dissenting.
This case arrives in this Court in a peculiar procedural posture. Under a factual scenario clearly entitling the plaintifffAppellee to an instruction on punitive damages, the trial court ruled first that the language of KRS 411.184(l)(c) precluded such an instruction, then that KRS 411.184 was unconstitutional because it abolished the common law right to *270punitive damages. Having thus discarded KRS 411.184, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the common law standard established in Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., Ky., 690 S.W.2d 382, 389-90 (1985), viz : conduct exhibiting a wanton or reckless disregard for the lives and safety of other persons, or a willful or malicious act. From this set of circumstances has arisen the great and unnecessary debate as to (1) whether KRS 411.184 is unconstitutional as violative of the so-called “jural rights” doctrine, and (2) whether the “jural rights” doctrine has any valid constitutional basis.
I.
There was no need to address the “jural rights” doctrine in this ease, for KRS 411.184 does not abolish the common law right to punitive damages. Faced with an argument similar to that accepted by the trial court in this case, we specifically so held in Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885 (1993). Justice Leibson wrote in that case:
Throughout this litigation State Farm has presented various arguments against submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury based on its interpretation of statutory language found in the new punitive damages statute enacted in 1988, now codified as KRS 411.184. It suffices to say that this Court could not interpret KRS 411.184 to destroy a cause of action for punitive damages otherwise appropriate without fatally impaling upon jural rights guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution, Sections 14, 54, and 241.... “We shall not so interpret it.”
Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
KRS 411.184 and .186 did not destroy the cause of action for punitive damages, but merely established standards to guide the jury in its determination of whether such damages are appropriate and the amount to be awarded. Never before have we questioned the authority of the General Assembly to enact statutes establishing the degree of culpability necessary to entitle a litigant to recover punitive damages. ‘We do not think it any longer an open question as to the authority of the general assembly to pass the statute in question.” Clark’s Adm’x v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 101 Ky. 34, 39 S.W. 840, 841 (1897); see also Wright v. Woods’ Adm’r, 96 Ky. 56, 27 S.W. 979 (1894). Even though the majority finds fault with the fact that the statute refers to malice rather than gross negligence, we held in Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., supra, that “wanton or reckless disregard for the lives, safety or property of others” is indistinguishable from “malice implied from the facts.” Id. at 389-90. (Remember that last phrase.)
The only possible argument for the proposition that KRS 411.184 “abolished” the right to punitive damages is the one rejected in Wittmer v. Jones, supra, but accepted by the trial court in this case, i.e., that the element of “subjective awareness” set forth in the definition of malice, KRS 411.184(l)(c), can be proven only by the direct testimony of the person against whom punitive damages are sought. Since the defendant/Appellant was unavailable to testify, the trial court reasoned that Appellee could not prove Appellant’s “subjective awareness,” thus was not entitled to an instruction on punitive damages. However, as Justice Leibson also wrote in Fowler v. Mantooth, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 250 (1984), a case addressing the requirement of proof of malice as a condition precedent to an award of punitive damages, “Malice may be implied from outrageous conduct, and need not be express so long as the conduct is sufficient to evidence conscious wrongdoing.” Id. at 252. This obviously is what the Court meant by the phrase “malice implied from the facts” in Horton v. Union Light, Heat and Power Co., supra, at 390. This is also in conformance with the principle that “a plaintiff is entitled to prove a defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence.” Ball v. E.W. Scripps Co., Ky., 801 S.W.2d 684, 689 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1622, 113 L.Ed.2d 719 (1991), quoting from, Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2686, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). Even in a criminal ease, where the elements of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, mens rea may be inferred from the act itself and/or the circumstances surrounding it. Tungate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 901 S.W.2d 41 (1995); *271Anastasi v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 860 (1988); Lambert v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 885 S.W.2d 299 (1992).
It is no longer arguable in this day and age that proof of the act of driving while intoxicated creates an inference of “subjective awareness” on the part of the actor of the potential consequences of the act. If that inference would satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof in a criminal ease, it is sufficient to satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard set forth in KRS 411.184(2).
