dissenting.
It is a well established rule that when the State introduces a defendant’s confession in evidence, it is bound by any exculpatory statements contained therein unless such statements are disproved. See cases cited in 12A Texas Digest, Criminal Law, <®=» 781(8). See also McCormick and Ray, Evidence, Sec. 1224 (2d ed.1956); 1 Branch’s Penal Code, Sec. 95 (2d ed.1956). However, this rule is not a sound rule; it should no longer be followed.1
That the State is bound by exculpatory statements contained in the confession which it offers in evidence rests on a rule that, by introducing the confession into evidence, the State vouches for its credibility. Thus, the rule exists as a variant of the broader “voucher” rule, which is itself a rationalization for the rule against impeaching one’s own witness. 3A Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 898 (Chadbourn rev.1970); McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 38 (2d ed.1972). Not only does it strain credulity to suggest that the State guarantees the credibility of a criminal defendant, but such a guarantee is wholly inconsistent with the right of the State to introduce facts contrary to the exculpatory statements. If there were such a guarantee, the State could not fly in the face of it proving that the exculpatory statements are not to be believed.
The voucher rule has been widely condemned as archaic, irrational, and destruc*184tive of the truth-gathering process. 3A Wigmore, supra; McCormick, supra; Morgan and Weinstein, Basic Problems of State and Federal Evidence, p. 63 (5th ed.1976). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the rule “bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process,” and has held that its application in some situations may interfere with a defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in his own behalf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The “voucher” rule has been rejected in Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and its application has been limited in Texas. Art. 38.28, V.A.C.C.P.
In order for the “exculpatory statements” rule to be applicable, the statement of the accused must constitute an admission plus an assertion that would exculpate the accused from the crime charged. Simon v. State, 488 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). That is, if the accused does not admit doing the acts which constitute the gravamen of the offense, the State will not be bound by his statement even though the facts asserted therein are inconsistent with a finding of guilt. Simon v. State, supra; Brown v. State, supra; Davis v. State, 474 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). The rule as to exculpatory statements also has no application where the defendant testifies to substantially the same facts as contained in his exculpatory statement and the trial court submits this defense to the jury. Bruce v. State, 402 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1966); Vaughns v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 465, 358 S.W.2d 133 (1962); Madden v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 80, 344 S.W.2d 690 (1961). These attempts to modify or qualify the rule serve only to demonstrate its irrationality.
Truth is not obtained by binding parties with guarantees and vouchings. The State should not be bound by, and the trier of fact should not be required to accept as true, the exculpatory statements of a defendant, no matter how incorrect or farfetched they might be, merely because the statements were introduced by the State and not disproved by other evidence. See United States v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1975). Exculpatory statements should be weighed and considered by the trier of fact, and should be accepted or rejected by the trier of fact, in the same manner as is the other evidence in the case.
I dissent.
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge, joins in this dissent.. A corollary equally well established, which should also be abandoned, is the rule that the State may offer in evidence only portions of a defendant’s statements; the result of this rule is that a confession offered by the State is often wholly distorted.