dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. The employee, McDaniel, submitted as evidence in support of his summary judgment motion a letter from his supervisor that read as follows:
26 Dec 91
Red,
As you have probably heard our workers [sic] compension [sic] insurance rates tripled last month. Since you have two previous injuries to your knee and two claims we will be unable to employ you in the future. I truley [sic] regret this since I felt you were one of the most qualitified [sic] entergittic [sic] people working on the erection crew but ecnomics [sic] doesn’t permit us to retain you at this time. Please feel free to call on me if there is anything I can do to help.
Larry
KRS 342.197(1) states that “[n]o employee shall be harassed, coerced, discharged, or discriminated against in any manner whatsoever for filing and pursuing a lawful claim under this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)
The language of this statute is clear and unambiguous. Courts are required to give the words of a statute their plain meaning. Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1984). To read this statute to require that the “lawful claim” referred to be pursued against the discharging employer is to add “restrictive language ... where it does not now exist.” Id. at 834.
As the majority notes, KRS 342.197 was enacted within months of the rendition of Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730 (1983). Therein, this Court recognized that implicit in the Workers’ Compensation Act was “a public policy that an employee has a right to be free to assert a lawful claim for benefits without suffering retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 732. More recently, in Beale v. Faultless Hardware, Ky., 837 S.W.2d 893, 897 (1992), we recognized the policy objectives that lay behind the creation of the Special Fund:
First, they are designed to encourage the hiring and retention of disabled workers with either latent or obvious disabilities. Second, these funds spread the risk associated with hiring and retaining disabled workers because the last employer should not be asked to bear the total burden when a disability arises only “in part” from the last employment.
In failing to limit the language of KRS 342.197(1) to claims against the current employer, I believe the legislature recognized the meeting of these two policy considerations. Just as the creation of the Special Fund encourages the hiring and retention of previously injured workers, KRS 342.197(1) prohibits their discharge because of prior injuries. I would affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court.
SPAIN and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.