Appellants, a number of taxpayers residing within the Duncanville Independent School District, appeal from an adverse judgment rendered in their suit against the Duncanville Independent School District for injunctive and declaratory relief. Appellants sought to prevent the District from building a natatorium financed by the sale of a portion of the bonds authorized by a 1978 bond election. On appeal they contend that the trial court erred in: (1) concluding that the District was not bound by certain representations made to the public in connection with the bond election; and (2) concluding that the District did not act illegally in voting to use a portion of the bond proceeds to build a natatorium. We hold that the District was not bound by the representations in question because they were not formally adopted by the Board of Trustees 1 (“the Board”) of the District as a body at a properly called meeting. We also hold that the District did not act illegally in voting to use bond proceeds to finance the construction of a natatorium. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The controversy in this case concerns a bond election held on May 23, 1978, and certain representations made by the superintendent of schools in connection with the election. At a properly called meeting on May 4, 1978, the Board adopted the following proposition:
Shall the Board of Trustees of said District be authorized to issue the bonds of the District, in one or more series, in the aggregate principal amount of $15,000,-000, for the purpose of the construction and equipment of school buildings in the District and the purchase of the necessary sites therefor, with said bonds to mature, bear interest, and be issued and sold in accordance with law; and shall the Board of Trustees be authorized to levy and pledge, and cause to be assessed and collected, annual ad valorum taxes, on all taxable property in the district, sufficient, without limit as to rate or amount, to pay the principal of and interest on said bonds?
This proposition was submitted to and approved by the voters. No other orders, statements, or representations concerning the bond election were adopted by the Board at a called meeting.
On May 3, 1978, the superintendent of schools met with several Duncanville business and civic leaders. The local press was also in attendance. The superintendent, Dr. Sam Thompson, informed those present that the Board would meet the following *17day to officially call a bond election. Dr. Thompson explained that the bonds were needed to finance construction of new facilities required because of the District’s anticipated rapid growth. Dr. Thompson used an overhead projector to display the District’s projected student enrollment figures for the next several years. In the course of his presentation, Dr. Thompson stated that “[i]f the school does not grow in student population ... the bonds will not be sold.” The anticipated growth in student enrollment has not occurred.2
Dr. Thompson subsequently repeated his presentation at a number of other community meetings. Additionally, a leaflet was distributed at these meetings and placed in the mail slots of Duncanville residents containing the same growth figures that Dr. Thompson displayed on the overhead projector. The leaflet specifically projected the District’s need for four new elementary schools and one junior or senior high school, stating that 300,000 square feet of new classroom space would soon be needed. The leaflet bore the names of all Board members, and some of the Board members assisted in its distribution.
On May 14, 1984, the Board met and decided to use a portion of the bond proceeds to construct a natatorium on the campus of Duncanville High School. Appellants sued to enjoin construction of the natatorium. After trial to the court, judgment was rendered denying the relief sought.
On appeal, appellants first contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the District was not bound by the representations concerning the use of the bond proceeds that were made by Dr. Thompson and contained in the leaflet. We do not agree. The legislature has granted to the Board of Trustees of the District the exclusive power to manage and govern the schools within its jurisdiction. TEX.EDUC. CODE ANN. § 23.26(b) (Vernon 1972). It is a well-established rule in Texas that where the legislature has committed a matter to a political subdivision of the state, that subdivision may act only as a body corporate at a properly called meeting. Webster v. Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co., 140 Tex. 131, 166 S.W.2d 75, 76 (1942); Cook v. City of Addison, 656 S.W.2d 650, 657 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Thermo Products Co. v. Chilton Independent School District, 647 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex.App.—Waco 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Toyah Independent School District v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School District, 466 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1971, no writ). This general rule applies to governing bodies of school districts. Toyah, 466 S.W.2d at 380.
Appellants concede that none of the representations at issue were adopted by the Board as a body at a called meeting. Appellants, however, point to the trial court’s finding of fact that the Board was “aware of” the distribution of the leaflet and the presentations of Dr. Thompson and “acquiesced” in these actions. They argue that this knowledge and acquiescence makes the representations binding on the Board. We cannot agree. As our supreme court has stated:
Consent or acquiescence of, or agreements by, the individual members acting separately and not as a body do not bind the board of the political subdivision which they represent, and all persons are chargeable with knowledge that such is the case.
Webster, 166 S.W.2d at 77. See also Cook, 656 S.W.2d at 657. Accordingly, we hold that the District was not bound by the representations at issue because they were not formally adopted by the Board as a body at a properly called meeting.
Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the District did not act illegally in voting to use part of the bond proceeds to build a natato-*18rium. We disagree. The bond proposition submitted to and approved by the voters authorized the sale of the bonds “for the purpose of the construction and equipment of school buildings in the District.” The trial court found that the natatorium proposed by the Board is a “school building” within the meaning of the proposition submitted to the voters. Appellants have not challenged this finding on appeal. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that the District did not act illegally in voting to use bond proceeds to build a natatorium.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
HOWELL, J., dissents.
. The District is managed by its elected Board of Trustees.
. The District anticipated an increase of 4318 students from 1977-78 to 1984-85. The actual increase has been 561 students.