concurring.
I would like to believe that the insurance companies deal fairly and in good faith with all members of the public, regardless of status — insured or so-called third-party complainants.
Irrespective of whether Mrs. Rumley is an insured or a third-party claimant, applying the rationale of Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1988), and Connolly v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 910 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, no writ), I would hold that when the present claim was made, the validity of the family member exclusion was an unsettled issue of law. There was a bona fide controversy in the law and that had to be resolved by the Supreme Court. Where the insurer has a reasonable basis to deny or delay payment of the claim, even if that basis is eventually determined by a factfinder to be erroneous, the insured is not liable for the tort of bad faith. See Lyons v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co. of Texas, 866 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.1993). *451In my opinion, the 575 endorsement and the issue pending before the Supreme Court in National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 879 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.1993), constituted a reasonable basis for the denial of the claim or delay in payment of same, as a matter of law.
Further, as to the appellant’s statutory claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Insurance Code, a reasonable basis for the denial or delay in payment of a claim will operate to defeat related claims under the DTPA and Insurance Code. See Walker v. Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co., 828 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Therefore, I concur in the judgment entered by the court.