dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The rule requiring strict construction of criminal statutes is not to be applied inflexibly to override all other considerations. State v. Daugherty, 744 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Mo.App.1988).
While the use of the word “shall” in a statute will generally be interpreted as mandatory, such is not always the case. State v. Conz, 756 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Mo. App.1988). The general rule used to determine whether a statute is mandatory or directory is that when a statute provides what results shall follow a failure to comply with its terms, it is mandatory and must be obeyed; however, if it merely requires certain things to be done and nowhere prescribes results that follow, such a statute is merely directory. Id. (Citations omitted). Additionally, the paramount rule of statutory construction is the obligation to give effect to the lawmaker’s intent. Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. banc 1983).
Both Hampton and the State cite § 195.-140. This section, enacted prior to § 513.-607, likewise pertains to forfeiture, but allows the State to seize property and take no action for five years. Both parties agree that § 513.607 was intended by the legislature to supplement § 195.140. According to Hampton’s interpretation, the legislature intended the time periods of § 513.607.5(2) to be mandatory because the five year period provided by § 195.140 would result in unfairness, would be unconstitutional and would cause a denial of due process and property rights of the citizen. I find Hampton’s analysis unpersuasive.
Hampton argues that the language of § 513.612 provides a penalty for the failure to comply with § 513.607.5(2). While it is correct that § 513.612 allows a party to file a motion to dismiss, dismissal is not directed for failure to act within the periods prescribed by § 513.607.5(2).
Section 513.612 does not entitle a party to a dismissal. This section merely gives any party the option of filing a motion to dismiss on whatever grounds might be presented. Section 513.612 does not reference § 513.607.5(2) and merely allowing for the filing of a motion to dismiss can not be construed as a penalty for failure to comply with § 513.607.5(2).
If the option to file a motion to dismiss under § 513.612 is exercised, the court should have discretion to grant or deny the motion based upon the facts and circumstances presented. If noncompliance with the statutory time limits is not based upon bad faith or inexcusable neglect and considering the length of delay, together with all other relevant factors, if there is no prejudice to the defendant, it should be within the court’s discretion to deny the motion to dismiss.
When the legislature enacts a statute using terms which have had other judicial meanings attached to them, the legislature is presumed to have acted with knowledge of that judicial action. Citizens Electric Corp. v. Director of Department of Revenue, 766 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 1989). The legislature is presumed to have known that uses of the word “shall” without prescribing a result for failure to comply, was directory as opposed to mandatory.
When the court construes a statute, it does so in light of the purpose the legislature intended to accomplish and the evils it intended to cure. In Interest of A.M.B., 738 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Mo.App.1987). In this regard, the legislature is presumed to have intended a workable statutory scheme to provide for the forfeiture of property used in the course of, derived from or realized through criminal activity in its effort to *474deter criminals and protect law abiding citizens from criminal activities. Strict enforcement of the time limitations would not serve the obvious legislative objective.
In the Missouri case relied on most directly by the majority opinion, State ex rel. Reid v. Kemp, 574 S.W.2d 695 (Mo.App. 1978), the court was addressing the forfeiture of property of innocent persons whose property had been used by another in the commission of a crime. I do not find Kemp or the cases cited by the majority from other states to be controlling in the case at bar.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.