Opinion on Motion FOR ReheaRing
Opinion by:
PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice.The motion for rehearing filed by Feliciano and Sylvia Garcia (“Garcias”) is denied. We issue this supplemental opinion to address any misunderstanding in interpreting our earlier opinion. The reason for the reversal and remand of this case is based solely on our holding that the instruction set forth in section 110.31 of the Texas Pattern Jury-Charge (“PJC”) was requested and required, but not given.
The Garcias initially contend that our conclusion that Green Tree properly preserved the jury charge error was erroneous because we failed to read the entire record relating to the jury charge. We read the record, but in deference to the complaints raised by the Garcias, we have re-examined it. It reveals the following.
Green Tree requested PJC 110.31. Green Tree expressly referred to it by its correct number and complained that it was not in the charge. Green Tree said the boilerplate language contained in the charge regarding course and scope was inadequate. Green Tree correctly asserted: “This is not the proper instruction with regard to corporate liability for alleged exemplary damages.” The trial court then responded that counsel for Green Tree and counsel for the Garcias were talking about different things. The court noted that with respect to the corporate liability issue, “that’s for the punitive damages instruction to say that the corporation ratifying the acts, and all that language.” This comment by the trial court was an appropriate response to Green Tree’s request and was a short-hand rendition of PJC 110.31. There is only one instruction on punitive damages in this context: PJC 110.31. The court’s response in answer to Green Tree’s complaint about PJC 110.31 not being in the charge was partially in the words of PJC 110.31. It is unrealistic, given the context and words actually spoken, to imagine that the court did not understand Green Tree’s complaint and the instruction it was requesting.
Nevertheless, the instruction was not given. In response to the urging of the Garcias that there was already a finding that satisfied the predicate requirements, the trial court responded: “He is right.” We cannot agree — the instruction was necessary. The only remaining question with respect to the jury charge is whether Green Tree preserved the error.
“There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge, and that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling.” State Dept. of Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex.1992). Green Tree objected twice to the absence of an instruction on the predicate requirements for assessing punitive damages against a corporation. In its first objection, Green Tree expressly referenced PJC 110.31. The trial court’s statement that the punitive damages instruction would need to say “that the corporation ratifying the acts, and all that language” evidences its understanding of Green Tree’s objection. Later, in reviewing the punitive damages question, Green Tree raised a second objection “to the absence of any question which would make the corporate entity liable for the acts of the employee or agent, any predicate question with regard to that ... such as imputing liability or ratification, vice principal, anything like that.” Garcias’ counsel acknowledged that Green Tree was referring to PJC 110.31; however, Garcias’ counsel argued that the predicate requirement was conclusively established, and the trial court agreed.
Green Tree’s objections were timely and plain. Prom the trial court’s response, there *787is no doubt that the trial court understood the instruction Green Tree was requesting— “the corporation ratifying the acts, and all that language.” Concerning ourselves with common sense and not promoting form over substance, See Dallas Market Center Development Co. v. Liedeker, 958 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex.1997), we hold that Green Tree’s objections were sufficient to preserve the jury charge error.
The Garcias’ second complaint in their motion for rehearing relates to their argument that the evidence conclusively established the predicate requirements for assessing punitive damages against Green Tree. In response to this argument, we held: “Since the jury could have based its answer to the malice question on any of the wrongful acts listed in the liability questions, we would need to conclude that the evidence conclusively established a predicate requirement as to each of those wrongful acts in order to accept the Garcias’ reasoning.” The Garcias assert that we can uphold the punitive damages award even if the predicate requirement is conclusively established as to just one of the wrongful acts.
With regard to the “laundry list” of wrongful acts listed in jury question number one, our prior opinion explains the reason we cannot uphold the punitive damages award. Some of the wrongful acts in which the jury could have found Green Tree engaged under jury question number one would support a punitive damages award, while others would not. We have no discrete findings and no instruction, so we do not know which wrongful act or acts listed in question number one the jury might have used as the basis for its punitive damages award. Since the jury could have based its punitive damages award on a wrongful act that would not support such an award, we cannot uphold the punitive damages award.
The Garcias further assert that we could ignore the jury’s response to question number one and uphold the punitive damages award if we found the predicate requirement was conclusively established as to the wrongful act listed in jury question number two. However, the jury could only award punitive damages if it based the award on a wrongful act that was undertaken with malice and caused harm to the Garcias. The jury was instructed to answer jury question number seven regarding whether the Garcias were harmed as a result of malice if they answered any of the liability questions “yes.”1 Given the instructions, the jury could have found that the wrongful acts listed in jury question number one caused harm to the Garcias as a result of malice, but that the wrongful act listed in jury question number two did not cause harm to the Garcias as a result of malice. In such a case, the jury would have responded affirmatively to jury question number seven, but the wrongful act listed in jury question number two would not support the punitive damages award because the jury did not find that it caused harm to the Garci-as as a result of malice. Without separate findings as to whether each wrongful act caused harm to the Garcias as a result of malice, we cannot determine which action the jury found to be undertaken with malice to support the punitive damages award.
This court cannot uphold a jury verdict that is rendered without proper instructions. We cannot rely on a jury’s award of punitive damages if the jury is not given the proper rules for assessing such damages. Where the jury is not properly instructed, its verdict could be contrary to the law by which it must be guided. The jury was not given the necessary rules to guide it, and we cannot deter*788mine from the verdict that was reached whether the jury would have awarded punitive damages if it had been given the proper instruction.
This court’s decision does not “trivialize” the jury’s verdict. Nothing could be more important in the legal system. But a jury must be properly instructed so that they may properly assess the facts according to the law. Appellees’ motion for rehearing is denied.
. Jury question number seven provides:
If you have answered any of questions 1, 2, 3, or 4 "Yes", then answer Question 7; otherwise do not answer question 7.
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm to Feliciano and Sylvia Garcia resulted from malice?
Malice means
(a) A specific intent by Green Tree Financial to cause substantial injury to Feliciano and Sylvia Garcia; or
(b) An act or omission by Green Tree Financial, (I) which when viewed objectively from the standpoint of Green Tree Financial at the time of its occurrence involved an extreme ■ degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and (ii) of which Green Tree Financial had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others.