dissenting.
Today’s writing represents the next step in the dismemberment of Texas consumer product safety law. Having so recently declared that certain previous guarantees of that law are available neither to those Texans with limited education nor to those who labor under hot, sweaty working conditions, Dresser v. Lee, 1993 WL 433292 (Tex.1993),1 the majority now eliminates a safeguard for another class of our citizens. No longer will our law offer comprehensive protection to a consumer provided an inadequate warning of product limitations. And since even this abrupt change is not enough to assure General Motors victory here, the majority must also resolve an issue never even raised in this Court.
I.
The rule in Texas has long been that a manufacturer is required to provide an adequate warning, not simply any warning.2 But the majority’s destruction of our deci-sional law continues here with the discovery that the important safety presumption that a warning will be heeded no longer applies when any warning, no matter how inconspicuous or deficient, is given. Without explanation or citation of authority, today’s opinion simply omits a now inconvenient, but vital part of our writing in Magro v. Ragsdale Brothers, Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.1986) (emphasis added):
When a manufacturer fails to give adequate warnings or instructions, a rebutta-ble presumption arises....
Euphemistically declaring that this presumption “operates differently” for an inadequate warning, 873 S.W.2d at 359, the majority really means that the presumption no longer “operates” at all in this situation.
The requirement that manufacturers provide adequate warnings serves the dual goals of “risk reduction and the protection of individual autonomy in decision-making.” W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER and Keeton on the Law of ToRts § 96, at 685 (5th ed. 1984). In more plain terms, this means that individual Texans can often protect themselves, avoiding injuries and lawsuits, if sufficient information is provided in a conspicuous and comprehensible form. But
a consumer-victim of a product should be able to recover if he was not actually put on notice of a risk or danger involved in the use of a product that would be material to some users in malting the choice whether to accept the risk.
W. Page Keeton, Products Liability — Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex.L.Rev. 398, 411 (1970).3 To realize these policy goals of risk reduction and informed consumer choice, in *363Texas a warning is deemed legally adequate only when certain prerequisites are satisfied:
(1) it must be in such form that it could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent man in the circumstances of its use; (2) the content of the warning must be of such a nature as to be comprehensible to the average user and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to the mind of a reasonably prudent person- [Moreover], the question of whether a warning is legally sufficient depends upon the language used and the impression that such language is calculated to make upon the mind of the average user of the product.
Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.).4 Hence the product warning requirement in our state is one that centers on reasonableness, not the type of never-to-be-fully-achieved state of warning perfection to which the majority derisively refers. 873 S.W.2d at 360-361. But a warning that fails to meet these reasonable criteria — “[a] warning which fails to call attention to the dangers! — ]⅛, in effect, no warning at all.” William Kimble & RobeRT O. LeSHER, PRODUCTS Liability § 204, at 220 (1979); see also Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir.1962) (“[W]here the manufacturer is obligated to give an adequate warning of danger the giving of an inadequate warning is as complete a violation of its duty as would be the failure to give any warning.”).
Nowhere does the majority explain its loss of faith in the policies underlying the legal mandate for adequate product warnings; nor does it provide any rationale for according differing treatment to warning deficiencies as distinguished from warning omissions. Instead, today’s opinion only attacks its own self-created silly strawman — the unrealistic best and brightest warning — and simplistically announces that one cannot
presume that [a] person would have heeded a better warning when, in fact, he paid no attention to the warning given.
873 S.W.2d at 359 n. 4. This contention ignores the requirement in Texas that, in order to be adequate, a warning must be sufficiently prominent to attract the attention of a reasonable user. The majority has not offered the slightest justification for eliminating the presumption when the cause of a victim having “paid no attention to the warning given” was a deficiency in the form and manner of the warning itself.
In discharging his burden of proving that GM’s failure to provide an adequate warning was a producing cause of his damages, Saenz was rightly aided by the presumption described in Magro:
[WJhen a manufacturer fails to give adequate warnings or instructions, a rebutta-ble presumption arises that the user would have read and heeded such warnings or instructions.... This presumption may be rebutted with evidence that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated at the time of the product’s use, irresponsible, lax in judgment, or by some other circumstance tending to show that the improper use would have occurred regardless of the proposed warnings or instructions.
