concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The principal opinion properly holds that §§ 105.711 and 105.716.1, RSMo 1986, apply to actions pending on September 28, 1983, their effective date. I am surprised that the Attorney General argues to the contrary.
The record shows that the plaintiff bailiff was hired by the associate circuit judge he serves and is responsible only to the judge. The salary for his position is budgeted by the circuit court, but Jackson County is without power to alter or amend the budget certification. The State Legal Expense Fund exists to protect the covered employees from the burden and expense of civil litigation relating to the performance of their duties. The purposes are apparent. A competent employee, who is in demand elsewhere, may be unwilling to work for the state without protection. Those who do serve may be unwilling to take necessary risks for fear of litigation.
*908The plaintiff serves only the state. It accords with the purpose of the statutory plan to grant him coverage. The circumstance that his salary and fringe benefits are borne by the county is of minor significance, given the purpose of the Legal Expense Fund. Statutes relating to other functionaries, in which the legislature has adopted explicit classifications are of little help in determining the status of an official whose office the legislature has not dealt with.
The view I take obliges me to comment upon the Attorney General’s claim that the plaintiff was not serving the circuit court at the time of the incident giving rise to the suit against him. The pleadings indicate that an employee of a nearby office called for help on account of a disturbance. The plaintiff responded. Any kind of disturbance in the courthouse is of concern to the court, and it makes no difference that the judge the plaintiff served may not have been in the building at the time. The suit relates to a claim “upon conduct of such officer arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on behalf of the state, or any agency thereof, ...” Section 105.711.2(2), RSMo 1986.
I would reverse and remand with directions to grant the plaintiff a declaration of his entitlement as prayed.