joined by SPECTOR, Justice, dissenting.
Because the Court conducts an improper factual sufficiency review of the evidence supporting Presidio’s actual damages for Formosa’s fraud, I dissent.
I. LOST PROFITS
A. No Evidence Review
As the Court holds, the victim of common law fraud in the inducement can recover benefit-of-the bargain damages. This measure of damages allows recovery for lost profits. In reviewing damage awards for lost profits, this Court must conduct only a traditional no evidence review. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Management, 877 S.W.2d 276, 281 (Tex.1994) (holding that there was no evidence to prove reasonable certainty of lost profits); Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.1992) (holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove lost profits); Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (1938) (court determined that it could not decide, as a matter of law, that facts required judgment against plaintiffs lost profits claim).
We cannot weigh the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. See Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex.1992). It is only when reasonable minds cannot differ that evidence lacks probative force that it is “no evidence.” See Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983). Like all cases where this Court considers the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to support the lost profits finding, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 84.
B. The NatuRE of Lost Profits Evidence
Recovery of lost profits is allowed where a business relationship is established on the strength of a contract but is adversely effected by a contracting party’s misconduct under the contract. See Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 155 Tex. 179, 284 S.W.2d 340, 348 (1955). We have held that “recovery for lost profits does not require that the loss be susceptible of exact calculation.” Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 84. In fact, “[i]n their nature, profits are more or less conjectural or speculative.” Pace Corp., 284 S.W.2d at 348. Nevertheless, a party must prove lost profits by some competent evidence with “reason*53able certainty.” Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 84; Southwest Battery, 115 S.W.2d at 1098. To withstand no evidence review, “[a]t a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures, or data ... [and] [r]ecovery of lost profits must be predicated on one complete calculation.” See Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1994).
Before today, this Court had held that “[i]t is impossible to announce with exact certainty any rule measuring” a party’s lost profits. Southwest Battery, 115 S.W.2d at 1099. In fact, until today, this Court hastened to “sanction any one method for determining lost profits.” Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 85. Nevertheless, today the Court conducts an improper factual sufficiency review of Presidio’s lost profits evidence by weighing Presidio’s testimony against what the Court calls “the proper calculation” of lost profits. 960 S.W.2d at 50 (emphasis added). I would affirm the jury’s verdict because Presidio presented some evidence, by providing an objective and complete calculation, to support its loss with reasonable certainty. Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 84-85.
II. PRESIDIO’S LOST PROFITS EVIDENCE
A.Peesidio’s Witness
Bob Burnette has been Presidio’s president since its formation in 1984. Burnette has a bachelors degree and a masters degree in civil engineering. He is a licensed professional engineer in California and in Texas. Burnette has negotiated contracts for Presi-dio since 1984. The contracts have ranged from a quarter million dollars to two million dollars. Before bidding jobs for Presidio he participated in other large contract bids including one for a pipeline in Iran for over $100 million.
Burnette prepared Presidio’s bid package, in reliance on Formosa’s representations about the job, and negotiated the contract with Formosa’s representatives. During the project, Burnette dealt with Formosa about the contract’s terms and handled contract disputes for Presidio. At trial, Burnette testified as an expert.
B.Presidio’s Evidence
Based on his expertise and personal knowledge, Burnette testified about how he calculated Presidio’s lost profits caused by Formosa’s fraud. Specifically, Burnette testified that had Formosa truthfully represented the project’s details, Presidio would have bid about $1.3 million. Burnette calculated the $1.3 million bid by comparing his original estimated cost to Presidio’s actual cost to obtain a ratio, and then multiplying by the original bid. After deducting what Formosa paid Presidio, this results in a figure of $700,-000, which includes lost profits. The percentage of lost profits in the $1.3 million bid is identical to the percentage of estimated profit in the original bid that Formosa fraudulently induced. In other words, Burnette’s calculation multiplied Presidio’s actual bid, which included a specific profit margin, by a ratio comparing what it took to complete the job because of Formosa’s fraudulent scheme to what Presidio relied upon under the contract.
C.Application of Law to The Evidence
Of course, Burnette’s opinions are “hypothetical” and somewhat “speculative” — he didn’t expect Formosa to commit fraud when he bid the job and won the contract for Presidio.1 Moreover, as we have recognized, by their nature, lost profits are “more or less conjectural or speculative.” Pace Corp., 284 S.W.2d at 348. Indeed, just over three years ago, this Court reaffirmed the rule that the “reasonable certainty” requirement for proof of lost profits “is intended to be flexible enough to accommodate the myriad circumstances in which claims of lost profits arise.” Texas Instruments, 877 S.W.2d at 279.
