dissenting. I dissent.
This court’s distaste for the tort of outrage results in a majority opinion that blatantly ignores our firmly established, deferential standard of review in sufficiency of the evidence cases. It is a well-settled rule that this court will affirm sufficiency of the evidence cases “if there is any substantial evidence to support a jury’s verdict, . . . .” Boyd v. Reddick, 264 Ark. 671, 675, 573 S.W.2d 634, 637 (1978). (Emphasis supplied.) In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we have stated that we will rely on two crucial principles to avoid invading the province of the jury: 1) We will consider only the evidence favorable to the successful party below, Love v. H.F. Constr. Co., 261 Ark. 831, 552 S.W.2d 15 (1977); and, 2) we defer to the jury’s resolution of the issue unless we can say that there is no reasonable probability to support the version of the successful party below. Id.
In the instant case, the jury’s verdict reflected a studied deliberation of the lay and medical testimony elicited during a two week trial. The majority, however, disregards our well-settled standard of review and its supporting rationale to undertake a de novo review of the evidence. This de novo analysis focuses on testimony detrimental to Mrs. Patterson’s claim rather than on testimony supporting her allegations about Dr. Ross’ behavior. Such an analysis cannot be reconciled with our oft-stated concern for protecting the province of the jury. I believe that our prior explanation of this concern is applicable to the case before the court today:
Both of these parties were interested in the results. Consequently, the jury was not duty bound to accept either party’s testimony as being undisputed. Indeed, a fact question was presented for resolution by the jury. The jury heard the witnesses, observed their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand and, therefore, were in a better position to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Boyd, supra, at 675, 573 S.W.2d at 637.
After viewing the evidence favorable to appellee Dorothy Patterson, I believe substantial evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict on the outrage claim. The evidence indicates that Dr. Ross knew of Mrs. Patterson’s precarious emotional state and the potential injurious consequences to Mrs. Patterson of his absence during the latter part of her pregnancy. Dr. Ross admitted that his incapacity had been developing for some time yet he deliberately chose not to advise his patients to retain alternative obstetric care during the course of their pregnancies. Instead, he rubber-stamped a prescription pad, leaving his nurse to prescribe medication for his patients. Mrs. Patterson testified that after receiving one such prescription, she was'unable to have it filled because the pharmacist became suspicious.
Mrs. Patterson also produced both lay and expert testimony concerning the bond she felt with the doctor to whom she entrusted her health and the delivery of her baby. Her evidence indicated that Dr. Ross’ treatment of her throughout the last trimester of her pregnancy caused her severe emotional distress because his deception concerning his whereabouts left her unable to procure medical treatment for the obstetric problems she developed near the end of her pregnancy. Particularly distressing to Mrs. Patterson was her experience at the hospital hours before her baby’s birth. When Mrs. Patterson began experiencing contractions, she went to the hospital only to learn that no arrangements had been made for her. Confused about the whereabouts of Dr. Ross, the hospital staff sedated Mrs. Patterson and sent her home. She returned only a few hours later to deliver her son.
After the jury heard the evidence, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of outrage. The jury voted nine to three to award damages under the tort theory of outrage, and I do not think it coincidental that five out of six women on the jury agreed that Dr. Ross’ treatment of his expectant patient rose to the level of outrage. Based on Mrs. Patterson’s evidence, I believe it was certainly within the jury’s province to find that Dr. Ross willfully or wantonly caused severe emotional distress to Dorothy Patterson by extreme and outrageous conduct.
Brown, J., joins in this dissent.