dissenting.
It is well-established that mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy, should not issue unless othe trial court has either (1) clearly abused its discretion or (2) failed to observe a mandatory statutory provision conferring a right or forbidding a particular action. E.g., Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex.1985); State Bar of Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex.1980). The majority opinion holds that the trial court’s protective order was a clear abuse of discretion. I disagree.
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure expressly authorize trial courts to issue “any order in the interest of justice to protect ... property rights.” TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(4). The Rules also specifically provide that trial courts may limit the distribution or disclosure of discovered documents. TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(4)(c). Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the protective order in this cause did not prohibit Garcia from disseminating documents to other litigants; the order merely required Garcia to obtain the trial court’s approval before sharing any information with other litigants. Considering the interest of the parties and other litigants, this protective order is not clearly unreasonable or overly burdensome. In fact, many state and federal courts have employed such protective orders in complex litigation. See, e.g., Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir.1986); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., 529 F.Supp. 866 (E.D.Pa.1981); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 96 F.R.D. 582 (E.D.N.Y.1983).
The trial court’s order was expressly authorized by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and was therefore not an abuse of discretion. If this Court believes that trial courts should not be allowed to issue such orders, then the Court should seek to change the rules through the formal procedures rather than handing down this mandamus order when a clear abuse of discretion has not been shown. Accordingly, I dissent.