concurring.
I concur in the decision that the City of Denton is not liable for the dangerous condition of the storage building. I write only to clarify the court’s interpretation of the Texas Tort Claims Act.
The majority is correct when it states that section 3 of the Tort Claims Act does not create new duties. “It simply waives the common law doctrine of governmental immunity under circumstances where a private person similarly situated would be liable.” The Act’s waiver of immunity is clear. A governmental unit is liable for its negligence “if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of this state.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-19, § 3 (Vernon 1970).
The majority opinion holds that “the City of Denton is not liable for the dangerous *836condition of the storage building because it neither owned, occupied nor controlled the premises, nor did it create the dangerous condition.” This is a correct statement, but it should not be read to suggest that a governmental unit will be liable only if it owns, occupies or controls the premises, or creates the dangerous condition. The duties of a private person are not so limited.
For example, the rule has long been recognized in Texas that “one who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course of action for the benefit of another has a duty to exercise reasonable care that the other’s person or property will not be injured thereby.” Colonial Savings Ass’n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex.1976). The rule is stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.
There is evidence in this case that the city fire marshal undertook to perform an inspection of the storage building. The jury found that the fire marshal did not exercise reasonable care in performing the inspection. The jury also found that the marshal’s failure to properly inspect was a proximate cause of Page’s injuries. However, in order to recover under section 324A, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk of harm, or that the defendant undertook to perform a duty owed by another to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s undertaking.
In this case, there is no evidence that the fire marshal’s negligent inspection of the storage building increased the risk of harm. The city’s negligence in failing to discover the stored gasoline left Page in no worse condition than if the city had never undertaken to inspect the building. Further, there is no evidence in the record to show that the city undertook with Frances Melton to perform a duty owed by Melton to Page. The city did not agree with Melton to inspect the storage shed or to keep the premises safe for her invitees.
Finally, there is no evidence that Page relied on the fire marshal’s inspection to discover the dangerous condition of the storage building. On direct examination, Page testified as follows:
Q Did you see any of the firemen or Fire Marshal Hagemann making a search of the barn for flammable liquids?
A They went through the barn and walked all around the perimeter of it to see if they could find a discarded can or something of that nature.
Q Did anybody say anything to you about finding anything?
A No.
Q Did Fire Marshal Hagemann or any of the firemen say anything to you about making an inspection of the inside of the barn to find out if any of the flammable liquids were stored in there?
A No.
Q Do you know whether or not they did?
A They were going through the inside of the barn. Whether they were making an inspection to look for things, I can’t say.
This testimony affirmatively shows that Page did not rely on the fire marshal’s inspection. Without proof of any of the three elements, the city cannot be charged with a duty under section 324A of the Restatement.
*837There is no evidence the City of Denton owed any other duty to Page. Absent some showing of a duty, any duty, a private person is not liable for his negligence, and a city is not liable under section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Therefore, I concur in the decision announced by the court.
RAY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.