721 S.W.2d at 834 (emphasis added). Instead of applying this presumption to the facts of this case, the majority derides Texas consumers as routinely failing to follow warnings. And rather short on authority for this approach, today’s opinion relies solely on the old adage about leading a horse to water. While hardly a substitute for precedent, even this platitude is particularly unpersuasive here. When a consumer has not been provided adequate warnings of product dangers, he is not like a horse led to water that stubbornly refuses to drink; he is rather like a horse led nowhere and then blamed for being thirsty. I would not so callously disregard our prior rulings in favor of decision-making by cliche.
II.
Essential to the result sought by the majority is its conclusory statement that “there is no evidence that the inadequacies in GM’s warning caused the accident.” 873 S.W.2d at 361. This declaration essentially provides *364GM a generous “no evidence” analysis that it has not requested.
In both its brief to the court of appeals and its motion for rehearing to that court, GM unequivocally urged a no evidence challenge to the jury finding of causation, which challenge was quite appropriately rejected. 829 S.W.2d at 238. Instead of renewing the same complaint to this Court, GM has offered only the contention that when any warning is given, failure to read it negates the causation element as a matter of law.5 Today’s opinion insists that it is not accepting this incredible argument by announcing that
[a] warning which is not displayed with sufficient prominence to give reasonable notice to the persons to whom it is directed is hardly better than no warning at all.
873 S.W.2d at 360. And to be sure that has until now been our law. But if the majority is not embracing this sole GM causation argument, no other point of error in this appeal supports achieving today’s predetermined result. Without an objection by GM in this Court to the legal sufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury finding of causation, the majority has no basis to “consider whether there is any other evidence of causation to support the jury’s verdict.” Id,.6
The jury was instructed that
“Adequate warnings and instructions” means warnings and instructions that are given in such form that they could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent person in the circumstances of its use; and the content of the warnings and instructions must be of such a nature as to be comprehensible to the average user of the product and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger, if any, and how to avoid it to the mind of the reasonably prudent person.7
The record contains evidence of deficiencies in the content of both the doorjamb warranty label, allegedly “placed in compliance with federal regulations,” 873 S.W.2d at 361,8 and the single related sentence in a lengthy owner’s manual. Other than learning the gross vehicle weight and that the owner’s manual contained additional loading information, all that one who did read the doorjamb label could learn is that:
*365WARRANTY MAY BE VOIDED IF WEIGHT EXCEEDS ANY OF THE RATINGS SHOWN.9
GM’s representative at trial, engineer Carl Jansen, reluctantly conceded that neither the label nor the safety caution reference in the owner’s manual were adequate to convey the serious danger of overloading. He indicated that the comment in the owner’s manual upon which the majority today places much weight would not even qualify as a “caution label” by GM’s own labeling procedure. His testimony concerning content deficiencies alone, contrary to the majority’s assertion, “suggestfs] why the warning GM gave was not sufficient to give reasonable notice against overloading.” 873 S.W.2d at 361:
Q: Now, does this meet the requirement that — the message that you’re trying to say? Does it explain why these instructions should be followed?
A: Not specifically, no.
Q: All right. In other words, it doesn’t tell people what could happen if you do overload, correct?
A: That’s correct, it does not.
Q: And the message also does not relate to the possible consequences if these instructions are not followed, correct?
A: There are no specific — no specific information like that, that is correct.
Agreeing as to these failings by GM, John Stilson, an engineer retained by Saenz, added that the GM “warning” “d[id] not conform to a standard of the American National Standards Institute” (ANSI) published in 1968. Nor did GM conform with the legal standard set forth so recently by this Court in General Chemical Corp. v. De La Lastra, 862 S.W.2d 916, 922 n. 9 (Tex.1993), cert. dismissed — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 490, 126 L.Ed.2d 440 (1993) (noting that a jury finding that a warning is inadequate was proper where the warning failed to alert of the potentially serious effects — namely death — that could result from misuse of a chemical).
Further evidence also demonstrated that the reason that the GM notice went unread was a deficiency in the placement and prominence of the notice itself. Among this evidence which the majority simply wishes away is that of a representative of the manufacturer, which added the water tank to the truck, who testified that this particular modification would not have been made had a more conspicuous warning been provided. Multiple witnesses — a DPS investigator, a mechanical engineer hired by the manufacturer which added the water tank, and two of that manufacturer’s employees — indicated that they personally observed no warning on the vehicle about the dangers of overloading. Under our previous law a warning could be found inadequate either because of its content or its lack of conspicuity or a combination of the two. As the court in Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir.1962), concluded in upholding the responsibility of a product manufacturer for the death of a child despite the mother’s failure to read an inadequate warning:
[H]ad the warning been in a form calculated to attract the user’s attention, due to its position, size, and the coloring of its lettering, and had the words used therein been reasonably calculated to convey a conception of the true nature of the danger, this mother might not have left the product in the presence of her child. Indeed, she might not have purchased the product at all, a fact of which the manufacturer appears to be aware. Having deprived the mother of an adequate warning which might have prevented the injury, it cannot be permitted to rely upon a warning which was insufficient to prevent the injury.
