OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
KELLER, Judge.In our original opinion, we reversed and remanded this cause for a new trial on the basis of Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). On rehearing the State urges that Garrett error is “error affecting punishment only,” and that, therefore, this ease should be remanded for a new punishment hearing only, in accordance with Art. 44.29(c).1 We agree. Because of our disposition on rehearing, we must address appellant’s other points of error. Finding none with merit justifying reversal of the conviction, we affirm the conviction but vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
1. Garrett error
Voir dire error does not inevitably affect the guilt/innocence phase of a trial. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the United States Supreme Court indicated that the erroneous excusal for cause of a venireman for holding conscientious scruples about the death penalty did not affect the capital murder conviction but merely invalidated the death sentence. Id. at 517-518, 88 S.Ct. at 1774-1775. This conclusion was expressly adopted in Bumper v. North Carolina, in which the Supreme Court held that Wither-spoon error did not require reversal of the conviction because the defendant had been given a life sentence instead of the death penalty. 391 U.S. 543, 545, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1789-90, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). In both Witherspoon and Bumper, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had the burden to bring forth evidence showing that the voir dire error necessarily produced jurors who were biased with respect to the question of guilt; because the defendants in those cases failed to present such evidence, the voir dire error did not affect their convictions. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-518, 88 S.Ct. at 1774-1775. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 545, 88 S.Ct. at 1789-90.
Following Bumper, we have held consistently that Witherspoon error does not govern the resolution of capital murder convictions that ultimately result in life sentences. Garcia v. State, 626 S.W.2d 46, 55 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 768 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 3067, 69 L.Ed.2d 432 (1981). Phelps v. State, 594 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). White v. State, 591 S.W.2d 851, 858 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), overruled on other grounds, Bighy v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Because Witherspoon error has no application when life sentences are imposed, it follows that Witherspoon error relates only to punishment. And since Witherspoon error relates only to punishment, it further follows that death sentences in trials in which With-erspoon error occurred need only be reversed and remanded for a new punishment determination rather than a new trial on guilt.
In fact, in Cuevas v. State, 641 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), we recognized this, stating explicitly that Witherspoon error relates to penalty only. We reversed the conviction in Cuevas and remanded for an entirely new trial because at that time we lacked the authority to remand only on punishment. Art. 44.29(c) was amended in 1991, *298however, and we now have such authority. Moreover, the language of Art. 44.29(c) is mandatory.
Witherspoon and Garrett are, in respects relevant to the present case, indistinguishable. Both relate to a prospective juror’s opinion about issues to be decided during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial.
And although Garrett error is based upon state law rather than the federal Constitution, we do not believe that to be a material distinction here. In Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 1858, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993), a capital case, the appellant complained that he was erroneously denied the right to voir dire the jury on the parole laws applicable to the lesser included offense of murder. Ordinarily, when error stems from the refusal to permit proper voir dire questioning, harm is presumed, and the error is not subject to a harmless error analysis. Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). But in Jones we held that any error was rendered harmless by the fact that the jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder and no parole instruction was given. Id. at 498. By holding the error to be harmless in Jones, we implicitly held that any voir dire error in that case related to punishment only. Had we presumed, as stated in footnote five of our opinion on original submission in this ease, that voir dire error conceivably affects the composition of the jury, then the harmless error analysis in Jones would have been improper.
We hold that voir dire error regarding a subject that a jury would consider only during the punishment phase of a trial is “error affecting punishment only,” unless the defendant produces evidence showing that the error necessarily produced a jury biased against the defendant on the issue of guilt. Since no such evidence has been produced in the present case, this cause should be remanded for a new hearing on punishment in accordance with Art. 44.29(c).
2. Errors affecting punishment only
Points of error eight through ten allege errors during voir dire. In point of error eight, appellant claims that he was not permitted to question a venireman about the range of punishment for the lesser included offense of murder. In point of error nine, appellant complains of the trial court’s refusal to permit questioning regarding appellant’s minimum eligibility for parole if given a life sentence.2 In point of error ten, appellant alleges that the trial court erroneously sustained a state’s challenge for cause in violation of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Points of error fourteen and fifteen allege errors in the jury charge at punishment. In point of error fourteen, appellant complains that the punishment charge does not define the term “probability.” Point of error fifteen complains of the trial court’s failure to submit an instruction concerning parole. Finally, in point of error sixteen, appellant complains that he was prejudiced when a juror received a death threat during the punishment phase of the trial. All of these points of error relate to punishment only and are therefore moot in light of our disposition of point of error one.
