dissenting.
The face of the policy here, styled “Limits of Liability,” provides $10,000 and $20,-000 on Section IV, Uninsured Motorists. Section IV of the policy is headed in large letters “UNINSURED (and underinsured) MOTORISTS INSURANCE.” This would lead any reasonable person to conclude that the heading means what it says, i.e., the terms for the purposes of this policy mean the same. On the second page of Section IV, under “Definitions,” there is a part headed “ ‘uninsured highway vehicle’ includes an underinsured highway vehicle.” Section IV is relatively brief and to the point. To anyone who reads his policy, it is perfectly clear.
The trial court held that the limits on uninsured (underinsured) coverage in the policy violated the statute which mandates this coverage to be the liability limits of the policy. The Court of Appeals held this to be error, that all the statute means is that the policyholder is permitted to purchase this coverage to the extent of the liability limits of the policy. The briefs here argue the interpretation of the statute. The trial court and the Court of Appeals seemed to think that the terms of the policy were clear and easily understood, and that “uninsured and underinsured” were given the same meaning. The policyholder here asks only that we hold that the statute means *214that underinsured coverage must equal the insured’s liability policy limits.
Undaunted by all of this, the majority reserves this issue to another day and charges off on the esoteric principles of ambiguity and reasonable expectations.
It would seem reasonable to me to go ahead and answer the issue presented to us. Of course, it is clear to me that the Court of Appeals opinion is exactly right, that for this coverage the policyholder gets exactly what he pays for. The only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that the policyholder can purchase this coverage up to the limits of the policy. It is absurd to think that the language of the statute mandates coverage to the limits of the liability policy.
In my view, the policyholder’s reasonable expectations are to receive the coverage paid for. I suppose that the majority had to conjure up ambiguity in order to justify the holding. There is no ambiguity here. The plain headings and definitions in Section IV support the limits recited on the face of the policy. The majority rewrites the policy to achieve a desired result.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
STEPHENS, C.J., and GANT, J., join in this dissent.