dissenting. The fact that a Pocahontas policeman cannot make an arrest in Paragould or a Texas Ranger in Fordyce, unless in fresh pursuit, does not (or should not) lead to the conclusion that police officers on the borders of their own area of authority (here the city limits of Searcy) may not lawfully act in response to an offense occurring in their presence and immediately adjacent to such borders, if only to detain the offender until an officer from the appropriate jurisdiction can arrive to effectuate an arrest. The rule of law now adopted by the majority means that an officer confronted, as was Officer Edmunson, with a highly inebriated motorist, is powerless to prevent an offense potentially dangerous to the public and must stand helplessly by while the drunken motorist drives away. Nothing I can find nor cited by the majority suggests that the law if so compartmentalized that police officers are legally impotent under these facts. Neither Logan v. State, 264 Ark. 920, 576 S.W.2d 203 (1975) nor Blevins v. State, 31 Ark. 53 (1876), have any factual resemblance to this case: in Logan, a Crittenden County sheriff participated in an arrest in St. Francis County (hours after the offense) no part of which the deputy witnessed; in Blevins, a Pope County sheriff executed an arrest warrant in Conway County, in excess of his powers as then defined by statute.
Moreover, I submit a sound argument exists that even a private citizen could act under the circumstances of this case. It was certainly true at common law that private citizens could arrest for misdemeanors committed in their presence where a breach of the peace was involved. 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest, § 35 (1962). This is the rule adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 119:
Arrest Without Warrant by Private Person for Criminal Offense.
Subject to the rules stated in §§ 127-136, a private person is privileged to arrest another without a warrant for a criminal offense.
* * *
(c) if the other, in the presence of the actor, is committing a breach of the peace or, having so committed a breach of the peace, he is reasonably believed by the actor to be about to renew it. . . .
That rule of common law has never been expressly overruled in Arkansas (dictum in Brewer v. State, 286 Ark. 1, 688 S.W.2d 736 (1985) notwithstanding), Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. McKinney, 189 Ark. 69, 71 S.W.2d 180 (1934). So far as I can determine, the common law rule has simply been ignored.
There is nothing so hallowed about geographical boundaries of police officers that the law restrains them from acting beyond those boundaries in certain instances, that is, when in fresh pursuit of: a suspected felon, any offender whose offense was committed in their presence, or anyone for whom they have a warrant. [See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-301 (1987)]. Thus if their authority has some flexibility where exigent circumstances exist (as in fresh pursuit), it is equally plausible that they have the authority to detain any offender acting in their presence whose conduct endangers the public, even though the offense may be occurring just beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. I would affirm.