3. Venue
In point of error four, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a change of venue based upon prejudicial publicity occurring after the voir dire stage of the trial. At the end of voir dire, while in the courtroom, appellant grabbed his attorney and held a sharp object to the attorney’s throat. After a bailiff ordered appellant to release his attorney, appellant responded that the person he really wanted was the prosecutor; whereupon, appellant attacked the prosecutor and was finally restrained by one of the bailiffs. The prosecutor, the defense attorney, and one bailiff were injured during the episode. This incident was reported in the media and is the basis for appellant’s motion for change of venue.
*299A defendant has the right to a change of venue when there exists a prejudice in the county that is so great that he cannot receive a fair trial. Art. 31.03(a)(1). A trial court’s determination of venue may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 109 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 932, 113 S.Ct. 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 428 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 1422, 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). The trial court has the task of acting as fact-finder on the venue question. Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 109. Its decision will not be disturbed so long as it is within the realm of reasonableness given the record before it. Narvaiz, 840 S.W.2d at 428.
The trial court found that the publicity occurred after the jury had been selected and after the jury had been instructed to avoid media coverage of the case. The trial court subsequently questioned the jurors, and only one juror stated that she had been exposed to any publicity. She stated that she had heard only very brief fragments of a report about the incident before turning off the radio. Although she maintained that she had not formed an opinion as to appellant’s guilt, the trial court excused her and replaced her with an alternate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion. Point of error four is overruled.
4. Extraneous offenses
a. The courtroom incident
In point of error two, appellant complains that the admission into evidence during the guilt phase of trial of testimony concerning the assault in the courtroom violated the prohibition against extraneous offense evidence found in Rule 404(b).3 Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident....
We have held that criminal acts that are designed to reduce the likelihood of prosecution, conviction, or incarceration for the offense on trial are admissible under Rule 404(b) as showing “consciousness of guilt.” These include threats against the prosecutor, Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); threats against witnesses, Rodriguez v. State, 577 S.W.2d 491, 492-493 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) and their families, Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); physical violence against witnesses, Maddox v. State, 288 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1956); escape from confinement, Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); bail jumping, Cantrell v. State, 731 S.W.2d 84, 93 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); and the presentation of fake identification to the police, Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 97-98 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 95, 126 L.Ed.2d 62 (1993). Attacks upon the prosecutor and the defense attorney in the courtroom dming the trial of the case clearly fall within this category. The evidence was relevant to show consciousness of guilt. Point of error two is overruled.
In point of error three, appellant complains that the prejudicial effect of admitting this evidence substantially outweighed its probative value in violation of Rule 403.4 The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on this issue is abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). We have previously held that the probative value of a crime showing “consciousness of guilt” may outweigh its prejudicial impact. Havard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195, 203 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (escape or attempted escape). The record in this case supports the trial court’s determination that the probative value of the *300evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so holding. Point of error three is overruled.
b. The stolen car and gun
In point of error six, appellant complains that testimony concerning a stolen automobile and gun constituted evidence of an extraneous offense, inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Testimony revealed that the victim was a gun dealer. When appellant was arrested at his home, the police recovered two guns, a .44 Ruger and a Tec Nine, from his bedroom. Fired projectiles found at the crime scene matched the .44 Ruger. The serial number from the Tec Nine was traced to the victim as a gun registered to him. Outside the presence of the jury, appellant objected to the testimony, claiming that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and that the evidence had no probative value. In front of the jury, the State questioned Isaac Johnson, one of appellant’s accomplices, as follows regarding the events on the day of the offense:
Q. Mr. Ransom went inside? Did he come back outside again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did he have anything with him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he have?
A. A .44 Ruger.
Q. A .44 Ruger?
A. Yes.
Q. .44, meaning caliber?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had you seen that gun before?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When had you seen the gun before that occasion?
A. Probably about a month or two before this had happened.
Q. Okay. And did the Defendant tell you where he had gotten that gun?
A. Yes, sir.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, hearsay, and the previously stated objections.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. Did the Defendant tell you how he got that gun?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did he get the gun from?
A. He had told me that he had stole this lady’s car, and he got it out of this gym bag in the back seat floor, on the floor of the car.
Johnson later testified that he, appellant, and two other men robbed the victim of several Tee Nines. Johnson further testified that he saw appellant shoot the victim.
