ON appellant’s motion for rehearing.
DAVIDSON, Judge.Appellant insists that the charge of the trial court in defining the term, “negligence,” was so patently wrong as that the error could be pointed out by a proper exception to the charge.
The charge of the court, when read in connection with the special requested charges that were given, is susceptible of the construction that, in order to convict, the jury were required to find the existence of facts which would constitute negligence.
In addition, appellant’s guilt was required to be based upon a finding that the danger of causing death was “then and there obvious”; that the collision causing death was not the result *405of an unavoidable accident; and that the collision was not caused by the negligent act of the driver of the other automobile or by any person other than the appellant.
When the charge is viewed as a whole, we cannot agree with the appellant that his every right under the law was not fully protected before the jury.
The other matters arising have been examined again in the light of appellant’s insistence.
We remain convinced that a proper disposition was made originally. The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.