On Rehearing
HUGHES, Justice.The only point in appellant’s Motion for Rehearing requiring discussion is his contention, that the letter of April 2, 1946, is sufficient as a written instrument under Section (7) of the Trust Act.
It is. our opinion that this writing is inadequate because of insufficient description of the lands. A further statement from the record of undisputed facts must be made in order to explain our conclusion-.
Appellant sued for 619.65 acres of land, more or, less, situated in Hidalgo County and described “as follows.” Here is set out separate descriptions of tracts, numbered one through fourteen.
The testimony of appellant’s witness Ridgeway shows that these fourteen tracts consist, of seven- noncontiguous and separate tracts of land some of which are separated from any other tract by a distance of several miles and some of which are on the Military. Highway and some of which are several miles from such highway and some of which are several miles from any tract located on such highway.
Referring to the letter of April 2, it is to be noted that only one tract is mentioned and that the county and survey in which the land lies is not given.
Conceding that extrinsic evidence is admissible to aid the description in' the letter such evidence must be consistent with the nucleus of the description there given or it is inadmissible. Davis v. Kirby Lumber. Co., Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 158 S.W.2d 888, writ ref. w. o. m.
The question , arises then as to whether the letter describing one tract can be aided by parol evidence showing , that fourteen, or at least seven, tracts were-in*233tended instead of one. We believe the question is answered adversely to appellant in Coffee v. Manly, Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 166 S.W.2d 377, writ ref., and in Clark v. Gregory, 87 Tex. 189, 27 S.W. 56. We quote from the opinion of Judge Gaines in the latter case: .
“Where the description.in a convey*-anee fits equally either of two things, and one is intended,• parol evidence as to which of the two was intended removes the ambiguity, and is therefore legitimate. The deed, in such á case, is sufficiently descriptive to convey the thing, and the parol testimony is ¡merely admissible in order to distinguish the thing conveyed. But when there are two tracts of land, to either of which the same description applies, and a deed purports to convey one of them by such description, and it is proposed to show, by parol testimony, not that the intention was to convey one, in particular, but that it was. to convey both, the offer is not to remove an imbiguity, and to identify a thing that has actually been conveyed, but it is to' enlarge the operation of the instrument, and to make it convey two tracts of lands, contrary to the expressed intention to convey one only. This is not evidence to explain a deed. It is simply evidence to add to its terms, and to make it convey more then it purports to convey. Parol evidence is not admissible for such a purpose, where the instrument comes collaterally in question.”
It is unnecessary to consider further shortcomings in the description in the letter. Such description ■ cannot be aided by the parol evidence in the record which is not only undisputed and conclusive but which is of such nature that it excludes the possibility of there ever being any admissible parol evidence to make up for the deficiency of description in the letter.
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is overruled.
Appellee has filed a motion in which he requests that we make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. We presume appellee means findings of undisputed facts ■and with this understanding we will comply with his request for additional fact findings except as otherwise indicated; "
Starr wrote, but never showed to Ripley, the following statement on the-bottom of Ripley’s letter of April 2, 1946. “When Ripley gives back the money he put in this deal then we are fifty-fifty on the above property, /s/ H. L. Starr.”
The second requested fact finding has been made in connection with our opinion overruling appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
When Starr was asked why he agreed to take title to the property in Ripley’s name he testified:
“Q. It is a fact, is it not, that you then had añ unpaid judgment'against you? A. I think so.
“Q. Thát was the reason, was it? A. Could have been.
“Q. Could have been, Well, was it? A. That was one of the reasons, yes.”
Based on this testimony we are asked to find that “Starr caused title to the land in question to be conveyed to Ripley with the .intent to hinder or delay a judgment creditor of Starr.”
We refuse to give conclusive' effect to the above testimony' of Starr as to his intent to hinder or delay his judgment creditor.
We have answered .appellees’ first requested conclusion of law in overruling appellant’s Motion for Rehearing and decline to make the second because of our refusal to make the f.act finding above indicated.
Appellánt’s Motion for Rehearing overruled.
Appellees’ motion for additional findings of undisputed facts and conclusions of law granted in part and in part overruled.