dissenting.
There should be no misunderstanding about what the record shows concerning the choice of sanctions made by the trial court. In summary, the record shows Fletcher filed a motion for new trial urging expressly that the following sanctions were more commensurate with her admitted misconduct in lying under oath: (1) disallowing any further discovery; (2) charging against Fletcher a part of the discovery expenses; (3) disallowing those aspects of her damages to which her falsehoods related; or (4) denying her use of any deposition evidence shown to be tainted by her false testimony.
An evidentiary hearing was held on Fletcher’s motion for new trial. A statement of facts recording that hearing is in our record. It reveals quite extensive argument between the opposing parties based on undisputed facts. Fletcher’s counsel argued for the suggested lesser sanctions as being “more appropriate” sanctions, “if sanctions are indeed necessary” at all. Opposing counsel argued against any of the lesser sanctions on the *87ground that only dismissal would “comport” with the purpose of discovery-abuse sanctions, namely “to deter other litigants from violating the rules and to punish parties that violate the rules.” He pointed out the materiality of Fletcher’s falsehoods to the issues in the case and how her falsehoods had hindered the discovery process. Another opposing counsel pointed out Fletcher’s continuing deceit in that, until the very hearing itself, she had maintained the correctness of her false tax returns and had repeatedly treated with disdain both the court and her oath. In ruling from the bench, the trial judge noted expressly that dismissal was a “very harsh remedy” but concluded she must adhere to her original ruling. In a written order to that effect, signed by the trial judge, she declared expressly that she had considered the motion for new trial and the parties’ arguments thereon. The meaning and effect of this written order are that the trial judge considered and rejected any lesser sanctions as being insufficient for the purposes involved. See 4 Roy McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts § 17.10.1, at 90-91 (Frank W. Elliott ed., 1982).
Thus, we most assuredly do not have before us a record that is “silent” with regard to whether the trial court considered lesser sanctions. The record shows affirmatively that a hearing was held specifically for that purpose and the trial court received evidence and argument on which available sanction was most appropriate. There are no disputed facts; hence findings of fact would have been superfluous. The “testing” of lesser sanctions is inappropriate when the abuse of discovery consists of manufacturing and supplying false information rather than resisting disclosure of information. “The fabrication of evidence raises a presumption ... that the supposed cause of action ... of the party guilty thereof is without substantial foundation.” 29 Am.Jur.2d “Evidence” § 176 at 29 (1967).
It is apparent to me, from the contents of the record before us, that the trial judge acted on the basis of the reasons given in connection with the motion for new trial and others apparent on the face of the record. For the reasons given in my earlier opinion, I conclude the record shows the trial court did not abuse her discretion. See Fletcher v. Blair, 843 S.W.2d 601, 605-10 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992) (Powers, J., dissenting), rev’d, 849 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.1993). I would therefore affirm the trial-court order.