This is a suit brought by twenty landowners and the Town of Turrell, to enjoin the State Highway Commission from relocating a twelve-mile segment of U. S. Highway 61. At present this part of the highway extends northward from the City of Marion, passes through the unincorporated towns of Jericho and Clarkedale, and continues on to Turrell. The Commission has instituted condemnation proceedings to obtain a new right-of-way that will lie west of the existing highway and will by-pass Jericho, Clarkedale, and Turrell. The chancellor, after a hearing at which a number of witnesses testified, denied the temporary injunction sought by the plaintiffs. Three issues are presented by this appeal from the chancellor’s order.
I. It is contended that the Highway Commission cannot in any circumstances so reroute the highway as to by-pass Jericho, Clarkedale, and Turrell, since these three communities were shown on the map that the legislature adopted as the basic state highway system. Ark. Stats. 1947, § 76-501. We disagree. This section of the. statute authorizes the Commission “to make, from time to time, such necessary changes and additions to the roads designated as State Highways, as it may deem proper,” with a proviso that the Commission “shall not have authority to eliminate any part of the Highway System.” In construing a 1923 statute which was superseded by the present law, we held that the General Assembly had not prohibited changes in the system, however substantial, as long as a particular unit of the system was not eliminated as a whole. Bonds v. Wilson, 171 Ark. 328, 284 S. W. 24. In effect we said that a unit of the system consists of a fairly direct route that connects one terminus with another. Applying that reasoning to the case at bar, we are not willing to say that the section of U. S. Highway 61 now in question amounts to a unit in the system. One would hardly refer to Jericho and Clarkedale, two miles apart, as termini of a national highway that runs from New Orleans to the Canadian border. The Arkansas terminal points of this thoroughfare are its entrance into the State at the Tennessee border and its exit at the Missouri line as the road goes on its way to St. Louis. Under the ruling in the Bonds case the Commission’s action in moving a twelve-mile segment of tlie highway westward for about a mile does not have the effect of eliminating a unit in the highway system and is therefore permitted by the statute.
II. The second argument is that the condemnation is not for a public purpose, since the Commission seeks a right-of-way 250 feet in width and yet proposes to build in the immediate future a paved highway that will be only 24 feet wide. Most of the testimony heard by the chancellor was directed to this issue. For the landowners there was proof that even a four-lane highway may be built upon an easement not exceeding one hundred feet in breadth. But for the Commission there was convincing evidence that the course adopted will result both in public economy and in traffic safety.
The Commission’s testimony pretty well proves that on this section of Highway 61 there is already a need for four lanes of travel. The proof indicates that a four-lane thoroughfare is desirable when traffic exceeds 4,000 vehicles a day, and at present more than 5,000 cars and trucks travel daily on that part of Highway 61 that the Commission seeks to relocate. Even though the Commission’s existing commitment is to construct only a 24-foot two-lane highway, its plan for the future, when justified by available funds, is to build a second two-lane road, separated from the first by a parkway that will provide earth for the necessary fills and also promote the public safety by dividing the two arteries of traffic. By acquiring a sufficiently broad right-of-way in the first instance the Commission expects to avoid the expense that is incident to any attempt to enlarge a roadbed that has been hemmed in by the various commercial establishments that tend to spring up along the border of a public highway. It is evident that the present undertaking would not be necessary had the State taken a sufficiently wide easement when the road from Marion to Turrell was originally laid out. In these circumstances it is certainly permissible for the Commission to look ahead in its planning. “In determining whether the taking of property is necessary for public use not only the present demands of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future, may be considered.” Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U. S. 700, 67 L. Ed. 1186, 43 Sup. Ct. 689.
We need not detail the evidence that shows a 250-foot easement to be necessary, for the appellants shouldered a heavy burden of proof in attempting to persuade the courts to override the Commission’s judgment. Although we have suggested that the legislative determination of the necessity for the taking is conclusive on the judiciary, Sloan v. Lawrence County, 134 Ark. 121, 203 S. W. 260, the view now prevailing makes the legislative judgment subject to review in cases of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion. State Highway Com’n v. Saline County, 205 Ark. 860, 171 S. W. 2d 60. There being testimony by experienced engineers that a 250-foot right-of-way is needed in this instance, the chancellor was correct in holding, that the Commission’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
III. It is finally contended that the chancellor should have enjoined the Commission from proceeding further with an action it originally filed in the county court. The facts are that the Commission first petitioned the county court to provide a right-of-way, but that tribunal took no action on the petition within sixty days. Thereupon, as authorized by statute, the Commission filed condemnation proceedings in the circuit court. Ark. Stats., §§ 76-511 and 76-518; Ark. State Highway Com’n v. Pulaski County, 205 Ark. 395, 168 S. W. 2d 1098. We are not convinced that the continued pendency of the county court proceeding threatens in any way to visit a loss upon these appellants, but in any event the Commission’s election to proceed by eminent domain in the circuit court amounted to an abandonment of its earlier petition. There was no need for the chancellor to exercise his injunctive power to achieve a result that had already been attained by operation of law.
Affirmed.