concurring. I concur with the results reached in the plurality opinion; however, it is inscribed with such broad, sweeping statements, that I feel compelled to write in a narrow vein. In doing so, I adopt the plurality’s version of the facts, reorganize the issues as written, and restrict my views as follows:
WINGO ACT
Nelms initially asserts that his employment agreement with Morgan is void and unenforceable because it violates the Wingo Act. There is no dispute that Morgan’s charter was revoked for failure to pay franchise taxes at the time of execution of the employment agreement. However, the undisputed, express terms of the agreement contain a non-competition clause regulating Nelms’s conduct in interstate commerce. Such a clause falls within the purview of an established interstate commerce exception to the requirement that a corporation must be qualified to do business in Arkansas before it can enforce a contract. Goode v. Universal Plastics, Inc., 247 Ark. 442, 445 S.W.2d 893 (1969). We have also noted that the Wingo Act will not be applied to prevent actions on contracts made outside of Arkansas, even thoughrinterstate commerce is not involved. UPI v. Hernreich, d/b/a Station KZNG, 241 Ark. 36, 406 S.W.2d 317 (1966); Hough v. Continental Leasing Corp., 275 Ark. 340, 630 S.W.2d 19 (1982).
PUBLIC POLICY
Nelms also argues that the employment agreement is void and unenforceable because it violates the public policy of the State of Arkansas.
We have adhered to the view that an individual who subjects himself to the personal jurisdiction of a court by express agreement shall be bound by that contract if the agreement can be determined to be fair and reasonable. SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assoc., Inc., 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451 (1982); see Ark. Code Ann. § 4-1-105 (1987); and see also R.A. Leflar, American Conflicts Law 100 (1977).
In this case, the pleadings provide only a conclusory allegation that this is an unfair adhesion contract, as Nelms’s petition is barren of any factual support for such a conclusion. An examination of the undisputed terms of the agreement reveals that Nelms’s employment rights, compensation, and employment rules are equally balanced with Morgan’s protective covenant rights and remedies. Without further evidence or factual support in the record to show otherwise, we are compelled to conclude that this contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP
The enforceability of a choice of forum clause also hinges on whether the state that the parties have chosen to govern the contract has a “substantial relationship” with the contract. Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., Inc., 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d 158 (1963); Arkansas Appliance Distrib. Co. v. Tandy Electronics, Inc., 292 Ark. 482, 730 S.W.2d 899 (1987). Here, Morgan is a Texas corporation that accepted an employment contract in Texas for one of its employees to manage a plant dealing in interstate commerce. The contract itself indicates that it was made and was performable in Texas and that Texas was selected as the proper forum in the event of a dispute. These factors establish a substantial relationship between the State of Texas and the employment agreement.
Special Justice Eddie H. Walker, Jr. joins in this concurring opinion.