I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the American Working Collie Association (AWCA) and its president, Jean Levitt, engaged in “purposeful activities” in New York and there was a “substantial relationship” between those activities and the defamation causes of action lodged by the SPCA of Upstate New York, Inc. (SPCA) and its executive director, Cathy Cloutier.
Under CPLR 302 (a) (1)—the jurisdictional basis upon which the SPCA and Cloutier rely—long-arm jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary exists where a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim asserted arises from that transaction (see Johnson v Ward, 4 NY3d 516, 519 [2005]). “It is a ‘single act statute’ and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]).
The majority classifies activities of AWCA and Levitt as being “quite limited” (majority op at 405), but the record is littered with instances where the AWCA—whose express mission is the promotion of “the well being of collies”—“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [New York]” (Ehrenfeld v Bin Mahfouz, 9 NY3d 501, 508 [2007] [citations omitted]), such that it “should reasonably . . . expect[ ] to defend its actions” here (Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v Montana Bd. of lnvs., 7 NY3d 65, 71 [2006]).
Even construing CPLR 302 (a) (1) “more narrowly in defamation cases” (Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d 239, 248 [2d Cir 2007]), the facts here certainly meet the standard. Levitt, upon learning that 23 collies and dachshunds had been rescued from a home in Fort Ann, New York, initiated telephone contact with the SPCA and “offered” AWCA’s “services,” which included the donations of collars and leashes, along with a check from the AWCA for $1,000. When the collars and leashes *407arrived, Levitt contacted Cloutier a second time and, during that telephone conversation, agreed to meet with Cloutier to facilitate the delivery of those items. At this first New York meeting, Levitt again offered AWCA’s assistance and wrote a personal check to cover veterinary costs of the rescued dogs. Shortly after that visit, Levitt telephoned the SPCA to discuss arrangements she had made to send one of the rescued collies to a rehabilitation center. Nearly two months later, on January 5, 2008, Levitt visited the SPCA facility “to check on the care that was being given by the SPCA to the [rescued dogs].” In addition to these activities, the AWCA, over eight weekends, sent members and volunteers to the SPCA to assist in exercising the dogs and cleaning their crates. That Levitt’s visits may have been brief is irrelevant; the AWCA conducted a significant number of “purposeful activities” in New York, such that they could hardly be classified as “quite limited,” particularly in light of the monies and items donated and the services provided.
Nor can it be said that there was no “substantial relationship” between these “purposeful activities” and Levitt’s alleged defamatory statements. Of significance is the fact that the first alleged defamatory comment was posted by Levitt on January 13, 2008, a week after her second visit to the SPCA, detailing Levitt’s observations during the second visit which, according to the post, was precipitated by complaints made to her by AWCA volunteers about the condition of the SPCA facility. Moreover, each of the alleged defamatory posts addressed the conditions of the rescued dogs in New York, and the inference can be drawn from the complaint that Levitt’s purpose for going to New York (and for sending volunteers to assist at the SPCA) was to garner attention for the plight of these rescued dogs in order to promote their well being. Finally, several of the alleged defamatory posts reference accounts given by AWCA volunteers to Levitt concerning the conditions of the SPCA facility. For an organization whose “purpose ... is to promote the well being of collies,” it cannot reasonably be said that there was no nexus between AW-CA’s purposeful activities and the alleged defamatory comments.
Finally, the majority’s “free speech” concern is illusory in the context of this case. CPLR 302 (a) (2) and (3), long-arm provisions that address tortious acts committed by a defendant within the state, and tortious acts committed out of state but cause injury in New York, respectively, exclude defamation claims from their reach. CPLR 302 (a) (1) does not contain such an exception, and for good reason: “There is a clear distinction *408between a situation where the only act which occurred in New York was the mere utterance of the libelous material and on the other hand, a situation where purposeful business transactions have taken place in New York giving rise to the cause of action” (Legros v Irving, 38 AD2d 53, 55 [1st Dept 1971]). In the latter case, “it may not be said that subjecting the defendant to this State’s jurisdiction is an ‘unnecessary inhibition on freedom of speech or the press’ ” (id. at 55-56). So long as a plaintiff can establish purposeful activities on the part of the defendant and a substantial relationship between those activities and the defamation claim, there is little danger of chilling free speech through the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.
Judges Cipabick, Read and Jones concur with Chief Judge Lippman; Judge Pigott dissents in a separate opinion in which Judges Gbaffeo and Smith concur.
Order affirmed, with costs.