The majority opinion also takes umbrage with the statute’s use of the “clear and convincing evidence” standard as a “vastly elevated standard for the recovery of punitive damages and a clear departure from the common law.” (Op., p. 264.) Even if that were true, such would not implicate the “jural rights” doctrine, since the establishment of a heightened standard of proof would not “abolish” the right to collect punitive damages, but only establish the standard of proof to be applied by the jury in determining whether to award them. In fact, both malice and fraud have always required proof by clear and convincing evidence. E.g., Hardin v. Savageau, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 356 (1995); Warford v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Ky., 789 S.W.2d 758 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047, 111 S.Ct. 754, 112 L.Ed.2d 774 (1991). The standard recognizes the quasi-criminal nature of punitive damages by taking the middle ground between the standard ordinarily used in civil cases of proof by a “preponderance of the evidence,” and the criminal law standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” While holding that Due Process does not require a standard higher than the “preponderance of the evidence,” if buttressed by other procedural and substantive protections, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “There is much to be said in favor of a State’s requiring, as many do, ... a standard of clear and convincing evidence” or, even, “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23, n. 11, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1046, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991). The “clear and convincing evidence” standard for punitive damages has been adopted by legislative enactment or judicial decision in twenty-nine other states and the District of Columbia,1 and has been recommended by each of the principal academic groups to analyze the law of punitive damages since 1979, i.e., the American Bar Association,2 the American College of Trial Lawyers,3 the American Law Institute,4 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.5
*272The jury in this ease should have been instructed on punitive damages in accordance with KRS 411.184 and .186 as initially requested by the plaintiff/Appellee. If the trial court had done so, there would have been no need to address whether the “jural rights” doctrine has any basis in our Constitution.
II.
In his well reasoned and well documented article, Jural Rights Under Kentucky’s Constitution: Realities Grounded in Myth, 80 Ky. L.J. 953 (1991-92), Professor Thomas P. Lewis, a preeminent scholar of Kentucky constitutional law, makes a compelling case for the proposition that the “jural rights” doctrine is nothing more nor less than a judicial usurpation of a traditional legislative prerogative. Id. at 964 and 976. As first enunciated in the case of Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), the doctrine appears to have been intended to perpetually tether the jurisprudence of this Commonwealth to nineteenth century tort principles, i.e., any common law right of action existing prior to the adoption of the 1891 Constitution is sacrosanct and cannot be abolished. Id., 49 S.W.2d at 351; cf. Carney v. Moody, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 40 (1983). In arriving at that conclusion and in coining the phrase “jural rights,” the Ludwig court relied principally upon the Oregon case of Stewart v. Houk, 127 Or. 589, 271 P. 998, 999 (1928). Ludwig v. Johnson, supra, 49 S.W.2d at 350. Oregon subsequently abandoned the “jural rights” concept. Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203, 207 (1971). We, on the other hand, have expanded it to include any common law right of action, whether or not that right existed prior to the adoption of the 1891 Constitution. Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809, 815-18 (1991), overruling, Carney v. Moody, supra. Ergo, any act of the legislature abolishing any right created by judicial decision violates the “jural rights” doctrine and is, therefore, unconstitutional. (!) As if that were not expansive enough, the majority of this Court today declares that any act of the legislature which “impairs,” though does not “abolish,” a common law right, is also unconstitutional. (Op., p. 260.) As Professor Lewis foresaw, this Court has now assumed for itself the sole power to make any meaningful changes in the area of tort law. Lewis, supra, at 980.
If that had been the intent of the framers of the 1891 Constitution, one can only wonder why they included Section 233 and the First paragraph of the Schedule accompanying the Constitution, both of which vest in the legislature the power to alter or repeal any laws in force and effect at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 864, 51 S.W. 624 (1899). In Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., Ky., 635 S.W.2d 475 (1982), we reiterated that Section 233 and the First paragraph of the Schedule explicitly recognize that the common law is subject to repeal or alteration by the legislature. Id. at 476; see also Ruby Lumber Co. v. K.V. Johnson Co., 299 Ky. 811, 187 S.W.2d 449, 453 (1945). And as recently as Commonwealth, ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 610 (1992), we held that “Judicially created common law must always yield to the superi- or policy of legislative enactment and the Constitution.” Id. at 614. There is not one word in the 6,023 typewritten pages (double columns, elite type) of the reported Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1890 (hereinafter “Debates") which supports a contrary conclusion. As Professor Lewis points out, there is no factual basis for a belief that the framers ever entertained the notion that the common law is immune from repeal or alteration. Lewis, supra, at 983. Certainly, no such intent can be discerned in the three constitutional provisions relied upon in Ludwig, supra, and in the majority opinion in this case.
Section 14 is as follows:
All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
This provision was first adopted as Article XII, Section 13, of our 1792 Constitution. It *273was readopted verbatim as Article X, Section 13, of the Constitution of 1799 and as Article XII, Section 15, of the Constitution of 1850. As Professor Lewis explains, it has its roots in Chapter XXIX of Magna Charta, a fact recognized by delegate Robert Rodes of Warren County, chairman of the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights, during his report of this provision to the other delegates at the 1890 Convention. Lewis, supra, at 965; 1 Debates, supra, at 444. More than ten years after the adoption of the Constitution of 1850 and thirty years prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1891, our predecessor Court was called upon in the case of Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Metc. 566, 60 Ky. 566 (1861) to interpret the meaning of this provision.
