CONCURRING OPINION BY
Judge BROBSON.I agree with the majority that we should affirm the trial court in this case. I write separately, however, because I cannot embrace the entirety of the majority’s reasoning.
Specifically, I am wary of the portion of the majority’s analysis that relies so heavily on Section 1.6-601 (a) of the Northampton County Charter (Charter), which provides that “[t]he County Council shall act only by the adoption of an ordinance, resolution, budget, or motion.” (Emphasis added.) Based on this language, the majority concludes that Northampton County (County) regards a “budget” as separate and distinct from an “ordinance.” The majority then reasons that because the initiative power in Section 1.11-1101 of the Charter extends only to the enactment of “ordinances” and not a “budget,” an initiative can never “extend to the budget” and thus can never exceed the limitation on the initiative power contained in Section 1101(b) of the Charter. If the majority’s reasoning is correct, however, then the express language of Section 1101(b), limiting the power of referendum where it *557would “extend to the budget,” is unnecessary and becomes mere surplusage. Because such a construction violates a well-settled principle of statutory construction, I cannot agree with it. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 589 Pa. 437, 450, 909 A.2d 1224, 1232 (2006) (“The legislature ... is presumed not to intend any statutory language to exist as mere surplusage and, accordingly, courts must construe a statute so as to give effect to every word.”); see Patricca v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Pittsburgh, 527 Pa. 267, 590 A.2d 744 (1991) (holding that principles of Statutory Construction Act of 19721 are to be followed when construing local ordinance.)
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that the “extends to the budget” limitation to the initiative power in the Charter cannot reasonably be read as extending to ordinances that merely have an indirect impact on a County’s budget. While there is no precedent from this Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court directly on point, the interpretation by the Court of Appeals of Michigan of identical language in the City of Detroit Charter is persuasive:
As to a related claim that this initiative extends to the budget and is, therefore, improper under § 12-101 of the city charter, plaintiff has accurately noted the charter limitation. However, examination of Detroit v. Detroit City Clerk, 98 Mich.App. 136, 296 N.W.2d 207 (1980), leads us to agree with the construction of the limitation suggested therein, namely, the initiative does not extend to matters directly and substantially affecting the budget. Incidental or indirect impact on the budget could not be included within the limitation, because no ordinance could be said to be totally unrelated to and without some effect on a city’s budget. The rules governing construction of statutes, also govern construction of ordinances.... This Court will construe statutes, and therefore this ordinance, to avoid, not produce, the absurd result that virtually no ordinance could be initiated under § 12-101 of the city charter. This issue is without merit.
Settles v. Detroit City Clerk, 169 Mich.App. 797, 808, 427 N.W.2d 188, 193 (1988) (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court made findings to the effect that the initiative at issue, if passed, would at most have an indirect impact on the County’s budget. The trial court also made findings to the effect that the County’s efforts to sell or lease Grace-dale Nursing Home had not progressed to such a point that a transaction was a certainty or that the initiative, if passed, would impact any existing contract rights. Although the objectors dispute these findings by the trial court, and while there is arguably record evidence to support the objectors’ contrary view of the facts, there is also substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings. Based on the trial court’s findings that the proposed initiative will not have a direct and substantial impact on the County’s budget, the proposed initiative does not extend to the budget. I would therefore affirm the trial court on this basis.
Judge LEAVITT joins in this Concurring Opinion.
. 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.