dissenting. The majority correctly states that the standard of review for a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and a decision of the Commission will be affirmed unless fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996). The standard of review further provides that this Court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision. Plante v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 319 Ark. 126, 890 S.W.2d 253 (1994). On appeal, the issue is not whether this Court might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, the decision must be affirmed. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996). The Commission is not bound by medical opinion, although it may not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of any witness. Crow v. Weyerhauser Co., 46 Ark. App. 295, 880 S.W.2d 320 (1994). The Commission may also examine the basis for a doctor’s opinion in deciding the weight to which that opinion is entitled. Id.
With this standard in mind, I do not agree that the decision of the Commission should be reversed in this case. The abstract and record reflect that, in addition to the evidence outlined by the majority, at the time Gansky went to work for Hi-Tech in June of 1991, he completed and signed under oath a pre-employment medical history, in which he denied ever having had trouble with his back and further denied that he had ever received Workers’ Compensation benefits. However, the record before the Commission reflects that Gansky suffered a back injury on February 14, 1990, while employed, under the name of Rick George, by Advanced Machine Corporation. He was off work about one year and filed a Workers’ Compensation claim as a result of this injury; this claim was setded by joint petition on May 17, 1991, less than one month prior to his employment with Hi-Tech. At the hearing on the joint petition, Gansky testified that he continued to experience recurrent episodes of back pain. He received a setdement in the sum of $3,815.78 for a 5% permanent impairment at the time of the joint petition. At Gansky’s last visit to the physician who treated him for this injury on March 20, 1991, he related that he experienced weekly episodes of back pain, which he claimed to be due to the physical demands of his employment as a machinist, and that this back pain caused him to sometimes miss work. Although Hi-Tech ultimately abandoned its Shippers defense based on Gansky’s misrepresentations at the time of his employment, this evidence certainly had bearing on his credibility in the proceedings before the Commission.
More importantly, it is clear from the evidence that Gansky was advised by Hi-Tech on Friday, February 19, 1993, that he was being laid off due to lack of work. Gansky signed the termination report which contained this information. He testified that when he visited Dr. Gocio three days later on Monday, February 22, 1993, he “thought Dr. Gocio would release him to return to work on that day,” but the doctor “decided to do a functional capacity evaluation because Hi-Tech told me prior to seeing the doctor, I could consider myself laid off.” This testimony, coupled with the report of Gansky’s physical therapist, is substantial evidence that Gansky had completed his period of temporary disability and was ready to return to work. The record further reflects that Gansky made no attempt to either return to employment or seek follow-up medical care after his last visit to Dr. Gocio on February 22, 1993. Although he testified that his neck and back continued to hurt, these were essentially the same complaints that he voiced following his injury of February 1990.
I conclude that this Court has chosen to disregard the standard for review of Commission decisions in reversing the Commission in this instance. Here, reasonable minds could clearly have reached the same conclusion as reached by the Commission; I would affirm its decision.
Glaze, J., joins in this dissent.