This provision is found in the bill of rights^ It prescribes certain general duties for the courts of the State, and also lays down general rules for the manner of conducting their business, the effect of which may be thus stated: 1. They are to be held in an open and public manner, and their proceedings are not to be secret or concealed from public view. 2. They are to administer justice without sale — that is, they are not to accept compensation from litigants; and 3. They are not to deny any one a fair trial, nor to delay the same, except upon sufficient legal grounds for continuance.
The terms and import of this provision show that it relates altogether to the judicial department of the government, which is to administer justice “by due course of law,” and not to the legislative department, by which such “due course” may be prescribed.
Any other construction would make it inconsistent with other clauses of the constitution, and, in fact, render it practically absurd.
Id., 60 Ky. at 570-71. This interpretation was reaffirmed in Barkley v. Glover, 4 Metc. 44, 61 Ky. 44 (1862).
In rendering his report to the 1890 convention, delegate Rodes first read the language of what is now Section 14, then reported: “That is unobjected to, and is the equivalent of section 15 of the present Constitution.” 1 Debates, supra, at 439. In readopting this provision verbatim and without debate, Id. at 1001, the delegates are presumed to have also adopted the construction given to it in Johnson v. Higgins and Barkley v. Glover. Hodgkin v. Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, Ky., 246 S.W.2d 1014, 1016-17 (1952); cf. Butler v. Groce, Ky., 880 S.W.2d 547 (1994); Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858, 172 S.W.2d 548 (1943); Ray v. Spiers, 281 Ky. 549, 136 S.W.2d 750 (1940) (same presumption applies to statutes reenacted after judicial construction). The holdings in Johnson v. Higgins and Barkley v. Glover having thus been in-grafted into Section 14 at the time of its adoption, the subsequent characterization of those holdings in Ludwig v. Johnson, supra, at 351, as “clearly unsound” is legally irrelevant.
Section 54 is as follows:
The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.
On its face, the purpose of this Section is to prevent the legislature from placing dollar limits on awards of damages “for injuries.” It has nothing to do with punitive damages, which are not awarded as compensation “for injuries,” but to punish and deter wrongdoing. Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., Ky., 508 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (1974); Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (1946). In reporting what became Section 54 to the 1890 convention, delegate Ignatius A. Spalding of Union County, chairman of the Committee on Legislative Department, explained it as follows:
Section thirty-nine [of the committee report] is a new section, forbidding the General Assembly from limiting amount recovered for damage to person or property. The Legislature has, perhaps, in some cases, put a limit upon the amount to be recovered for damages by railroad accidents to persons resulting in death or in injury to person or property. This section forbids the General Assembly from putting any limit upon the amount of damages to be recovered, leaving it to the jury.
3 Debates, supra, at 3793. Following the rejection of an amendment to strike this *274provision, it was adopted without further debate. Id. at 3916.
If the words contained in a constitutional provision are ambiguous, the debates of the constitutional convention which adopted it may be resorted to in ascertaining the purpose sought to be accomplished or the mischief designed to be remedied by that provision. Barker v. Steams Coal & Lumber Co., 287 Ky. 340, 152 S.W.2d 953, 956 (1941); Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 38 S.W.2d 987, 993 (1931); Higgins v. Prater, 91 Ky. 6, 14 S.W. 910, 912 (1890) (interpreting a provision of the Constitution of 1850). In fact, there is nothing ambiguous about Section 54. If there were, the explanation by delegate Spalding clarifies that its purpose was to preclude legislation placing dollar limits on awards of damages for injuries to persons or property. Nothing in its language or history suggests an intent to strip the legislature of its historical prerogative reiterated in Section 233 and the First paragraph of the Schedule to enact legislation in derogation of the common law.
Section 241 is as follows:
Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury, inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every death case, damages may be recovered for such death, from corporations and persons so causing the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the recovery shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made, the same shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person.