Here, Burnette’s “hypothetical” calculation or “speculation”, as the Court calls it, was not “remote” or based on the “mere hope of *54success” or some “untried enterprise.” Texas Instruments, 877 S.W.2d at 279-80. Instead, Burnette based Ms calculation on Pre-sidio’s contract with Formosa, the contract’s built in profit margin, and Presidio’s actual cost to complete the contract given Formosa’s fraudulent conduct. Burnette’s calculation was objective and complete. See Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649. Presidio presented at least the “minimum” evidence to establish lost profits with reasonable certainty. See Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649. Accordingly, there is legally sufficient evidence to support the judgment for Presidio. The Court can only find otherwise by conducting a Constitutionally proMbited factual sufficiency review of Presidio’s evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
To hold as the Court does today, allows Formosa, a proven fraud feasor, to escape liability2 simply because Presidio cannot “prove a perfect measure of damages.” See Southwest Battery, 115 S.W.2d at 1099. Besides improperly weighing in on the facts and crunching the numbers to determine the “proper calculation” of damages, the Court also ignores its rule against sanctioning any one method for determining lost profits. See Holt Atherton, 835 S.W.2d at 85. An injured party, like Presidio, “must not be deprived of [its] remedy because of the difficulties lying in the way of proving [loss profits].” Pace Corp., 284 S.W.2d at 348.
Because Presidio provided some evidence, based on an objective and complete calculation with reasonable certainty, I would affirm the court of appeals’ judgment for Presidio.
BAKER, Justice,joined by SPECTOR, Justice, dissenting to Order Overruling Motions for Rehearing and Voluntary Remittitur.
Today the Court overrules Presidio’s motions for rehearing and voluntary remittitur. I respectfully dissent to the Court’s order. Studying the Court’s opinion again after it issued, I write to . say some things I wish I had said in my original dissent. I also write to discuss the merits of Presidio’s motions, wMch the Court overrules without comment.
I believe that the Court’s entire discussion of the damages and the conclusions the Court reaches are fundamentally flawed. First, the Court calculates Presidio’s damages based on the contract Presidio and Formosa actually made, rather than the contract they would have made but for Formosa’s fraudulent inducement. Second, although the Court recognizes that the correct criteria for measuring damages in a fraudulent inducement case is ‘Value,” the Court calculates the damages it concludes are available to Presidio based only on “costs.”
Fraud in the Inducement versus Breach of Contract
In tMs case the Court holds that a party may recover tort damages for fraudulent inducement irrespective of whether the fraudulent representations are later subsumed in a contract or whether the party oMy suffers an economic loss related to the contract’s subject matter. To allow recovery of tort fraud damages oMy when a plaintiff suffers an injury distinct from the economic losses recoverable under a breach of contract claim is inconsistent with tMs well established law. To so limit the recovery ignores the fact that an independent legal duty, separate from the contract’s existence, precludes the use of fraud to induce a binding agreement. 960 S.W.2d at 47.
The Court acknowledges that Texas recognizes two measures of direct damages for common-law fraud: (1) the out-of-pocket measure and the (2) benefit-of-the-bargain measure. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex.1997); W.O. Bankston Nissan, Inc. v. Walters, 754 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.1988). The Court recognizes that the out-of-pocket measure is the difference between the value paid and the value received while the benefit of the bargain measure is the difference between the value as represented and the value received. See Arthur Andersen, 945 *55S.W.2d at 817; Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.1984). The Court states that the out-of-pocket measure allows the injured party to recover the actual injury suffered measured by the difference between the value of that with which he has parted with, and the value of that which he received. See Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 817. The Court also concludes that while the benefit-of-the-bargain measure can include lost profits, it only compensates for the profits that would have been made if the bargain had been performed as promised.
Despite recognizing that fraudulent- inducement to enter a contract is a breach of an independent legal duty separate from the contract itself, the Court calculates both measures of damages based on Presidio’s damages as if the contract made had been performed as promised.
Costs v. Value
Presidio’s argument in its motion for rehearing is that the Court improperly computed damages based upon costs rather than value. See Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d at 373. Presidio contends that the way the Court calculated damages, Formosa does not have to pay the full ‘Value” of what Presidio furnished Formosa. Instead, Presidio asserts Formosa will receive what Presidio furnished at “cost.” Presidio contends that Presidio will not be paid the full value of what it. gave, and thus will not be made whole.
Formosa responds that Presidio’s theory is wrong because it measures the damages after the contract is complete by striking a completely new bargain. Formosa argues that the proper measure of damages is computed as of the time of the sale, or as in this ease at the point of contract. See Leyendecker, 683 S.W.2d at 372. Formosa contends that the policy underlying fraud law is to redress actual losses. See Morriss-Buick Co. v. Pondrom, 131 Tex. 98, 113 S.W.2d 889, 890 (1938).
It is true that damages in a fraudulent inducement case are computed as of the time of the fraud. In this case, at the point of contract. However, Formosa essentially adopts the Court’s rationale; therefore, Formosa’s arguments suffer from the same fundamental flaws as those of the Court. That is, the damage calculation should be based upon the contract actually made, rather than the contract the parties would have made but for Formosa’s fraudulent inducements.
