concurring.
The Constitution of Texas requires every district court to “conduct its proceedings at the county seat of the county in which the case is pending, except as otherwise provided by law.” Art. V, § 7. In the instant cause, the district judge did not do so or, at least, he did not conduct all of his court’s proceedings at the county seat. Rather, in order to receive the testimony of a seriously injured witness who was not expected to live long, the court convened for a short time in a different city of the county.
In order to affirm appellant’s conviction in this cause, we might construe the phrase “its proceedings” to mean “most of its proceedings,” in which event the court’s conduct would plainly not have been in violation of the Constitution. We might accomplish a like result by holding that the constitutional exception for events “otherwise provided by law” confers authority on the district judge to make exceptions himself by judicial fiat. But either of these interpretations would be a gross distortion of the plain constitutional language. Clearly, the provision in question here was meant, for whatever reason, to forbid exactly what happened in this case.
Nevertheless, Presiding Judge McCormick and his fellow dissenters maintain that the taking of testimony outside the county seat is provided for by the statute authorizing trial judges to “require that proceedings be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and control the proceedings so that justice is done.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 21.001(b). With all due respect, this argument is almost ludicrous. If it is Judge McCormick’s position that orderly and expeditious proceedings could not have been had in this case at the courthouse or that it would have been impossible to do justice there, neither the law nor the record of trial in this *434ease remotely supports his conclusion. It is no wonder, therefore, that he makes no éffort to demonstrate the absence of other methods for securing the needed testimony or that employing them would have been disruptive or disorderly. The whole of his argument is an unabashed fictionalization of the statute law. Clearly, if the dissenters had their way, the constitutional mandate that cases be tried at the county seat would exist only at the pleasure of district judges, subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. This is such a patently false reading of the Constitution that I cannot subscribe to it, no matter how good the reasons may be for amending our statutes to permit what the trial judge did in this ease.
The plurality opinion is little better. For reasons which elude my understanding, this Court is prone to characterize any nonwaiva-ble requirement of the law as jurisdictional, with the invariable consequence that its opinions are more confusing than they need to be. Although the word “jurisdiction” has a broad meaning in common parlance, and is often used as a synonym for “authority” even in legal writing, it is traditionally considered in the law to identify a much more specific kind of power.
A court’s jurisdiction is comprised generally of its authority to render a particular kind of judgment (such as an order of commitment or a judgment for money damages) in some kinds of disputes (such as felony criminal prosecutions or personal injury lawsuits) between certain classes of persons (such as everyone present within the state or within a subdivision of the state). See Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Fairfield v. State, 610 S.W.2d 771, 779 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); El Paso v. Madero Development, 803 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1991). There are, of course, many other nonjurisdictional aspects of litigation in which the conduct of a court is controlled by law. Sometimes, when the court’s conduct violates one of these laws, especially a law which seems “mandatory” on its face, it is common to say that the court did not have authority to act as it did. But it is a mistake to say that the court was without jurisdiction in the matter.
If the problem were merely semantical, calling attention to it would be sniveling. But, whether defects of adjudication are considered jurisdictional has a profound effect on the treatment they receive in other contexts. The writ of habeas corpus, for example, is available to set aside a criminal conviction on the basis of any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings which led to it, no matter how remote in time. Apart from violations of the United States Constitution, and a few anomalies of Texas law, we do not permit the writ to attack anything else. Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Characterizing a defect as jurisdictional, therefore, automatically subjects all past cases in which it occurred to farther judicial review, and the convictions obtained in those eases to reversal. Indeed, because such convictions are absolutely void, courts may simply ignore them, even absent formal orders setting them aside. Hoang v. State, 872 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Plainly, calling something jurisdictional is not just a different way of .saying that a judge lacks authority to do it.
Thus, while I agree that the Texas Constitution requires trials in district court to be conducted at the county seat and that the requirement is systemic, not a waivable right of the parties, Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), I do not agree that proceedings held outside the county seat fall beyond the district court’s jurisdiction. I do believe, however, that such proceedings are voidable, and that they may be set aside on the basis of a complaint raised for the first time on appeal. In my view, for reasons substantially the same as those elaborated in the plurality opinion, the constitutional requirement that district court proceedings be held at the county seat is undoubtedly a systemic requirement. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.