The issue in this medical malpractice case is whether expert testimony is necessary to support a patient’s claim that a medical procedure was done without his informed consent, where the patient was given no information about the procedure, and where medical complications allegedly resulted. In the absence of expert testimony on this issue, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical center. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted discretionary review.
When considering a summary judgment, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, in this case the plaintiff/appellant. Pursuant to a written order from his personal physician, appellant Keel presented at St. Elizabeth for a CT scan, which was *861to include the injection of a contrast dye material. Prior to the test, he was given no information concerning any risks attendant to the procedure. He may have provided information in response to routine questions concerning allergies, illnesses, medications, and “whether the patient has ever had an x-ray or CT scan or undergone any tests where contrast materials were used and if so whether the patient has had any previous reactions to contrast materials, the type of reaction and the type of contrast previously used.” The dye was injected, and the scan conducted.
Later, Keel developed a condition diagnosed as thrombophlebitis at the site of the injection. Keel was prepared to offer expert testimony that the thrombophlebitis was secondary to the intravenous injection, but his expert was unable to say whether or not the injection was negligently administered. The plaintiff was prepared to offer no medical testimony with respect to the issue of informed consent.
As we perceive it, Keel’s argument reduces to the following thesis: a) lack of informed consent may be differentiated from medical negligence, and recovery may be had upon proof of lack of informed consent, damages, and causation; b) in the circumstances of this case, expert medical testimony is not required in order to prove the absence of informed consent. The position of the hospital is that distinguishing the issues makes no real difference, and that the question of informed consent, like the question of negligence, must be determined against the standard of practice among members of the medical profession.
On the issue of informed consent, this Court has stated that “the action, regardless of its form, is in reality one for negligence in failing to conform to a proper professional standard_” Holton v. Pfingst, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1975). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a physician had failed to disclose a risk which he had known to exist, or had failed to inform her of the risks of a medical procedure to the same degree as physicians of ordinary prudence and skill would have done. It is clear from the opinion that the physician had not informed the patient regarding the particular complication which eventuated in that case. It is not clear, however, whether the physician had mentioned other risks or, on the other hand, had said nothing. The court did note that he had “advised his patient, based on his medical judgment, as a result of his examination and diagnostic procedures.” Id. at 789. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant physician, for want of expert testimony, the Holton court stated:
■[W]e are persuaded that it is unnecessary to determine whether expert evidence should be required in all instances where the claim is lack of informed consent to medical treatment. It is our view that the cases considering the extent of required disclosure have failed in many instances to relate the requirement to the overall policy consideration. If it is the law, and it surely is, that a physician ordinarily is not liable for an honest mistake in judgment, when he follows acceptable medical standards for examination and diagnosis and treatment, then the extent of a disclosure relevant to securing the patient’s consent must be evaluated in terms of what the physician knew or should have known at the time he recommended the treatment to the patient.
Id. at 789. St. Elizabeth argues that the Holton decision implies that expert testimony is necessary in most informed consent actions, as in most medical negligence actions.
KRS 304.40-320 appears to adopt the same approach:
In any action brought for treating, examining, or operating on a claimant wherein the claimant’s informed consent is an element, the claimant’s informed consent shall be deemed to have been given where:
(1) The action of the health care provider in obtaining the consent of the patient or another person authorized to give consent for the patient was in accordance with the accepted standard of medical or dental practice among members of *862the profession with similar training and experience; and
(2) A reasonable individual, from the information provided by the health care provider under the circumstances, would have a general understanding of the procedure and medically or dentally acceptable alternative procedures or treatments and substantial risks and hazards inherent in the proposed treatment or procedures which are recognized among other health care providers who perform similar treatments or procedures_
We must agree with St. Elizabeth that, in most cases, expert medical evidence will likely be a necessary element of the plaintiff’s proof in negating informed consent. In view of the special circumstances of this case, however, we believe that neither Holton nor KRS 304.40-320 requires Keel to produce expert testimony on this issue. With respect to Holton, we answer the question left open there, and hold that expert evidence is not required in all instances where the claim is lack of informed consent. Here, we find it significant that St. Elizabeth offered Keel no information whatsoever concerning any possible hazards of this particular procedure, while at the same time the hospital admits that it routinely questions every patient about to undergo a dye injection as to whether he/ she has had any previous reactions to contrast materials. If we are to analogize consent actions to negligence actions, we must also acknowledge that a failure adequately to inform the patient need not be established by expert testimony where the failure is so apparent that laymen may easily recognize it or infer it from evidence within the realm of common knowledge. Cf. Jarboe v. Harting, Ky., 397 S.W.2d 775 (1965); Butts v. Watts, Ky., 290 S.W.2d 777 (1956). In the present case, a juror might reasonably infer from the non-technical evidence that St. Elizabeth’s utter silence as to risks amounted to an assurance that there were none, whereas its own questions to patients regarding reactions to this specific procedure demonstrate that St. Elizabeth itself, as the health care provider performing the treatment, recognized the substantial possibility of complications, and whereas (subject to further proof) a complication did in fact result. These inconsistencies are apparent without recourse to expert testimony; we believe this evidence was sufficient to satisfy the standards of Holton, supra, and of KRS 304.40-320, and to protect the plaintiff from adverse summary judgment.
We note incidentally the suggestion (not strictly an issue) that St. Elizabeth might not have a duty to inform Keel, on the theory that this responsibility lay with his personal physician. Under KRS 304.-40-320, the duty is upon “health care providers”; and KRS 304.40-260 expressly includes hospitals within the definition of that term. We have no doubt that the duty exists and is breached at peril.
The judgment is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Kenton Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LAMBERT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ„ concur. LEIBSON, J., concurs in result only, and files a separate concurring opinion. RONALD M. SULLIVAN, Special Justice, dissents by separate opinion in which STEPHENS, C.J., and SPAIN, J„ join.