
. See also Article 5, Section 31, of the Texas Constitution.
. When this Court decided Tuan Van Truong, some believed a conviction "had in violation of due process” rendered the conviction "void” by somehow depriving a trial court of its jurisdiction to convict. See Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d at 813-15 (Teague, J., dissenting) (this Court, following the federal lead, has made the writ available to correct errors arising from violation of federal (and perhaps state) constitutional law upon the rather vague theory that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to convict without due process of law).
. In light of this exception, this Court is not required to address the constitutionality of a law that would prohibit this Court from addressing the merits of a successive habeas corpus application containing a claim an applicant had no opportunity to raise in an “original” application.
. I also note the Legislature has withdrawn this Court's rulemaking authority "with respect to rules of appellate procedure relating to an application for a writ of habeas corpus, but only to the extent the rules conflict with a procedure under Article 11.071, Code of Criminal Procedure, as added by this Act, or Article 11.07, Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by this Act.” See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, Section 6.
. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, Section 7(c).
. X note the majority opinion in Dinkins held the defendant's “right to Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by prosecuting him under pre-amended art. 37.071. (Footnote Omitted).” Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 341-42. The majority reached this holding by concluding the jury was able to give effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence at trial. See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 342 (record did not suggest jury was unable to consider and give effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence “under the statutory punishment issues which applied at the time of his trial"). However, had the jury in Dinkins not been able to give effect to the defendant's mitigating evidence at trial, that would have constituted an Eighth Amendment violation and not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).
Moreover, even under the analytical approach the majority in Dinkins followed, applicant is not entitled to relief on his equal protection claim. It is clear we are not dealing with a legislative classification which implicates a "fundamental right” or singles out members of a "suspect class” for invidious discriminatory purposes. See Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 341-42. Criminals are not a "suspect class” and they have no "fundamental right” to file successive writ applications. See id.
Moreover, the Legislature rationally could have concluded death penalty applicants have been more likely than nondeath penalty applicants to have "abused” the writ. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the Legislature to make death penalty applicants who file successive writ applications after September 1, 1995, subject to the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a). That death penalty applicants with successive writ applications pending on September 1, 1995, are not subject to the successive writ provisions of Article 11.071, Section 5(a), does not violate equal protection principles as there is no indication of invidious discrimination against members of a "suspect class.” That this class of death penalty applicants may have received a legislative "break" does not establish invidious discrimination against death penalty applicants, like the one here, who file successive writ applications after September 1, 1995. All similarly *229situated death penalty applicants are treated equally.
. Applicant’s brief indicates he was represented by "pro bono” counsel when he filed his original habeas corpus application. This raises the question of applicant's standing to complain that Article 11.071 "retroactively renders [applicant] without the full and effective assistance of counsel during the first habeas corpus case.”
. Applicant’s original habeas corpus application under former Article 11.07 did not run almost parallel with his direct appeal, and he does not proclaim his innocence in this proceeding. This raises the question of his standing to assert this claim.
. The "exception” in Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1), apparently would permit this Court to consider the claim advanced in Herrera — i.e., a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. at 860. In Herrera, the United States Supreme Court left open the question of whether federal courts in federal habeas proceedings may entertain claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427, 113 S.Ct. at 874 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (the Court has no reason to pass on, and appropriately reserves, the question whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of actual innocence). In this respect, Article 11.071 may provide more protection than what the federal constitution provides. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427-28, 113 S.Ct. at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring) (there is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice for finding in the constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction). Of course, there is no claim before this Court asserting applicant's innocence based on newly discovered evidence. See Davis, 782 S.W.2d at 219-20.