Before Johnson’s testimony and outside the presence of the jury, appellant’s counsel had argued that where the gun came from was not probative of whether appellant used it as the murder weapon. The prosecutor responded that the extraneous offense incident tended to prove appellant’s ownership of the gun and that such ownership connected appellant to the crime because the gun was the murder weapon. The prosecutor pointed out that defense counsel had cross-examined police officers concerning other guns found in the victim’s car after the shooting. The prosecutor contended that such testimony could imply that the .44 Ruger was one of the guns owned by the victim.
Appellant argues that it was never disputed that he owned the Ruger. Appellant’s theory at trial was that although he owned the gun, he had lent it to his accomplice. However, at the time the evidence of the burglary was introduced, appellant’s defensive theory had not been presented. Furthermore, had there been other evidence to establish ownership of the gun, that fact does not speak to relevance under R. 404(b), but to probative value versus prejudicial impact under R. 403. See, Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390.
It is the trial court’s task to determine whether extraneous offense evidence is relevant to a non-propensity purpose; the trial court’s ruling is entitled to deference and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. In the present case, the trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the testimony tended to show appellant’s ownership of the .44 Ruger before the murder, thus con*301necting him to the murder. The fact that appellant stole the gun links him somewhat more strongly to the gun than mere possession would, as it implies purported ownership rather than incidental control. Further, extraneous offenses are admissible to rebut defensive theories raised by the testimony of a State’s witness during cross-examination. Crank v. State, 761 S.W.2d 328, 341 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 209, 107 L.Ed.2d 162 (1989). The trial comí; could reasonably have believed that the cross-examination testimony about other guns found in the victim’s car raised the inference that defendant did not own the .44 Ruger. Point of error six is overruled.
In point of error seven, appellant contends that the admission of testimony concerning the stolen car and gun was error under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Appellant argues that the probative value of the gun was minimal because ownership was not contested and that the prejudicial effect was great because the murder offense and the extraneous offense both involved the theft of guns. While the evidence showed that appellant possessed and admitted ownership of the .44 Ruger after the murder, at the time it was recovered by the police, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the question of appellant’s ownership of the gun at the time of the murder was still in dispute. Moreover, the extraneous offense is of a character that pales in comparison to the primary offense. The trial court was justified in concluding that the jury would not be swayed to convict appellant of capital murder on the basis of the comparatively minor offense of burglary of a motor vehicle. We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the prejudicial effect of the extraneous offense did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Point of error seven is overruled.
5. Discovery objection
In point of error five, appellant contends that the trial court should have excluded the testimony of accomplice Isaac Johnson altogether because the prosecution did not reveal a “deal” made with Johnson until immediately before his testimony. Appellant had previously filed a motion for discovery which was granted by the trial court. Appellant claims that the failure to disclose the agreement violated the trial court’s discovery order.
The State agreed not to seek the death penalty against Johnson in exchange for his testimony at trial. The trial court found that the State’s offer of leniency was made on the same day that Johnson was called to testify. The details of the agreement were presented to the jury, and appellant’s attorney cross-examined Johnson regarding the deal.
This point is governed by our recent opinion in Etheridge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 314, 133 L.Ed.2d 217 (1995). In that case, the defendant complained that the State did not disclose until the day of testimony that one of its witnesses had a prior conviction. Etheridge, 903 S.W.2d at 17. The State did not learn about the conviction until the morning of testimony, and the conviction was used to impeach the witness in front of the jury. Id. We held that, due to the availability and use of the prior conviction to impeach the witness at trial, there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the existence of the prior conviction been disclosed earlier and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the witness to testify. Id. As in Etheridge, the present case involves impeachment evidence that was unknown by the State until the time of trial, was disclosed to the defense, and was presented the jury. Point of error five is overruled.
6. Jury charge
In point of eiTor eleven, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the inclusion of a “parties” section in the jury charge. Appellant contends that the evidence of guilt showed him guilty only as the primary actor and that there was no evidence showing him to be guilty merely as a party.
*302When the evidence is sufficient to support both primary and party theories of liability, the trial court does not err in submitting an instruction on the law of parties. Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 267 & 267 n. 7 & 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3202, 105 L.Ed.2d 709 (1989). See also Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 3230, 106 L.Ed.2d 578 (1989). Evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties where the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words or other agreement. Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct. 1942, 90 L.Ed.2d 352 (1986). “In determining whether the accused participated as a party, the court may look to events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Id. Further, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove party status. Id.
