On Motion for Rehearing.
PER -CURIAM.Appellees have filed a motion for rehearing in which they contend that we erred in holding that appellant’s cause of action was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations, Art. 5529, R.C.S., because the deed executed by Mrs. M. J. Cox, appellant’s mother, on January 30, 1919, conveying her undivided one-half interest in the land to¿ appellant was immediately filed in the officelj of the county clerk of Henderson Countyll and recorded in the deed records. They! contend that the record of the deed was open to appellant for inspection, disclosed the extent of the estate conveyed to him by his mother and charged him with constructive notice -of its contents. They further contend that the record of the deed was sufficient to require appellant to make inquiry concerning its contents and that his failure to do so constituted negligence on his part and, therefore, his right to correction and reformation was barred four years after June 26, 1928, when he executed his deed conveying all of his interest in the land to Cager Cox.
As we stated in the original opinion, appellant contended and testified -he did not have actual knowledge of the deed executed by his mother in 1919 until sometime in the year 1947, and we are unable to agree with appellees in their contention that the record of the deed constituted constructive notice to him of its contents and of the fact *804that it had 'been executed. While Article 6646, R.C.S., purports to require that all persons be held to know what appears on the face of a duly recorded instrument, it is settled by numerous decisions of our courts that it carries notice of its contents only to tho.se who are bound to search for it, such as subsequent purchasers under the grantor in such an instrument. Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 216 S.W. 382; Herd v. Wade, Tex.Civ.App., 63 S.W.2d 253. Illustrative of this principle of law is a condition under which a grantor conveys the same property twice. If he should do so, the record of the deed to the second grantee is not constructive notice to the first grantee or to a purchaser from him for the reason that the first grantee already owns the land and he is not required to search the records every morning in order to, ascertain if something has happened that affects his interests or deprives him of his title. The object of all registration acts is to affect with notice only such persons as have reason to apprehend some transfer or incumbrance prior to their own, because none arising afterwards can affect them or their .estate in the land. The object of the recording acts is to protect innocent purchasers and incumbrancers against previous deeds, mortgages or the like, which are not recorded and to deprive the holder of prior unregistered conveyances or mortgages of the right which his priority would have given him under the common law. They are intended only to affect with notice such persons as-have reason to apprehend some transfer or incumbrance prior to their own, because none arising afterwards can affect them. White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 50 S.W. 564; Fidelity Lumber Co. v. Adams, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 177.
If appellant did not know anything about the deed his mother had executed and was in complete ignorance of her conveyance to him until the year 1947, he could not be charged with the duty of searching the deed records of Henderson County. He was not a conscious purchaser of the land and therefore did not come within the class of persons who are required to search the records or to whom the record of deeds give constructive notice of their existence and contents. One cannot be held to have constructive notice of facts from which the presumption of notice arises, such as the proper recording of a deed, who is wholly ignorant of those facts. A knowledge of them is a necessary influence of his conduct in reference to such matters. Williams v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 187 S.C. 103, 196 S.E. 519.
In regard to the second contention made by appellees, that the record of the deed was a sufficient circumstance to require appellant to investigate and search the records of Henderson County, the rule is well settled that the knowledge or information which can be urged as being sufficient to -require inquiry by such person must be directly related to the ultimate knowledge in question or the ultimate information he would gain .by such inquiry or investigation. The circumstances known to him must be. such as would reasonably suggest an inquiry. The rule imputes notice only of those facts which are naturally and reasonably connected with -the fact known by him, The testimony in this case was wholly lacking in proof of any circumstance or the happening of any event which would, in the remotest degree, suggest to appellant that his mother had conveyed her interest in the land to him in 1919 or that such a deed of conveyance had been filed in the office of the county clerk and appeared in the deed records of Henderson County.
We have carfully considered appellees’ motion for rehearing and find nothing in it which changes our. conclusions as expressed in the original opinion. The motion will, therefore, be overruled.