Billy Leon Graham was employed by Turnage Employment Group, a temporary employment agency, and reported to a job site for a roofing job on June 13, 1995, at approximately 5:00 a.m. At 9:45 a.m., when the accident occurred, he was unrolling insulation and moving backwards on top of a building. He fell through an open part of the roof and landed on a concrete floor thirty feet below, breaking his wrist and injuring his back, spleen, and liver. At the hospital emergency room, a urine specimen was taken for drug testing. Laboratory reports revealed the presence of marijuana metabolites.
The administrative law judge awarded benefits to Mr. Graham after finding that he had overcome the presumption of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Repl. 1996) that his accident was substantially occasioned by the presence of illegal drugs. The Workers’ Compensation Commission reversed the award of benefits in a split decision. Mr. Graham now appeals, contending that 1) there was no substantial evidence to invoke the presumption, and the Commission abused its discretion by invoking the presumption; and 2) the Commission had no substantial basis to deny relief to appellant, and it abused its discretion by disbelieving his testimony and ignoring other evidence of record. The issues are identical to those raised in Brown v. Alabama Electric Co., 60 Ark. App. 138, 959 S.W.2d 753 (1998), which we also decide today. We affirm, addressing the issues as appellant presents them.
I. There was an absence of substantial evidence to invoke the presumption of Ark. Code Ann. § ii-9-t03(b)(iv), and the Commission abused its discretion by invoking the presumption.
A prima facie presumption existed under our prior workers’ compensation law that an injury did not result from intoxication of the injured employee. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-707(4) (1987). Act 796 of 1993 changed that presumption: Arkansas Code Annotated § ll-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Repl. 1996) now reads in pertinent part:
(B) “Compensable injury” does not include:
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(iv)(a) Injury where the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician’s orders.
(b) The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician’s orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician’s orders.
(c) Every employee is deemed by his performance of services to have impliedly consented to reasonable and responsible testing by properly trained medical or law enforcement personnel for the presence of any of the aforementioned substances in the employee’s body.
(d) An employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs utilized in contravention of the physician’s orders did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Repl. 1996).
The Commission referred to the statute above and wrote in its decision, “In the present claim, the evidence shows that marijuana was present in the Claimant at the time of the injury. Therefore, we begin with the assumption that the Claimant’s injury was substantially occasion [sic] by the drug.” Appellant presents the threshold issue of whether there was substantial evidence upon which the Commission could base the presumption that the injury was substantially occasioned by marijuana.
Evidence presented at the hearing included testimony of appellant and of Dr. Henry F. Simmons, Jr., a toxicologist and medical doctor who reviewed the laboratory testing report and testified by deposition. Appellant testified that he had smoked marijuana as a teenager and on an occasion seventeen days before the accident, but had not smoked between then and his accident. In cross-examination, he was questioned about statements in his deposition testimony, which had been recorded a month before the hearing; he acknowledged that he had responded both that he did not use illegal drugs and that he had smoked marijuana on May 27. He explained that his affirmative answers about “occasional use” were meant to refer to use of alcohol, not marijuana, and that he had been on pain killers when an insurance representative came to his home ten days after the accident to record his statement.
Dr. Henry Simmons testified that marijuana metabolites are the breakdown products that arise from the use of THC, tetra-hydro-cannabinol, which is the principal psychoactive ingredient in marijuana. He stated that the presence of marijuana metabolites in appellant’s urine was consistent with appellant’s either being impaired or not being impaired on the date the specimen was taken. Dr. Simmons stated his opinion, based upon laboratory testing and appellant’s statement that he had not used marijuana since seventeen days before his accident, that appellant would not have been acutely impaired by marijuana on the date of the accident.
Appellant contends that the urine testing did not meet the statutory requirements for “reasonable and responsible testing” by “properly trained medical or law enforcement personnel” as provided in Arkansas Code Annotated § ll-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(c). Appellant also contends that the presence of marijuana metabolites in his urine was not evidence of impairment due to the presence of marijuana and that, therefore, the presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs did not arise. See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b).
As we said today in Brown v. Alabama Electric Co., Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) (Repl. 1996) does not require that the Commission promulgate drug-testing procedures or specify particular types of tests to be used as a precondition to the intoxication presumption. The Arkansas General Assembly could have required testing that would show a certain level of illegal drugs, as they have required to invoke the presumption in D.W.I. cases, but they have not made such a requirement. The Commission has broad discretion with reference to admission of evidence, and its decision will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of its discretion. We find no abuse of discretion in the Commission’s considering the report on urine testing as evidence of the presence of drugs under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Repl. 1996). Neither do we find that there was an absence of substantial evidence for the Commission to invoke the presumption that appellant’s accident was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana.
II. The Commission had no substantial basis to deny relief to appellant, and the Commission abused its discretion when it disbelieved his testimony and ignored other evidence of record.
When a claim is denied because a claimant fails to show entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if a substantial basis for the denial of relief is displayed by the Commission’s opinion. Linthicum v. Mar-Bax Shirt Co., 23 Ark. App. 26, 741 S.W.2d 275 (1987). It is well established that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters exclusively within the province of the Commission. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh’s, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989). Furthermore, the Commission may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995).
In denying appellant’s claim, the Commission wrote as follows:
The claimant offered no credible evidence to refute the presumption and he gave contradictory and inconsistent testimony regarding his marijuana use. Therefore, after giving the claimant’s testimony the weight that it is entitled to receive, and based upon the testimony of Dr. Simmons, we find that the claimant has failed to rebut by a preponderance of the evidence the presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs.
Appellant takes issue with the Commission’s statement that he offered no credible evidence to refute the presumption that his accident was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana.
Appellant complains that the Commission’s treatment of testimony by his expert, Dr. Simmons, was highly selective and unfair. He notes that the Commission quoted the testimony about results of the drug test and mechanics of the accident being consistent with impairment, but that it did not mention the testimony about results also being consistent with no impairment and about the inability of any urine test to reveal when marijuana had been used or whether it had affected a person’s capacity to function. Appellant also complains that the Commission ignored the fact that his medical records never mentioned intoxication or the presence of THC. Finally, he complains that the Commission greatly exaggerated by characterizing his testimony as “replete with contradictions and inconsistencies,” when he testified that any contradictions were due to his pain medication and his confusion about the questioning. He points out that the Commission reversed the decision of the administrative law judge, who gave credence to his testimony.
We reiterate, as we have many times before, that when reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and uphold those findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. Roberson v. Waste Management, 58 Ark. App. 11, 944 S.W.2d 858 (1997). The issue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from that reached by the Commission or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the result in the Commission’s decision, we must affirm. Id. Moreover, this court reviews only the findings of the Commission and ignores those of the administrative law judge. Crawford v. Pace, 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996).
Here, the Commission based its decision on the evidence it found credible and of greater weight. We cannot conclude that the Commission’s decision failed to display a substantial basis for the denial of the claim.
Affirmed.
Bird, J., agrees. Arey, Crabtree, and Roaf, JJ., concur. Griffen, J., dissents.