dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because K.R.S. 61.102, the so-called “Whistle-blower Statute” is applicable to this situation and Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution is also applicable.
K.R.S. 61.102 provides in pertinent part that no employer shall discriminate against any employee who brings to the attention of the Attorney General or any member or employee of the judiciary or any law enforcement agency or any other appropriate body of authority any facts which relate to the endangerment of the public health or safety. This lawsuit, although on behalf of her son, is essentially a report of information regarding claims of mismanagement and endangerment of the public health and safety by the Housing Authority. Boykins contends that her discharge was a direct reprisal- for making such disclosures.
The statute in question should be broadly applied and interpreted so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. The concept of open courts embodied in Constitution § 14 would be a hollow right if you lose your job as a result of availing yourself of the court system and the whistle-blower law. I believe there is a fundamental and easily discerned public policy as expressed by the legislature in the whistle-blower statutes. In my view, the statute clearly protects public employees from any reprisal for disclosing violations of the law or dangers to the public health and safety. Certainly, the government or agents of the government must set a good example. The government should never be exempt from application of the law, otherwise the public’s confidence in the credibility of the governmental authority is severely weakened.
If a public employee cannot act so as to file a lawsuit which publicly reports alleged improper management or maintenance in his or her own agency for fear of losing his or her job, there is a clear injustice. The employment at will doctrine should not be allowed to be a shield by any government agency to protect it from the responsibility for its acts.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for trial on the merits.
COMBS, J., joins in this dissent in regard to the Section 14 discussion.