ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee General Motors Acceptance Corporation has filed its motion for a rehearing relative to the matter of the finance charge, again alleging and maintaining that *940such was not usurious and that the transaction in controversy complied with and came under the protection of Article 5074a, V.A.C.S.
We have reviewed the entire matter and do not find any additional information or sufficient reason in the motion to reverse our original holding.
It is clear from the record that C. E. Mack did not, in the contract which he sold to G.M.A.C., correctly and sufficiently itemize the cost items that he took into consideration in arriving at what he calls the time credit price. For example, as will be recalled, appellant Bradford claimed that the difference in the two cars was to be $2100.00, whereas the contract was filled in for the amount of $2920.00. Examination of this contract reveals that it shows a net trade-in value of his old car of $757.70, a documentary fee of $10.00, and a finance charge of $630.84 which includes a $29.60 item for group creditor insurance. And yet, on page 17 of the Statement of Facts, we find this statement by C. E. Mack:
“That $2920.00, he owed $569.00 or $567.00 on his car, I think there was $190.00 some dollars for transmission work, take the $2100.00 and add all that to it, and I think you will come out right • on $2920.00, that’s where the money come from.”
These various items for repair and indebtedness on the original car were not itemized in any place on the contract other than the mere statement that he was allowing $567.00 net trade-in value on the old car. Also, on page 77 of the Statement of Facts, it appears that there was a $60.00 item for sales tax which, according to the statement there found, C. E. Mack stated that he had paid $60.00 for sales tax on a new car. This item does not appear on the conditional sales contract or invoice. Also we have again examined the record and find that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the jury’s finding that only one price had been quoted to the purchaser of the car, F. H. Bradford, that price being $2100.00 difference between his car and the new car. In closing, we might say there were other items, such as the license, tax, and title expenses included.
With reference to the case of Gill v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 282 S.W.2d 401, cited and relied upon by G.M.A.C., we should like to point out that the court says at page 407 of that case the following:
“The Wade and other automobile sales contracts on their face and by their plain and unambiguous terms purport to be on the credit or ‘time sales’ contract prices, which contracts were duly signed by each of the purchasers of said automobiles with the provision in said contracts that they had ‘been quoted a time price and a lesser cash price’ and had elected to buy the car for the time price, which contracts were filled out by appellant Gill and accepted by him.” (Emphasis ours).
This, we think, is a very substantial distinction between that case and this one. We think the legal principles set out in Associates Investment Co. v. Sosa, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 703 are still in effect and are applicable here. This case is distinguished from the authority cited by G. M. A. C. in that we have here a definite and distinct jury finding that C. E. Mack quoted only one price to F. H. Bradford, plus the fact that a casual check with the financial or interest compilation will show that the item set forth as a finance charge is usurious.
In re-examining this matter we have discovered an error in our original opinion, and such opinion on file here has been corrected to comply with the facts as they existed at the time the opinion was written. The error consists of the omission of the word “not” in the third paragraph of the opinion, which is found at the bottom of page 2. This word is twice omitted from such paragraph, and the paragraph has *941been amended so that it now reads as follows:
“The appeal here is only from that part of the action of the court in holding that the contract was not usurious and that therefore the charge of $630.84 should not be deleted from the amount due GMAC, as provided by Article 5071, V.A.C.S., hereinafter set forth in this opinion.”
This change, of course, does not affect the judgment as it was merely an erroneous recital of the findings of the lower court.
The motion of General Motors Acceptance Corporation for rehearing is in all things overruled.