The jury was entitled to conclude from all of this evidence, as well as all of the circumstances of the accident, that any warning was *366not “in such form that [it] could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent person in the circumstances of its use” and that it did not “convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger, if any, and how to avoid it.” Unquestionably, there was legally sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that GM’s failure to provide an adequate warning was a producing cause of the accident.10
III.
Equally bizarre is the way today’s opinion addresses a product manufacturer’s duty. Consider the opening and conclusion of that part of the writing:
We first consider whether the court of appeals correctly held that GM violated a duty to warn against overloading its truck.... GM does not argue that the evidence is legally insufficient to show a breach of its duty to warn. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals did not err in holding that GM breached that duty.
873 S.W.2d at 356.11 Apparently the only purpose of this discussion is to modify Texas law through dicta regarding those products specifically designed for subsequent modification. The rule the majority recommends is set forth in Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3rd Cir.1978), a decision that has been followed only twice in Texas during the last twenty-five years.12 Even if correct, this rule, as the court of appeals has ably explained, is inapplicable to the facts of this case. See 829 S.W.2d at 235-36.13 A jury found GM breached its duty; the trial court entered judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. Moreover, this writing is entirely unnecessary to what we have been asked to decide here. All this exposition by the majority accomplishes is to inform GM of the argument it should have made in order for the majority to reach the conclusion it really desired — that GM had no duty.
IV.
And so the majority once again pens more answers than the parties have proper questions. Today’s opinion has effectively resolved whether a warning is adequate as a question of law that only judges can decide.14 Instead of competent legal analysis, the majority substitutes itself for the jury in quali*367tatively evaluating the evidence and declaring that placement of a doorjamb label afforded a quite ample warning. 873 S.W.2d at 360-361. With this type of approach, the previously applicable Pattern Jury Charge can be tossed in the scrap heap. See 3 State Bak of Texas, Texas PatteRN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.06 (1990). The majority has engaged in a series of wordgames to achieve its desired result; in no way has it accorded the parties an impartial review of the properly presented points of error. According to the jury, two Texans are dead as a consequence of a manufacturer’s failure to warn; according to the majority, a little more Texas consumer product safety law is now dead too, as our right to trial by jury ebbs away.15
. Offering a belated defense to its unfortunate writing in Dresser, the majority says its determination to weaken product safety law there was not limited to the poorly educated but "applies regardless of plaintiff's education or working conditions.” 873 S.W.2d at 361 n. 8. But in that case, it was evidence that an employee labored in a “hot, dusty, improperly ventilated” workplace and had "only an eighth grade education” upon which the majority relied to conclude that such Texans would "not pay attention to warning labels.” *p. 4. This same type of “elitist view that our safety laws should afford less security to the poorly educated,” id. at * p. 9 (Doggett, J., dissenting), which permeates Dresser, has today been extended to eliminate another important legal guarantee previously available to Texas consumers.
. See General Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 815 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.1993); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582, 592 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shop Rite Foods, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 619 S.W.2d 574, 579 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pearson v. Hevi-Duty Elec., 618 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lopez v. Aro Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
. See also William Kimble & Robert 0. Lesher, Products Liability § 191, at 192 (1979) (adequate warnings are necessary because users of modem products may not understand and appreciate the way the products operate or the dangers inherent in their use).
. See also De La Lastra, 815 S.W.2d at 756; Nowak, 638 S.W.2d at 592.
. GM’s point of error is limited solely to a complaint that:
The [court of appeals] erred as a matter of law in holding that any warning inadequacy caused the injuries here, because undisputed evidence showed that no one read the warnings and information that was [sic] given, so any failure to warn could not have been the proximate cause of the accident.
This is not a request for a "no evidence” review on causation of the type urged by GM in the court of appeals; it is a claim that GM cannot be held legally responsible for any deficiency in a warning, which was not read, even when evidence challenging that warning’s adequacy is offered.
