concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority that the cause be reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the insufficiency of the evidence of the Kneips’ pecuniary loss.
However, I disagree with the court's discussion and holding that the trial court *138may disregard the findings by the jury that the bank was estopped from foreclosing on the Kneips’ sixty acres of land under the deed of trust and from recovering under the guarantee executed by Gary Kneip because the trial court was exercising its chancery powers.
I do not perceive the question of estoppel to be an exception to the general rule that the trial court may disregard the answers of the jury only if there is no evidence to support them or if the answers are immaterial. Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex.1967).
The cases cited by the majority for the proposition that the findings by the jury are not binding on the trial court in the exercise of its equitable power are not es-toppel cases, but cases involving injunctive proceedings.
Injunction is a distinctly equitable remedy. Hamilton v. Davis, 217 S.W. 431 (Tex. Civ.App. — Austin 1919, writ ref’d). The rule is well recognized that the determination of whether or not to grant an injunction is not an ultimate issue of fact for the jury, but is an issue to be decided by the trial court in the exercise of its chancery powers. State v. Texas Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.1979); Alamo Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Association, 360 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) The court in Alamo Title makes the distinction that in Texas, although findings on issues of fact are binding, equitable principles and relief afforded in equity are to be applied by the court.
The rule relied on by the majority has been referred to by the Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals in upholding a trial court's order of specific performance when the jury found the underlying contract to be ambiguous, and thus a supposed bar to specific performance. However, the Beaumont Court held that the question of whether a contract is ambiguous is always one of law to be determined by the court rather than the jury. Foust v. Hanson, 612 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1981, no writ).
The rule applied in injunction cases relied on by the majority should not carry over into estoppel matters. No findings of fact can mandate an injunction; however, certain findings are necessary in order for an injunction to lie. Texas Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d at 803-805.
It has been consistently held that estop-pel is ordinarily a question of fact and should be submitted to the jury. See Donaldson v. Lake Vista Community Improvement Association, 718 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.); Page Airways, Inc. v. Associated Radio Service Co., 545 S.W.2d 184, 192 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Astro Sign Co. v. Sullivan, 518 S.W.2d 420, 426-427 (Tex.Civ.App.— Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
To require estoppel to be submitted to a jury when there is a factual question to be resolved, but to allow the trial judge to disregard that finding, regardless of the evidence or materiality, is to require a needless exercise.
KENNEDY, Justice.I hereby join with Justice Dorsey’s concurrence.