OPINION
OLIVER-PARROTT, Chief Justice.Samuel Zolan (appellant), the father and possessory conservator of the child, Michael Zolan, appeals from a judgment for unpaid child support arrearage. The Texas Attorney General (appellee) brought the action to reduce unpaid child support to judgment. See Tex.Hum.Res.Code Ann. § 76.007 (Vernon Supp.1994), § 76.009 (Vernon Supp. 1994). Mr. Zolan argues the judgment should be reversed because, although the proceeding was filed within four years after his son became an adult at age 18, he was not served with citation within such period or with due diligence after the period had expired. We affirm.
Factual Background
Samuel Zolan and Elvie Zolan (now Star-rett) divorced on February 29, 1980. The decree of divorce appointed Mrs. Starrett managing conservator of their son, Michael Zolan, who was born on July 28, 1970. Mr. Zolan was ordered to pay child support of $400 per month to Mrs. Starrett.
On June 9, 1992, forty-nine days before Michael turned 22 years old, but within the four-year period after Michael’s eighteenth birthday, the attorney general filed a motion to reduce unpaid child support to judgment. According to the motion, the aggregate ar-rearage, as of May 27, 1992, was $13,743.39. Mr. Zolan was served with citation on September 22, 1992. A hearing was held on December 2, 1992.
On January 14,1993, the trial court signed a corrected judgment, finding Mr. Zolan in arrears on child support in the total sum of $13,743. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 21, 1993.
Due diligence in service of citation
In his first point of error, Mr. Zolan contends the trial court erred in failing to find that the attorney general did not exercise due diligence in procuring the issuance and service of process. In his third point of error, he states the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in making the following conclusions of law because there is nothing to support a finding of due diligence on the part of the attorney general:
3. The Time Limitations prescribed in Texas Family Code Section 14.41(b) were tolled by the filing of the Motion to Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment within four years after the child Michael J. Zolan became an adult and the use of due diligence by the Attorney General of Texas in securing service over the Respondent, Samuel G. Zolan.
4. All legal prerequisites to the granting of a money judgment have been met.
5. The Attorney General of Texas is awarded a judgment for past-due child support against Samuel G. Zolan in the amount of $13,743.00, together with interest at the legal rate.
The attorney general responds that there is ample evidence in the record that diligence was exercised in procuring service of citation upon Mr. Zolan. Furthermore, he contends that section 14.41 is a jurisdictional statute, and the tolling rules, such as diligence, typi*726cally applied to statutes of limitation, do not apply to section 14.41.
Section 14.41(b) of the Family Code reads as follows:
(b) Time Limitations. The court of continuing jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child support in arrears and enter judgment for past-due child support obligations if a motion to render judgment for the arrearages is filed within four years after:
(1) the child1 becomes an adult; or
(2) the date on which the child support obligation terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by operation of law.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.41(b) (Vernon Supp. 1994).2
We agree with the attorney general that section 14.41(b) should not be subject to a due diligence analysis. Unlike statutes of limitation, it is jurisdictional in nature. Section 14.41(b) clearly defines the continuing subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. In re C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ); Sandford v. Sandford, 732 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); see In re Dickinson, 829 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ); Jordan v. Middleton, 762 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ). Unlike a statute of limitations, the four-year period contained in section 14.41(b) does not run from the accrual of a cause of action, but starts to run from the time the court’s jurisdiction would normally end. TexFam.Code Ann. § 14.41(b). The statute, therefore, expands the period of the court’s jurisdiction over the parent-child relationship and mitigates the earlier results where jurisdiction ended on the date when a child turned 18 or was emancipated. C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d at 792.
Because section 14.41(b) addresses a court’s jurisdiction, tolling rules typically applied to statutes of limitations do not apply to section 14.41(b). See C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d at 792 (appellate court found running of two-year period not suspended under Tex.Civ. Peac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.063, which applies only to statutes of limitation). Conceptually, an attempt to collect child support arrearage is different than the filing of a cause of action for money damages. The latter is subject to the traditional two- or four-year statutes of limitation to give the defendants reasonably prompt notice of a potential claim. An action for child support, however, is a motion filed in a matter over which the court has continuing jurisdiction. The Beaumont court, calling the statute jurisdictional, concluded that section 14.41(b) could not be tolled by a defendant’s absence from the State. C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d at 792. It is analogous that the existence or absence of due diligence, like presence within the State, is not a valid or relevant inquiry.
The language of section 14.41(b) uses the word “filings” rather than the phrase, “bringing suit.” Most statutes of limitations require a plaintiff to “bring suit” within a relevant limitation period. See, e.g., TexCiv. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 16.002-16.004 (Vernon 1986). The supreme court interprets the phrase “bring suit” to require that a plaintiff not only file suit within the limitations period, but use diligence in serving a defendant with process. Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex.1990). In contrast, the phrase “bring suit” does not appear in section 14.41(b). Instead, section 14.41(b) simply requires that a motion to render judgment for arrearages be “filed.”
Mr. Zolan agrees that the motion to reduce unpaid child support to judgment was timely filed on June 9, 1992. Further, Mr. Zolan does not challenge the trial court’s *727conclusion of law number two, that the court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the action. Therefore, the trial court retained and possessed continuing jurisdiction of the motion to reduce at the time of hearing and properly granted judgment in favor of the attorney general of Texas.
We overrule appellant’s points of error one and three. The inquiry into due diligence was unnecessary. The motion was timely filed. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.41(b).
Conflicts between findings of fact
In his second point of error, Mr. Zo-lan asserts the trial court’s finding of fact number six (as submitted by the attorney general) is in irreconcilable conflict with the additional findings of fact and conclusions of law as found by the trial court pursuant to Mr. Zolan’s request for additional and amended findings of fact.
On December 7, 1992, five days after the judgment was signed, Mr. Zolan filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The record does not show that Mr. Zolan proposed any findings or conclusions. The attorney general proposed findings and conclusions on December 17, 1992, which were signed by the trial court on January 21, 1993. These are the only signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in the record.
On December 29, 1992, Mr. Zolan filed a request for additional and amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. A copy of this request, with handwritten rulings, “denied” or “granted,” appearing after each finding or conclusion, appears in the transcript. A document entitled “Additional and Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” with typewritten rulings, “denied” or “granted,” appears in the first supplemental transcript. Neither the request nor the document is signed by the trial court.
We find there is no irreconcilable conflict because the trial court did not make any additional or amended findings of fact or conclusions of law. We overrule appellant’s second point of error.
Admissibility of Mrs. Starrett’s testimony
In his fourth point of error, Mr. Zolan states that the trial court committed harmful error when it permitted Elvie Starrett to testify concerning other actions for enforcement she had brought against Mr. Zolan, overruling his objection of irrelevancy. Because Mrs. Starrett’s testimony went to the issue of due diligence, an inquiry we have held was unnecessary in points one and three, it is not necessary for us to address appellant’s point of error four.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed for the reasons stated herein.
Justice WILSON concurring.
. "Child" or "minor” means a person under 18 years of age who is not and has not been married or who has not had his disabilities of minority removed for general purposes. In the context of child support, "child” includes a person over 18 years of age who is fully enrolled in an accredited secondary school in a program leading toward a high school diploma. "Adult" means any other person.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.01(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
. This language reflects the amendments made by Act of June 18, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 798, § 14, 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 3169, 3174. Although the changes were not in effect when the trial court entered its judgment, they have no impact on our reasoning.