BPR Construction & Engineering, Inc. appeals from a take nothing judgment on its counterclaim for breach of a written contract. BPR contends that the court erred in placing the burden of proof of the cost of completion of the contracted work on it, the defendant contractor, because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs, Rivers. We disagree and affirm.
In October 1975, A. G. Rivers entered into a written contract with BPR Construction & Engineering, Inc. to perform certain repair work on the foundation of the Rivers’ then residence for the contract price of *249$8,320.00. When BPR informed Rivers it had completed the job, Rivers, at BPR’s request, compiled a list of complaints. The primary complaints were that the foundation and interior slab floors were not adequately leveled, that the center of the house was higher than the ends, that the slab floor of the garage was uneven, and that the slab patching was not done in a good, workmanlike manner. After receiving Rivers’ list of complaints, BPR informed him that it could not finish the job. Rivers, an experienced builder of houses, then attempted to level the slabs himself and withheld payment to BPR, whereupon BPR perfected a mechanic’s lien upon the property.
The Rivers sued BPR for breach of contract in failing to perform in a workmanlike manner, enumerating specific acts and omissions. The Rivers sought $10,000.00 in damages as the loss of the fair market value of their home, or alternatively $10,-000.00 as the amount necessary for others to complete the job. The Rivers further sought the removal of the mechanic’s lien, a permanent injunction from replacing the mechanic’s lien, costs of suit, and interest.
BPR responded with a general denial and counterclaim, claiming that it had performed in a good and workmanlike manner as required by the contract and that the Rivers’ refusal to pay the agreed price constituted a breach of contract. Alternatively, BPR plead that all work performed under the contract was performed in good faith and constituted substantial performance of the contract.
At the trial, neither BPR nor the Rivers introduced any evidence as to the cost of completing the work that BPR had contracted for but had not performed.
The jury found (1) BPR did not complete its contract in a good and workable manner, (2) BPR did substantially perform its obligations under the contract, and (3) $3,500.00 was a reasonable attorney’s fee for BPR. The trial court’s judgment was that all parties “take nothing” and also removed the mechanic’s lien.
In its first three points of error, BPR argues that the judgment is erroneous because the court improperly placed the burden of proof of the cost of completion of the contract on the defendant, BPR. It argues that the court erroneously applied the law found in Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers, 270 S.W. 848 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, holding approved), wherein it was held that the burden of proof of the owner’s damages, concerning the amount necessary to remedy defects of the contractor was on the contractor, rather than the owner. We disagree.
Although other jurisdictions place the burden of proof on the owner to establish the amount of damages, Texas courts have followed the Atkinson rule in holding that the burden of proof is on the contractor to establish the amount of damages to the owner. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Jasper Electric Service Co., 414 F.2d 8, 15 (5th Cir. 1969); Guittard, Building Contracts: Damages and Restitution, 32 Tex. B.J. 91, 122 (1969). The facts of the Atkinson case are directly on point with the instant case. Atkinson contracted with Jackson Brothers to build a house according to certain plans and specifications. The jury found that although Jackson Brothers did not fully comply with the terms of the contract, they had substantially complied. Neither Atkinson nor Jackson Brothers furnished proof as to the reasonable cost and expense necessary to correct defects and make the building comply with the specifications. In reversing the Court of Civil Appeals, the Commission of Appeals stated the general rule that the equitable doctrine of substantial performance is recognized in Texas. If the contractor has acted in good faith and has substantially performed, he will be allowed to recover notwithstanding slight deviations from the contract, but his recovery will be diminished by the amount necessary to compensate for the deficiency. Jackson Brothers could not recover at all without invoking the doctrine of substantial performance and therefore, the burden was on them to furnish the evidence to properly measure the deductions allowable necessary to remedy the defects and omissions. Atkinson v. Jackson Brothers, 270 S.W.2d 848, *250851 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925, holding approved). See Graham Construction Co. v. Robert H. Pyle, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Treiber v. Schaeffer, 416 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1967, no writ). Consequently, BPR cannot recover the full contract price without deduction for defects or omissions since it was found that there was only substantial performance. Accordingly, under the rule of Atkinson, BPR had the burden of introducing evidence to properly measure the defects and omissions. Having failed in its burden of proof, the trial court was proper in its judgment that BPR take nothing.
Appellant’s fourth and fifth points of error allege that since the jury found BPR substantially complied with its contract, Rivers’ damage was minimal and the judgment results in a substantial windfall to the Rivers, to which they are not entitled by the evidence. We cannot agree. Since no damages were determined, we hold BPR may not be granted a new trial based on an alleged award of damages manifestly too small as to BPR and manifestly too large as to the Rivers.
Appellant’s final point of error is that the court erred in removing the mechanic’s lien because the evidence shows no slander of title since the sale of the Rivers’ home was not prevented. We disagree. As the court determined that the Rivers owe no money to the party claiming the lien, there is no authorization for the mechanic’s lien to be in effect and it was properly removed.
Accordingly, we affirm.