dissenting. The majority implies the decision in Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 280 Ark. 106, 655 S.W.2d 426 (1983), may have been wrong or based on a faulty premise but will stand anyway. Of course, the Bishop decision was entirely wrong in its first premise and that is the language of the amendment is clear and unambiguous. If the language were clear, there would have been no dispute among court members then or now. The language of Amendment 60 is not clear, and we do have to find its meaning. The amendment reads:
(a) General Loans:
(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract entered into after the effective date hereof shall not exceed five percent (5%) per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at the time of the contract.
(ii) All such contracts having a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate shall be void as to the unpaid interest. A person who has paid interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate may recover, within the time provided by law, twice the amount of interest paid. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly charge a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate in effect at the time of the contract, and any person who does so shall be subject to such punishment as may be provided by law.
(b) Consumer Loans and Credit Sales: All contracts for consumer loans and credit sales having a greater rate of interest than seventeen percent (17 % ) per annum shall be void as to principal and interest and the General Assembly shall prohibit the same by law.
The amendment can be read two ways: as the majority chose to read it in Bishop, or as providing for a maximum of 17 % interest rate on consumer loans and a maximum rate of 5 % interest above the federal discount rate on all general loans. Why would paragraph (b), regarding consumer loans, be included if it did not have significance? Why doesn’t the amendment say that paragraph (b) is subject to paragraph (a)? It doesn’t because consumer loans are to be treated differently, having a maximum of 17% interest rate.
We went over all this in Bishop, and I can understand the reluctance of the majority to overrule Bishop. But to permit a bad decision regarding a constitutional provision to remain, especially when it can be corrected early (this is our first opportunity to reexamine Bishop), is simply poor appellate practice. More than anything, the constitution should be correctly interpreted.
If we followed the majority’s reasoning, we would never overrule a decision. In City of Hot Springs v. Creviston, 288 Ark. 286, 705 S.W.2d 415 (1986), we overruled 50 years of decisions regarding bond issues to finally read the constitution the way it should be read. The error regarding revenue bonds compounded as years went on; it could have been stopped dead in its tracks if this court had faced its responsibility. While I foresee no doom from the majority decision, I do see a clear mistake uncorrected.
Finally, the majority says that anyway the principle of stare decisis applies. I applaud this statement because I was beginning to think the majority had forgotten that principle of law. See Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Cowger, 295 Ark. 250, 748 S.W.2d 333 (1988); Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987).
I would correct the mistake now.
Hays, J., joins in this opinion.