At issue in this case is the authority of the Arkansas State Highway & Transportation Department Commissioners (Commissioners) to exchange roads with Van Burén and Searcy Counties. The chancellor found such action was “within the scope of its [the Commissioners] statutory and constitutional authority.” We agree and affirm.
Arkansas State Highway 254 runs through Van Burén and Searcy Counties. It extends from Highway 16 northwesterly across Archey Creek for about six miles. There is a 1.2 mile gap in the highway system. Highway 254 then extends easterly about ten miles to Highway 65 at Dennard, Arkansas.
The Commissioners entered a minute order stating that the section of Highway 254 that crosses Archey Creek would be eliminated from the state highway system and instead would become part of the county road system by transfer. The order then provided that approximately twelve miles of county road were to be added to the remainder of Highway 254 and bécome a state highway. The added road would connect Highway 27 near the Pope County line with the remainder of Highway 254, so that Highway 254 would extend from Highway 65 to Highway 27. The Van Burén and Searcy County Judges entered orders in which they agreed to the transfers.
Appellants own land on the section of Highway 254 that was turned over to Van Burén and Searcy Counties. They brought this suit claiming the Commissioners violated Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-501 (Repl. 1981) when they authorized the road exchange with the counties.
Section 76-501 provides:
State Highways are hereby declared to be those primary roads and secondary roads and connecting roads heretofore designated by the Highway Commission, as shown by a map on file in the office of the State Highway Commission, entitled “Map of the State of Arkansas Showing State Highway System,” and marked “Revised March 1, 1929,” including those portions of said roads extending into or through incorporated towns and cities. The State Highway Commission is hereby required to preserve said map as a permanent record.
The State Highway Commission is hereby empowered, with any necessary consent of the proper Federal Authorities, to make, from time to time such necessary changes and additions to the roads designated as State Highways as it may deem proper, and such changes or additions shall become effective immediately upon the filing of a new map, as a permanent and official record in the office of the State Highway Commission. Provided, however, the State Highway Commission shall not have authority to eliminate any part of the Highway System.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to take over, construct, repair, maintain and control all the public roads in the State comprising the State Highways as defined herein and hereinafter. [Acts 1929, No. 65, § 3, p. 264; Pope’s Dig., § 6523; Acts 1941, No. 6, § 1, p. 17.] (emphasis added).
The landowners correctly contend that the proposed exchange of roads with the counties would cause the elimination of part of the state highway system, which is prohibited by § 76-501.
Nevertheless, the landowners’ argument must fail because of subsequent legislation enacted by the General Assembly. Act 150 of 1961 is entitled, “An Act Relating to the Improvement of Federal-Aid Secondary Highways; to Authorize the State Highway Commission and the County Judges of the Respective Counties to Enter Into Agreements Providing for the Exchange of Highways in Their Respective Highway Systems; and for Other Purposes.” (emphasis added). Sections four and five of that Act provide:
SECTION 4. The State Highway Commission and the County Judges of the respective counties are hereby authorized to enter into agreements whereof certain highways in the State Highway System become a part of the County Highway System, and certain highways in the County Highway System become a part of the State Highway System. All such transfer agreements shall be recorded in the minutes of the Commission and spread upon the appropriate county court record.
SECTION 5. The provisions hereof are supplemental to existing laws relating to the subject matter of this Act.
The Commissioners through their minute order, and the county judges through their orders complied with the requirements of section four. The landowners point out that the county judges apparently did not enter their orders until after this lawsuit was filed. Section four, though, merely requires that the order be “spread upon the appropriate county court record.” No time limit is placed on compliance with this provision.
The plain language of section four unambiguously authorizes the exact action taken by the Commissioners and the counties. This court has no authority to construe a statute that is plain and unambiguous to mean anything other than what it says. Weston v. State, 258 Ark. 707, 528 S.W.2d 412 (1975); Johnson v. Lowman, 193 Ark. 8, 97 S.W.2d 86 (1936). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to any exploration for the legislative intent because the intention of the legislature must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used in the statute. Cook v. Bevill, 246 Ark. 805, 440 S.W.2d 570 (1969), (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
The landowners argue that Act 150, which has never been codified, was legislation only for the biennial period beginning January 1, 1961 and ending December 31, 1962, and that section four, therefore, was not general legislation and does not supersede § 76-501. Sections one through three of Act 150 do pertain to the biennial period only, as those sections relate to the improvement of federal-aid and secondary highways. The applicable time frame is specifically stated in those sections. Section four, on the other hand, concerns a different subject matter and no time frame is mentioned. As stated previously, inasmuch as the plain meaning of section four can be ascertained from the language used, this court may not speculate as to the legislative intent in passing this act. The fact that the act has never been codified is not proof that it is special legislation only. Statutory codes are private codes and the absence of an act in the statutes does not indicate that act is invalid. See Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 28.04 (4th ed. 1985).
Section five of Act 150 states that its provisions are “supplemental” to existing law. Because of the conflict, however, between § 76-501 and section four, a repeal by implication of this portion of the statute occurred with the passage of the act. We have explained that repeals by implication are not favored in the law and to produce this result “the two acts must be upon the same subject and there must be a plain repugnancy between their provisions.” Milord & Blanks, Trustees v. Arkmo Lumber & Supply Co., 272 Ark. 462, 615 S.W.2d 349 (1981), quoting, Forby v. Fulk, Judge, 214 Ark. 175, 214 S.W.2d 920 (1948). The act passed most recently operates in this situation as a repeal of the first, but only to the extent of the conflicting provisions. Id. Berry v. Gordon, 237 Ark. 547, 376 S.W.2d 279 (1964).
Section 76-501 provides that the Commissioners may not eliminate any part of the highway system; Act 150 authorizes the Commissioners to exchange lands with the county highway system, which would in effect eliminate those parts being transferred from the state highway system. The two laws are plainly repugnant. The remainder of § 76-501 is unaffected by Act 150, however, and accordingly remains in force.
The chancellor’s order upholding the action of the Commissioners is affirmed.
Hickman, Purtle, and Glaze, JJ., dissent.