concurring.
I join in the reasoning and result expressed by the Chief Justice but note one farther ground for rejecting the proposition that limitations may be controlled by some statute other than art. 4590i, § 10 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. As recently stated by the Texas Supreme Court, § 10 dictates the time in which one must initiate a health care liability claim, “notwithstanding any other law.” Jennings v. Burgess, 917 *420S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.1996) (emphasis added). I read this to mean that irrespective of whether the complainant couches his suit in negligence or some other legal theory, the limitations period found in § 10 of article 4590i would control to the extent that the cause of action entails the “treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care or health care or safety....” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon’s Pamph. 1996) (defining “health care liability claim”). Thus, the general limitation period found at § 16.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and invoked by the Radloffs would be utterly inapplicable.