This is a garnishment suit that was instituted by Ron Beall, as garnishor, against Tom Benson Chevrolet Company, as garnishee ancillary to a suit wherein garnishor obtained a judgment against Tom Amonett, as defendant. Ron Beall will be hereinafter referred to as garnishor, Tom Benson Chevrolet Company as Benson or garnishee, and Tom Amonett as defendant. The chronology of this case is as follows:
(1) August 30, 1976, a default judgment was rendered against defendant in the amount of $1,310.96 and costs;
(2) September 3, 1976, garnishor filed his application for writ of garnishment and writ of garnishment was served on Benson;
(3) September 8, 1976, defendant filed a motion for new trial;
(4) September 9, 1976, Benson paid defendant, doing business as “Auto Sheen Car Cleaning,” $2,186.50;
(5) September 24, 1976, Benson answered and denied that it was indebted to the defendant then or when the return was served;
(6) September 29, 1976, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for new trial;
(7) October 14, 1976, judgment was again rendered against defendant in favor of garnishor in the amount of $1,737.64 plus interest and costs;
(8) October 18, 1976, garnishor controverts garnishee’s answer;
(9) .May 10, 1977, judgment was entered for garnishor against garnishee in the amount of the first judgment with interest thereon from the date of the first judgment.
Benson had several contracts with defendant, Tom Amonett, doing business as Tom’s Make Ready and Tom’s Auto Cleaning, whereby defendant agreed to clean new cars for Benson prior to delivery. Upon receiving the writ of garnishment, the garnishee refused to do business with Tom Amonett doing business as Tom’s Make Ready or Tom’s Auto Cleaning. Defendant told Benson sometime in September that he had a new employer which was Auto Sheen Car Cleaning and that they would like to do business with Benson and there would be no problem because Benson would be paying the money to Auto Sheen and not to him, and thereafter, Benson did *859business with Auto Sheen, Amonett’s employer. The assumed name certificate of Auto Sheen Car Cleaning was introduced into evidence and showed that defendant was the sole owner of Auto Sheen Car Cleaning.
It is undisputed that both judgments involved were against Tom Amonett alone. The writ of garnishment mentions only Amonett and not Auto Sheen Car Cleaning.
We first consider garnishee’s points of error that there is no evidence and insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that garnishee knew or should have known that defendant was doing business under the assumed name of Auto Sheen Car Cleaning. We hold that under the evidence in this case, Benson, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, should have ascertained the type of business ■ and ownership with which it was dealing. Benson should have known that the debtor named in the writ of garnishment was the same as the creditor which it owed money. The trial court’s finding as to actual notice and knowledge are sufficiently supported by the record.
Benson’s other points of error assert that the garnishment judgment cannot stand for the reason that the garnishor did not have a judgment to support the garnishment judgment and that when the first judgment was set aside it destroyed the existence of the judgment on which the garnishment judgment was based. We agree.
It is apparent that the trial court has entered a judgment in this case against the garnishee, Tom Benson Chevrolet, based upon a judgment that has been set aside by the trial court. On May 10, 1977, the only judgment against the defendant was dated October 14, 1976. On this date, garnishee had no property in his possession belonging to defendant. On September 29, 1976, when the trial court granted the motion for new trial, the judgment of August 30,1976, no longer existed. Luck v. Hopkins, 92 Tex. 426, 49 S.W. 360 (1899); Turner v. Texas Sportservice, 312 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Tex.R.Civ.P., 329b (1978). In Turner, the court said at page 392, “When the Court on August 13, 1957, set aside the June 26th judgment, the status of the case was just the same as if the judgment had not been rendered . . .” The remedy of garnishment is summary and harsh and it follows that such proceedings cannot be sustained unless they are in strict conformity with statutory requirements. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937). Garnishment is but a mode of enforcing execution of a court’s judgment. Kelly v. Gibbs, 84 Tex. 143, 19 S.W. 380 (1892), 84 Tex. 143, 19 S.W. 563 (rehearing) (Tex.1892). In Kelly, our Supreme Court stated 19 S.W. at page 563:
It follows, therefore, that at any stage of the proceedings in garnishment he should have the right to show either that the judgment relied upon by the plaintiff to support his garnishment does not, in fact, exist, or that it is void.”
A judgment that is nonexistent will not support a garnishment judgment.
We need not discuss the second judgment as the garnishment was filed prior to the rendition of the second judgment and the court does not purport to base the garnishment judgment thereon.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and rendered that garnishor take nothing. Garnishee’s demand for compensation is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.