dissenting.
I dissent on rehearing. This summary judgment is fraught with problems. The majority focuses its attention on the problems of the Wilsons’ response; I focus on the problems of GMAC’s motion.
First, the motion itself contains no grounds for the summary judgment and violates the rule in McConnell v. Southside Sch. Dist, 858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.1993).1 In McConnell, the Supreme Court said even if the non-movant does not except or respond to such a motion, it is legally insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 342.2
Second, GMAC did not plead in its original petition, in its motion for summary judgment, or the affidavit attached to the motion that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. Commercial reasonableness of the sale was an element of GMAC’s cause of action. ' Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.1982); Plato v. Alvin State Bank, 775 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Carroll v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 734 S.W.2d 153,154 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). As the plaintiff-movant, GMAC was required to plead and prove there was no genuine issue about any material fact, and it was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R.Civ.P. 166a(c). Not only did GMAC not plead “commercial reasonableness of the sale,” it did not include the “all conditions precedent” allegations from Tex.R.Civ.P. 54, which can act as a substitute for conditions precedent, including commercially reasonableness of the sale. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat’l Bank, 851 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex.1992). Thus, the trial court granted GMAC a summary judgment on grounds not supported by any of its pleadings.
Third, the majority holds that the Wilsons did not challenge the hearsay nature of GMAC’s affidavit. I disagree. In a counter-affidavit, the Wilsons stated that the exhibits to the summary judgment did not constitute proof that GMAC sent the Wilsons any written notice or that Carleen Shannon or any other person sent exhibit B (the notice letter).3 The Wilsons also contend that Ms. Shannon’s statement and exhibit B did not constitute proof that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.
*825Fourth, the Wilsons argue that GMAC did not establish, as a matter of law, the sale of the vehicle was commercially reasonable. Ms. Shannon’s affidavit contains the only sworn facts regarding the sale. Nowhere in the affidavit does she state that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. In her affidavit, she merely states:
1. after mailing notice of sale to the Wil-sons, the vehicle was sold at Big H Auto Auction;
2. it was sold at a private auction;
3. it was sold to the highest bidder, Wayne Childers Auto Sales;
4. the purchase price was $5800;
5. the sum was a fair and reasonable price for the vehicle;
6. a deficiency of $5446.37 remained on the debt, as itemized on an attached schedule.
The majority concludes from these facts that the sale was commercially reasonable, even though GMAC does not make that statement in its petition, in its motion, or in the affidavit.
I would reverse and remand the case for trial.
. The grounds in GMAC’s motion, like the grounds in the motion for summary judgment in McConnell, state simply:
That after Plaintiff filed suit, Woodrow Wilson, Jr. and Woodrow Wilson, III, Defendants, entered an appearance and filed an answer herein which is insufficient in law to constitute a defense to Plaintiff's cause of action; that as shown by the pleadings, together with deposition, admissions and affidavits, if any, on file herein, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact between the parties herein; and that by reason thereof, the Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law, as prayed for by the Plaintiff.
. The majority says the Wilsons did not preserve the issue regarding the defective motion for summary judgment in their brief. I disagree. In their initial brief to this Court, the Wilsons complained that no grounds were stated in the motion, that the only grounds were stated in the affidavit.
.In then: response to the motion for summary judgment, the defendants challenged notice with the following statement: “Defendants specially deny ... (2) that Plaintiff sent Defendants any written notice of sale at least ten (10) days before selling the property described in Plaintiff's Original Petition.” In the affidavit attached to the response, the defendants challenged notice as follows:
Exhibit B of Motion for Summary Judgment fails to constitute proof that plaintiff sent Defendants any written notice of sale at least ten (10) days before selling the property described in Plaintiff's Original Petition, a contested fact issue in this cause; and, that neither Carlene Shannon nor any other person ever sent such Exhibit B.