The evidence indicated that there were four men involved in the robbery. While Johnson testified that he saw appellant shoot the victim, a rational jury could have disbelieved that testimony and harbored a reasonable doubt as to which of the four robbers was the actual shooter. Even if the jury held such doubts, the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to connect appellant to the offense as a party. Johnson testified that appellant agreed to a robbery scheme, recruited a friend to become part of that scheme, was present at the crime scene, was armed, and fired shots at the neighbors as the robbers left the scene after the murder. The .44 Ruger found in appellant’s bedroom and admittedly owned by appellant matched a bullet found in the victim’s garage and one found at a neighbor’s house. A Tec Nine owned by the victim was also found in appellant’s bedroom. Two non-accomplice witnesses, Oran Moore and Dwayne Kinney, testified that they saw appellant in the company of Johnson shortly before the offense was committed. The evidence was sufficient to show that appellant was present at the crime scene and aided the commission of the robbery-murder. The trial court was justified in submitting a parties instruction. Point of error eleven is overruled.
In point of error twelve, appellant complains that the parties charge did not limit the parties instruction to the particular facts of the case. The relevant portions of the charge are as follows:
All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for whom he is criminally responsible, or by both.
A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence alone will not constitute a party to an offense.
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If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 7th day of December 1991, in Tarrant County, Texas, Isaac Johnson, or Nathan Clark, or Bryan Williams did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, Herbert Primm, by shooting him with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, and that said Isaac Johnson, or Nathan Clark, or Bryan Williams was then and there in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery of Herbert Primm, and that the Defendant, acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense of capital murder committed by Isaac Johnson, or Nathan Clark, or Bryan Williams, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the said Isaac Johnson, or Nathan Clark, or Bryan Williams to commit the said offense, if any, then you will find the Defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment.
(Emphasis given by appellant).
Relying upon Johnson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), appellant contends *303that the instruction erroneously “fails sufficiently to inform the jury which specific mode or modes of conduct enumerated in Texas Penal Code § 7.02(a)(2) ... may form an alternative basis for conviction.” Id. at 305 n. 4. While the charge permitted conviction on all possible theories of party liability (i.e. “solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid”), appellant claims that not all of these theories are supported by the evidence. Assuming arguendo that this claim is correct, Johnson is nevertheless distinguishable from the present case. In Johnson, the issue was raised by a timely and specific objection, id. at 305, but in the present case, appellant made no objection at trial. Appellant argues that he has suffered “egregious harm,” but we have rejected that argument where the application paragraph of the charge merely referred to the general parties definition. Chatman v. State, 846 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). In Chatman, we held that such a general reference, while not surviving a specific objection requesting that the charge more explicitly apply the law of parties to the facts, was “not a total failure” in that regard, and hence, no fundamental error was shown. Id. The charge in the present case is actually more specific than the charge in Chatman, including the modes of liability within the application paragraph. Point of error twelve is overruled.
7. Jury argument
In point of error thirteen, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor made a reference to a witness who did not testify. During jury argument, the prosecutor stated:
The law says there must be something that tends to connect or link the Defendant to the offense besides the co-defendant’s testimony. You’ve got the .44. You have got the Tec Nine. You’ve got Oran Moore. You have got Dwayne Kinney. And you have Hai'vey Ray Jones. You have all of those. That tends to connect —
(emphasis added). At this point, defense counsel objected that the reference to Harvey Ray Jones was outside the record because he did not testify. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Appellant’s motion for mistrial was denied.
For jury argument that improperly refers to matters outside the record, error is cured by an instruction to disregard unless the argument is manifestly improper or so extreme that an instruction will not cure the error. Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 907 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (references to stocking mask and ski mask cured by instruction to disregard). Pyles v. State, 755 S.W.2d 98, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988) (argument that no complaint had been lodged against prison worker cured by instruction to disregard). We do not believe that the mere reference to the name of a witness who did not testify is so improper or extreme that it cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard. Point of error thirteen is overruled.
We AFFIRM the conviction but VACATE the sentence and REMAND this cause for a new hearing on punishment in accordance with Art. 44.29(e).
OVERSTREET and MALONEY, JJ., dissent.
. All references to articles are to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure unless otherwise provided.
Art. 44.29(c) provides in relevant part: “If any court sets aside or invalidates the sentence of a defendant convicted of an offense under Section 19.03, Penal Code, and sentenced to death on the basis of any error affecting punishment only, the court shall not set the conviction aside but rather shall commence a new punishment hearing ... as if a finding of guilt had been returned."
. Such questioning is patently improper, as a defendant’s minimum eligibility for parole is not a proper consideration for the jury in a capital case. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 919 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 131, 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995).
. All references to rules are to the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence unless otherwise provided.
. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”