. GM has not presented a “no evidence" argument in this Court as to either duty or causation. For some inexplicable reason, this is a significant factor to the majority in its analysis of duty but not of causation. The majority’s reaction to this procedural failure by GM also contrasts sharply with the reaction not only of this Court in De La Lastra, 852 S.W.2d at 922 n. 9, but also of the dissent:
The juiy found that the warning label was inadequate because it did not expressly state that the toxic gas produced by misuse of the product could be fatal ... [and] that this inadequacy in the label caused the De La Lastras’ deaths. General Chemical ... has not raised those challenges in this Court. Consequently, the inadequacy of the warning label must be taken as an established fact.
Id. at 926 (Hecht, L, dissenting in part).
. This instruction was a near verbatim version of that recommended by 3 State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury Charges PJC 71.06 (1990).
. Though GM makes occasional vague reference in its briefing to federal regulations, the sole reference to the regulations upon which the majority relies, 49 C.F.R. §§ 567.4(c) and 567.5 (1972), (1991), comes not from GM, but the amicus Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. Today's opinion simply adopts this group’s word as the gospel. Just as this majority requires no appellate point of error to accomplish its mischief, it also needs no trial court record; a friendly amicus will suffice.
Moreover, the mere fact that the spot chosen satisfied a federal regulation does not insulate a party from liability for failing to provide an adequate warning. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex.1978) (holding that warning on a drug package insert approved by the FDA was inadequate).
. John Stilson, a safety and automotive consultant retained by Saenz, testified that
this information conveys to a user that they might have a warranty problem. Warranty meaning that if you overload the vehicle, your components are going to wear out faster. You're going to come back to the manufacturer, and you’re going to replace the part under a warranty plan for potentially no cost. So the warranty issue is definitely spelled out in here in terms of that aspect.
But the safety consequences, the risk, possible consequences if these instructions are not followed. The safety risk to personal injury is not spelled out in any of these documents that I see.
. Distancing itself from this reality, the majority mischaracterizes this "dissent [as] argufing] that GM's warning must have caused the accident ... [and foolishly arguing that] if there is an inadequate warning and an accident, the two must be causally connected.” 873 S.W.2d at 361 n. 6. Of course, "[c]ausation remains an element of liability, and it cannot be proved simply by proving that a warning was inadequate.” Id. I maintain only that there was legally sufficient evidence in this record, which the majority deliberately ignores, to support the jury finding that an inadequacy in the GM warning constituted a producing cause of two deaths. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Battle, 745 S.W.2d 909, 913-14 (Tex.App.—Houston [1stDist.] 1988, writ denied) (upholding jury finding based upon expert testimony that inadequate warning was a producing cause of an accident).
. Had the majority been consistent in its analysis, it would have reached this same conclusion regarding causation. Since GM also did not argue that the evidence is legally insufficient to show causation, the majority should have concluded that the court of appeals did not err in holding that there was sufficient evidence of causation.
. See Elliott v. Century Chevrolet Co., 597 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Trevino v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 882 F.2d 182 (5A Cir.1989).
. Indeed, a careful review of Verge indicates its inapplicability. While the manufacturer there was not held liable, the court noted that a manufacturer of a product designed for subsequent modification could be held liable if Aere were "evidence from which Ae jury could have found Aat one [missing] safety device could be installed for all uses of Ae machine.” 581 F.2d at 389. That is precisely the situation here — overloading is a danger for virtually all uses of Ae cab and chassis, and GM had the ability, but failed, to provide an adequate warning as to Aat general danger.
. The majority writes Aat we have previously held Aat "the jury [is] free to conclude from [an] admission [Aat the plaintiff has not read a label on a product] that plaintiff would not have read Ae label if it had contained [an adequate] warning.” 873 S.W.2d at 357 (citing Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.1972)) (emphasis added). If Technical Chemical requires that the jury decide causation where an inadequate warning goes unread, then why does Ae majority today take the causation issue away from Ae jury?
. See, e.g., Texas Ass'n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 459-67 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 609-10, 616 (Tex.1993) (Doggett, J., dissenting); May v. United Serv. Ass'n of America, 844 S.W.2d 666, 675 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 55-56 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Intern. Trartsp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 599 (Tex.1992) (Mauzy, J., dissenting); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 491 (Tex.1991) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting).