dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This Court should assert jurisdiction in this case because the appeal was timely perfected.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the February 9, 1993 summary judgment was final for purposes of appeal. A judgment is not final unless it disposes of all parties and all issues in a case. Felderoff v. Knauf, 819 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Tex.1991) (per curiam). A final judgment disposes of all of the issues involved so that no future action by the trial court will be necessary in order to settle and determine the entire controversy. K & S Interests, Inc. v. Texas Am. Bank-Dallas, 749 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1987, writ denied).
The February 9, 1993 summary judgment did not purport to determine the entire controversy between the parties. Lapidus’ motion for sanctions under rule 13 was already pending at the time that the trial court heard his motion for summary judgment.1 The motion for summary judgment did not request a ruling on the sanctions issue.2 Nor did the order granting summary judgment overrule the rule 13 motion by necessary implication. Cf. J. Stiles, Inc. v. Evans, 667 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1983, no writ) (per curiam).
A motion for rule 13 sanctions requires the trial court to decide whether a pleading is groundless and whether it was filed in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. Tex. R.Civ.P. 13. The majority holds that these questions are not “issues” that must be resolved in a final judgment. Yet it also holds that they are not “collateral matters unrelated to the merits of the case.” Cf. Wolma v. Gonzalez, 822 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1991, orig. proc.). One wonders exactly what type of issue is raised by a rule 13 motion, if it is neither an issue in the case nor a collateral matter unrelated to the case. Apparently, the majority believes that the issue of rule 13 sanctions is waived or becomes moot by the entry of judgment. I disagree.
Rule 13 sanctions are unlike discovery sanctions in that they directly concern the merits of the underlying action. As a practical matter, a motion for rule 13 sanctions cannot be ruled on until after the trial court has decided the merits of the case, because the court must first decide whether a party’s pleading is “groundless.” Thus, unlike discovery sanctions, rule 13 sanctions should not be waived by going to trial. Cf. Remington Arms Co., Inc. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex.1993, orig. proc.). Nor does the issue of the rule 13 sanctions become moot by the granting of a summary judgment. To the contrary, the summary judgment may be necessary to show the requisite groundlessness:
The majority’s holding is largely based on the rather semantic observation that “a [sanctions] motion is not a pleading.” Yet, it also acknowledges authority for the proposition that a sanctions motion is “in the nature of a pleading,” at least for the purpose of defining the issues on which a trial court may rule. See Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). The distinction between a motion and a pleading in this instance is entirely artifi*769cial. Rule 13 sanctions can logically be sought by counterclaim. A request for rule 13 sanctions, whether by motion or pleading, is a request for affirmative relief. See New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d at 205.
The majority also cites J. Stiles, Inc. v. Evans, 667 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1983, no writ) for the proposition that a trial court’s failure to rule on a motion has no bearing on the finality of a judgment. This argument, which appears in Stiles as mere dictum, also relies heavily on the artificial distinction between a rule 13 motion and a rule 13 counterclaim. Moreover, Stiles cites as authority Rylee v. McMorrough, 616 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ dism’d), although Ry-lee offers no support for that position.
The March 24, 1993 “Final Judgment” signed by the trial court is the first order that determines the entire controversy between the parties, including the issue of sanctions. In my view, this is the first final judgment that was signed. Because a motion for new trial was filed on April 23,1993, the trial court was still acting within its plenary power when it signed a “Corrected Final Judgment” on May 27, 1993.
The Corrected Final Judgment was sufficient to restart the appellate timetable. Az-bill v. Dallas County Child Protective Serv. Unit, 860 S.W.2d 133, 138 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1993, no writ). This appeal was timely perfected from that judgment.
. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Hjalmar-son v. Langley, 840 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.App. — Waco 1992, orig. proc.), in which the rule 13 motion was not filed until after a final judgment was signed.
. Nor should it have, since rule 13 requires the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1993, no writ).