concurring.
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to point out the underlying principles which, in my view, mandate the result the majority reaches.
The controlling principles emerge from this state’s past experiences in oil and gas regulation generally, and in the matter of pooling specifically. In the early years of the Texas oil and gas industry, independent producers and small-tract owners saw no need for forced pooling. The policies of the Railroad Commission assured the small tract owner or lessee both a drilling permit and a “living allowable” — that is, an allowable that was sufficient to make the tract economically viable. See 3 Smith & Weaver, Texas Law of Oil and Gas § 12.1, at 5 (1990).1
A 1961 decision of this court, however, effectively nullified the Railroad Commission’s authority to protect the small producer. In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Railroad *50Commission of Texas, 162 Tex. 274, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961) (the Normanna case), we invalidated certain prorationing formulas that the commission had long used to provide small producers with living allow-ables. We issued a similar opinion the next year, again favoring large owners over small. Halbouty v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 163 Tex. 417, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962) (the Port Acres decision).
The Texas legislature responded in 1965 by enacting the Mineral Interest Pooling Act (MIPA), now codified at Tex.Nat.Res. Code Ann. §§ 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978). As this Court has recognized, “the intention of the Legislature in enacting [MIPA] was to save the owners and lessees of small tracts from the devastating effects of [the Normanna and Port Acres] decisions.” Railroad Commission v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.1970).
The history of MIPA suggests two general principles to apply in construing the act. First, MIPA should be construed to favor small-tract owners or lessees. See 3 Smith & Weaver § 12.1, at 7, § 12.3, at 33-1. Second, courts should allow the Railroad Commission broad authority under MIPA to accomplish the act’s aims. The act was created to counter the restrictions which this Court placed upon the commission; and as the majority notes, on occasions when courts have sought to restrict the commission’s authority under MIPA, the legislature has countered swiftly by restoring that authority.2
In the present case, the lessee of a relatively small tract seeks forced pooling under MIPA. Viewing the given facts, and giving due deference to the Railroad Commission, the majority upholds the commission’s finding that the MIPA applicant made a fair and reasonable offer to pool voluntarily. The majority then upholds the commission’s application of the term “common reservoir” to the facts of this case. Finally, the majority places the burden of modifying an interim MIPA order upon the well operator, who in this case acted in disregard of a commission order. All three holdings are consistent with the history and intent of MIPA: they work in favor of the small-tract lessee, and they reflect the Railroad Commission’s considerable latitude in construing and applying the act. For those reasons, I concur.
. Those policies included a liberal Rule 37 exception process for obtaining well permits on small tracts, along with large per-well allowable factors in the prorationing formulas for fields with small tracts. Id.
. See ch. 300, §§ 1-2, 1979 Tex.Gen.Laws 673-75 (enacted in response to Gage v. Railroad Commission, 582 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.1979) and Railroad Commission v. Graford Oil Corp., 557 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.1977)); ch. 688, 1981 Tex. Gen.Laws 2578-80 (enacted to address the issue presented in Railroad Commission v. Mote Resources, 645 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.App. — Austin 1983, no writ)).