This appeal presents the issue of whether Act 155, Acts of Arkansas of 1979 is constitutional when tested against the mandate of the people prohibiting local and special legislation as found in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of Arkansas of 1874.
Appellee, as clerk of the Municipal Court, Criminal Division, of Little Rock, Arkansas, by her letter dated July 24, 1979 addressed to the Appellant, Board of Trustees of Municipal Judges and Clerks Fund, City of Little Rock, requested retirement benefits to be effective beginning July 28, 1979 pursuant to authority of the provisions of Act 155, Acts of Arkansas of 1979.
The record reflects that Appellee served as a nonuniform employee of the City of Little Rock from September 23, 1958 through December 5, 1969, and further, that she had been employed as a Municipal Court clerk for the Little Rock Municipal Court (Criminal Division) from December 8, 1969 through July 27, 1979, for a total employment of between 20 and 21 years. Appellant petitioned the Circuit Court of Pulaski County for Declaratory Judgment presenting the question of constitutionality of said Act 155, and Appellee filed a Cross-petition for the same relief. The Lower Court found and declared that the Appellee had served as a former Municipal Court clerk in excess of eight years and was employed as a nonuniform employee and Municipal Court clerk for a combined total of more than twenty years; that Act 155 relating to the courts and administration of justice was neither local nor special in nature, particularly where the Act applies to all officials in a general category; that there are municipal courts and municipal court clerks in Little Rock, North Little Rock, Jacksonville and Sherwood, all in Pulaski County which has a population of 150,000 or over; that the duties of municipal court clerks are necessary to the administration of justice or pertain or relate to the administration of justice; that Act 155 is constitutional and does not violate Amendment 14 of the Arkansas Constitution and that the Appellee was entitled to her retirement funds, together with interest on all accrued payments until received by her.
Appellant asserts that Act 155 is local and special legislation and violates the provisions of Amendment 14 to the Constitution of Arkansas.
We do not address the question of whether Act 155 is local legislation for the reason that we find the Act in question to be special legislation in violation of Amendment 14, and therefore reverse the Lower Court holding on this point.
Amendment 14 to the Constitution of Arkansas of 1874 provides:
“The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special act. This Amendment shall not prohibit the repeal of local or special acts.”
This Court has said:
“The language of the Amendment is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, disclosing the intention of the people in adopting it, and dispensing with the necessity of seeking other aids for its interpretation. The restrictive provisions of the Constitution on the legislative power relative to the passage of local or special legislation, leaving its exercise to the discretion of the Legislature, has been so disregarded and abused as to create an intolerable condition. Numerous measures were enacted in all sessions of the General Assembly, general in their terms and nature, and from the operation of which from one or more of the counties of the State were excepted, and this Amendment was adopted to remedy the evil, and the poiwer of the General Assembly to enact local or special legislation was withdrawn, the General Assembly being prohibited by its terms from passing any local or special Act.” Webb v. Adams, 180 Ark. 731, 23 S.W. 2d 617 (1929)
This Court has said many times:
“Legislation may be roughly classified as general, special or local. A general law is one that operates upon all counties, cities and towns alike. A law is special in a constitutional sense when by force of an inherent limitation it arbitrarily separates some person, place or thing from those upon which, but for such separation it would operate and a local law is one that applies to any subdivision or division of the state less than the whole.” Thomas v. Foust, 245 Ark. 948, 435 S.W. 2d 793 (1969)
It is a well known rule of this Court that statutes are presumed to be framed in accordance with the Constitution, and should not be held invalid for repugnance thereto unless such conflict is clear and unmistakable. Buzbee v. Hutton, 186 Ark. 134, 52 S.W. 2d 647 (1932). We therefore must determine whether Act 155 of 1979 is prohibited by Amendment 14 to the Constitution. Is it general or is it special or local?
Act 155, Acts of Arkansas of 1979, amended Subsection (b) of Section 4 of Act 19 of 1965, as amended, same being Arkansas Statutes § 22-944 and reads as follows:
“SECTION 1. Subsection (b) of Section 4 of Act 19 of 1965, as amended, the same being Arkansas Statute 22-944 (b), is hereby amended to read as follows:
‘(b) Hereafter, any Clerk of a Municipal Court to which this Act applies, appointed by the Judge or Judges of such Court, who shall attain the age of sixty (60) years and who shall have served in office as clerk for at least ten (10) years, or who shall attain the age of sixty-five (65) years and who shall have served in the office for at least eight (8) years, or any such clerk who shall have served in office for at least twenty (20) years, irrespective of age, and any such clerk who shall have served twenty (20) or more consecutive years, irrespective of age, as a city employee for the city in which he (she) clerks, with eight (8) or more of those years served in the office of Municipal Clerk, shall be eligible to receive retirement benefits provided by this Act, and if such clerk resign, retire from office, or be succeeded in office by another clerk, said clerk shall receive retirement pay for and during the remainder of his (her) natural life in an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the salary payable to him (her) at the time of resignation, retirement or succession in office.’ ”
An examination of the subsection of the Statute here involved as it existed prior to the passage of Act 155 reflected three classifications for municipal court clerks pertaining to eligibility for retirement, and they were as follows:
a) who shall attain the age of 60 years and who shall have served in office as clerk for at least 10 years; or,
b) who shall attain the age of 65 years and who shall have served in office for at least 8 years; or
c) any such clerk who shall have served in office for at least 20 years, irrespective of age.
Act 155 of 1979 added a fourth classification of eligibility for municipal court clerk retirement as follows:
Any such clerk who shall have served 20 or more consecutive years, irrespective of age, as a city employee for the City in which he (she) clerks, with eight (8) or more of those years served in the office of Municipal Clerk.
Act 155 creates four separate and distinct classifications prescribing eligibility for retirement of municipal court clerks in cities and towns situated in counties of more than 150,000 population, which at the time of its passage included only Pulaski County, Arkansas. Can it be said that all municipal court clerks within Pulaski County are treated equally under the provisions of the four separate classifications? Are these classifications reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation, or are such classifications arbitrary and unreasonable? To ask the question of whether all such clerks are treated equally under these separate classifications is to answer it. Clearly they are not, and there can be no rational reason in support of a contrary conclusion. The fourth classification provided by Act 155 was apparently intended to separate the Appellee from other municipal court clerks in Pulaski County. Further, the Appellee herself was convinced that the Act was specifically enacted to make her eligible for immediate retirement benefits. We note her letter requesting retirement dated July 24, 1979, where she states:
“You will find attached a copy of my bill.”
All municipal court clerks in Pulaski County, and in all other counties of the State for that matter, have the same duties, authority and responsibility, functioning as a distinct essential arm of their respective courts, and while this Court has held that legislation pertaining to the judiciary, though dealing differently among counties and courts, is general as opposed to local or special for the reason that the judicial system for the State is an entity in and of itself, whole and not separate, nevertheless this Court has also held that even in dealing with the judiciary, all which should fall equally within a classification must be included and not separated out as in the case of Act 155. See Beaumont v. Adkisson, 267 Ark. 511, 593 S.W. 2d 11 (1980).
The people have spoken clearly in the passage of Amendment 14. It contains no exceptions. To allow exceptions is to do damage to that amendment by allowing the erosion of the particular exception to destroy the very substantive law.
Reversed.
Holt and Purtle, JJ., not participating. Hickman, J., and Special Justice Jim Burnett concur. Adkisson, C.J., and Dudley, J., dissent.