dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that the attorney-client privilege applies with equal force to attorney-to-client communications as it does to client-to-attorney communications. Certainly a derivative privilege equally protects those attorney-to-client communications- containing client-to-attorney communication,1 but where the communication contains no information at all emanating from the client, and the eommuni*90cation is relevant to the legal rights at issue in a separate and distinct action, I would not find it covered by a blanket privilege.
Appellee Gillard was injured January 21,1997. He had paid premiums to appellants for $200,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. On the eve of arbitration, appellants offered full policy limits, having theretofore made no settlement offer at all. This delay led to the present suit, wherein Gillard alleges the seven-year refusal to honor the claim, followed by the 11th hour acknowledgment of full liability, shows a breach of the duty to act in good faith.
The pronouncement of my colleagues, certainly thoughtful and well-reasoned, would make privileged all communications from counsel to the client, regardless of content, even when no information from the client is revealed. Such an extension of the statute leads to an easily applied result, but I believe this is too broad. Suppose (whether true in this case or not, for we are announcing a rule of applicability beyond the present case), that counsel advised the client in year one that there was no legal basis for denying the underlying claim, or that there was no legal basis for delaying payment. Suppose the client replied that they did not care; they were not going to pay until they were made to do so. The reply is privileged, for all the significant policy reasons advanced herein by appellants and amici. But what is the salience of calling counsel’s original warning privileged? It does not protect any disclosures the client made, and it denies evidence to the finder of fact that bears significantly on the claim of bad faith.
One must assume the defense to the bad faith claim includes an assertion the failure to offer settlement was predicated, at least in part, on a belief that there was a legitimate legal basis for contesting payment. If counsel’s advice was to the contrary, can appellants still assert good faith while hiding this fact under a claim of privilege?
The attorney-client privilege is a limited evidentiary privilege, and privileges are exceptions to normal evidentiary concepts and rules:
*91Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that “ ‘the public ... has a right to every man’s evidence.’ ” As such, they must be strictly •construed and accepted “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”
Commonwealth v. Spetzer, 572 Pa. 17, 813 A.2d 707, 717 (2002) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980)) (internal citations omitted). Pennsylvania’s attorney-client privilege statute provides, “In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5928. Because § 5928 unambiguously applies the attorney-client privilege only to those communications made by the client, the attorney-client privilege cannot apply to communications made by the attorney. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).2
I acknowledge the arguments advanced for extending the attorney-client privilege to protect attorney-to-client communications. It may be that the Court should expand the attorney-client privilege by Rule, after publication and comment, but we have not done so. Alternatively, it may be appropriate for the *92General Assembly3 to consider these various policy concerns and craft an expansion of the privilege statute, if deemed appropriate. Accordingly, I must offer this dissent.
. The trial court conducted an in camera review of all relevant documents, and the documents now at issue do not contain information emanating from the client.
. Given the statute’s plain language, and the narrow construction given to evidentiary privileges, I cannot agree the General Assembly intended the attorney-client privilege to be broader than provided for in § 5928. The majority relies upon our statement that the attorney-client privilege is a " ‘broad privilege.’ " Majority Op., at 86, 15 A.3d at 57 (quoting In re Search Warrant B-21778, 513 Pa. 429, 521 A.2d 422, 428 (1987)). However, in Search Warrant B-21778, we also observed the privilege "provides security that the information and facts revealed by the client will not be seized and used by others to his or her detriment.” In re Search Warrant B-21778, at 428 (emphasis added). While the case holds the privilege is broad, it is broad in one direction only. Other*92wise, privileges are limited and must be strictly construed. Spetzer, at 717.
. We did not grant allocatur on the constitutionality of § 5928, or which branch of government had authority to delineate the attorney-client privilege; amici's arguments that the General Assembly lacked authority to enact the limited privilege set forth in § 5928 are not before us.