dissenting.
The majority concludes that the State presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Fancil manufactured three or more grams of methamphetamine. Because I cannot agree that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference that Fancil had manufactured an amount of methamphetamine sufficient to sustain the conviction for Dealing in Methamphetamine, as a Class A felony, I respectfully dissent.
Our standard of review when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind.2000)). “The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Id. (quoting Pickens v. State, 751 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind.Ct.App.2001)).
The majority’s reasoning relies upon its interpretation of Halferty v. State, 930 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied. In Halferty, the State introduced testimony that the conversion ratio of one gram of pseudoephedrine to .7 or .8 grams of methamphetamine was true “in general,” but that the ratio could drop below fifty percent. Id. at 1153. Because in that situation the total yield of methamphetamine from precursor pseudoephedrine would bring the total amount of methamphetamine Halferty would have manufac*711tured below the three grams required for a Class A felony conviction, we concluded the evidence was insufficient to sustain Halferty’s Class A conviction. Id. at 1154.
The situation that faced us in Halferty does not present itself here. In that case, the testimony established a range of possible yields of methamphetamine both above and below the three grams total required to convict Halferty of a Class A felony. Here, the testimony is that the total amount of precursor pseudoephedrine possessed by Fancil came to around fifteen grams. The State elicited Detective Faulstich’s testimony that the fifteen grams of pseudoephedrine could produce five or more grams of methamphetamine.
The majority concludes that “the use of the term ‘could’ ... is, in and of itself, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Fan-cil manufactured three or more grams of meth.” Op. at 707. Yet while “the State cannot rely on the low conversion ratio from Halferty ” because that ratio was not in evidence, Op. at 707, the evidence that was put before the jury indicated that, given the amount of pseudoephedrine and other supplies recovered irom the home, Fancil could have produced at least five grams of methamphetamine as an experienced lab operator.
This evidence, I think, permits a reasonable inference that Fancil actually did produce five or more grams of methamphetamine. Our standard of review requires that we reverse a conviction only when “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (emphasis added). That condition was not met here, and thus I think a reasonable jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Fancil was guilty of Class A Dealing in Methamphetamine. I would therefore affirm his conviction of the Class A felony.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.