Here, Presidio was entitled to show and did show the value of its loss based upon what actually happened because of Formosa’s fraudulent inducements when the parties made the contract. Taking the known facts when Presidio completed the project, and applying Presidio’s regular calculations of costs plus profit margin as of the time the parties negotiated the fraudulently induced contract, produces a damages result based upon objective facts, figures or data, and predicated on one complete calculation. See Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1994).
The Court’s new writing reinforces my view, as expressed in my original dissent, that the Court has engaged in an improper factual sufficiency review. Despite its protestations, the Court weighs the evidence, which it cannot do. See Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex.1992). The Court asserts that Presidio’s damage evidence was entirely speculative because there is no evidence that Presidio would have been awarded the project if it had made a 1.3 million dollar bid. The Court then states that the evidence indicates that Presidio would not have been awarded the project because two of the three other bids Formosa received were lower than 1.3 million. The Court concludes that Presidio’s evidence is not based on expenses incurred and profits lost on this contract because of Formosa’s representations, but rather is based upon an entirely hypothetical, speculative bargain that was never struck and would never have been consummated. If this is not weighing the evidence, I do not know what is.
VOLUNTARY REMITTITUR
Alternatively, Presidio asserts that it is entitled to a remittitur of the damages the Court found excessive. Because the Court did not affirm the court of appeal’s judgment, Presidio offers a voluntary remittitur of the amount of the actual fraud damages the *56Court found to be excessive. Presidio requests the court of appeals judgment be reformed and affirmed as reformed. Alternatively, Presidio requests the judgment be reformed and remanded to the court of appeals. Presidio argues that the Court, for many years, has accepted voluntary remitti-turs from plaintiffs. See Redman Homes, Inc. v. Ivy, 920 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex.1996).
Formosa responds that the Court should not grant Presidio a voluntaiy remittitur because that relief from error in awarding damages unsupported by legally sufficient evidence is unavailable through' the office of voluntary remittitur. Formosa relies on Redman Homes in support of its argument.
In Redman Homes, a unanimous Court recognized that the Court has accepted re-mittiturs from plaintiffs in the past. See Redman Homes, 920 S.W.2d at 669. In Red-man Homes, the Court also said that our decisions involving voluntary remittiturs are limited by the rule that this Court can consider only questions of law. The Court observed that the plaintiffs offer in Redman Homes presumed that the Court could conclusively ascertain from the record the amount of damages untainted by what the Ivys conceded was inadmissible testimony about market value. In Redman Homes the Court concluded it was unable to ascertain the damages untainted by inadmissible testimony. Redman Homes, 920 S.W.2d at 669. I submit that such is not the case here. First, in its response to Presidio’s request for voluntary remittitur, Formosa neglects to state, but Presidio points out that in Formosa’s application for writ of error to this Court, Formosa asserted: “Presidio’s actual damages are excessive as a matter of law to the extent they exceed $467,000. The minimum relief to which Formosa is entitled for that error is excision of the excess and rendition of judgment for only $467,000. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.1987).” In my view, asserting to this Court that the actual damages are excessive as a matter of law to the extent that they exceed $467,000 is an express concession that Presi-dio’s actual damages are proven as a matter of law in the amount of $467,000.
Be that as it may, the facts here are distinguishable from those in Redman Homes. Here, the Court could and did conclusively ascertain from the record the damages untainted by inadmissible testimony. The substance of the Court’s damages finding in this case is that Presidio’s evidence about profits it might have earned is inadmissible testimony because it is hypothetical and speculative. The Court held that Presidio’s damages testimony does support an out-of-pocket damage award of $231,000 or a benefit-of-the-bargain damage award of $461,000. What the Court concludes amounts to a conclusive finding of damages under either measure that the court holds is permissible for a fraud in the inducement claim. However, the Gourt declines to render judgment for Presidio for a lesser dollar amount because Formosa contests the damages issue.
Based upon the Court’s finding of specific damages under either measure of damages that applies in a fraudulent inducement ease, my question is what is there left to be tried? It seems to me that the Court has conclusively ascertained the damages untainted by what it holds is the inadmissible testimony and that Presidio’s offer of a voluntary remittance is entirely in order. See Redman Homes, 920 S.W.2d at 669; see also Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641; Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. White, 129 Tex. 659, 107 S.W.2d 360, 361 (1937); Baldwin v. Haskell Nat’l Bank, 104 Tex. 122, 134 S.W. 1178 (1911).
Conclusion
Based on my original dissent, I still believe that the Court erred in how it disposes of the damages issue. The Court should have affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment for Presidio. However, based upon the Court’s holding and Presidio’s motion for voluntary remittitur, Presidio is at least entitled to have the Court grant that remittitur. The Court should modify the court of appeals’ judgment to that extent and otherwise affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.
. The Court observes that if Presidio would have bid based on Burnette’s calculation, Presidio might not have won the contract in the first place. 960 S.W.2d 49. Maybe not. On the other hand. Presidio might not have wanted to bid on the contract to begin with if it had known about Formosa’s fraudulent scheme.
. Formosa not only escapes liability for actual damages, but also avoids a $10 million punitive damage verdict punishing Formosa for its fraud.