It would be incongruous to suggest that this section was designed to protect and preserve a common law right of action; for there is not and never has been a common law right of action for wrongful death. Smith’s Adm’r v. National Coal & Iron Co., 135 Ky. 671, 117 S.W. 280 (1909); Eden v. Lexington & Frankfort R.R. Co., 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 165 (1853). “The maxim, ‘Actio personalis moritur cum persona,’ was the uniform rule of the common law, and prevails in Kentucky to-day (sic), except where it has been modified by the express language of the Constitution and statute.” Gregory v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., Ky., 80 S.W. 795 (1904). There were wrongful death statutes in existence at the time of the 1890 convention, but there was substantial uncertainty not only as to whom the cause of action belonged, but when the action might be maintained, if at all. Howard’s Adm’r v. Hunter, 126 Ky, 685, 104 S.W. 723, 725 (1907); see Henderson’s Adm’r v. Kentucky C. Ry. Co., 86 Ky. 389, 5 S.W. 875 (1887). Just prior to the convention, a judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court had declared a section of the wrongful death act unconstitutional because it purportedly discriminated against railroads.6 Debates, supra, at 4687. The delegates obviously were concerned about the future viability of tort recovery for wrongful death and trusted neither the legislature nor the courts to protect that statutory cause of action. Just as obviously, the adoption of Section 241 had nothing to do with protecting common law rights.
If, as posited in Ludwig v. Johnson and Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, common law causes of action in tort are cloaked with constitutional protection, that protection is not limited to acts of the legislature, but must apply also to acts of the judiciary. Surely, the majority of this Court does not believe that the Constitution applies only to the legislature and not to us.7 We would be forced to conclude under the logic perpetuated by the majority opinion in this case that this Court, itself, acted unconstitutionally when we abolished the common law tort of alienation of affections by unanimous vote in Hoye v. Hoye, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 422 (1992).
This Court has recently reiterated the maxim that public policy is within the constitutional domain of the legislature.
*275[T]he establishmént of public policy is not within the authority of the courts. Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that the powers of government be divided into three distinct units: Executive, Legislative and Judicial. The establishment of public policy is granted to the legislature alone....
Commonwealth, ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, supra, at 614.
Courts are well suited to adjudicate individual disputes concerning discrete issues and parties. The Founding Fathers recognized this when they drafted the United States Constitution to give the judiciary jurisdiction to decide “cases and controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill § 2 cl. 1; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); Associated Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1995). On the other hand, the judicial process is not well suited to the formulation of public policy. As Professor Lewis notes, individuals, lobbies, or other collectives cannot talk to a court.
Briefs amicus curiae may be filed, but the virtue of the judicial system is that its primary focus must be on the trial record and parties before it; judges are not generally equipped or expected to make textually generalized, interrelated rule-type decisions based on “legislative facts.” The common law decisions of a court are law, and no better system has been devised than this technique, by which general principles of law emerge from small bits of real life experience. But the technique has worked so well not because judges have a monopoly on wisdom but because the people have always reserved the power to modify principles that in the light of mounting experience have faded to work to their satisfaction.
Lewis, supra, at 983.
On the other hand, legislatures are uniquely well equipped to reach fully informed decisions about the need for broad public policy changes in the law. They have more complete access to information, including the ability to receive comments from persons representing a multiplicity of perspectives and to use the legislative process to obtain new information. If a point needs further elaboration, a witness can be recalled. The rationale for legislative preeminence in formulating broad public policy is reflective of these inherent strengths in the legislative process.
Section 28 of the Constitution provides as follows:
No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments [legislative, executive or judicial] shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing in Section 14, 54 or 241 which expressly transfers the power to formulate public policy in the area of tort law from the legislative department to the judicial department. In the absence of such an express provision, Ludwig v. Johnson and its progeny have simply ignored Section 28 and discerned implied support for this transfer of power in a combined interpretation of Sections 14, 54 and 241. Of course, premising the “jural rights” doctrine upon mere implication is itself a direct violation of Section 28. Nevertheless, the historical analysis of the origins and purposes of Sections 14, 54 and 241, as set forth in Professor Lewis’s article and in this dissenting opinion, reveals not even an implication that those sections are interrelated or that the framers intended for any or all of them, read separately or together, to transfer power over public policy with respect to tort law from the legislature to the judiciary. We, like Bonaparte, have placed that crown upon our own head.
Nor do I subscribe to the proposition that sixty-six years of error must be perpetuated for the sake of “predictability.” (Op., p. 267.) After all, although Ludwig v. Johnson has been on the books for sixty-six years, it purported to overrule over seventy years of precedent represented by Johnson v. Higgins and Barkley v. Glover, supra; and it and its progeny have effectively reversed 800 years of settled Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. Lewis, supra, at 964. I agree with Justice Leibson that “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis does not commit us to the sanctification of ancient fallacy.” Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 *276S.W.2d 713, 717 (1984). As for “predictability,” who could have predicted that after sixty-six years of applying the “jural rights” doctrine to legislative enactments which “abolish” common law rights of action, this Court would now extend its scope to enactments which merely “impair” those rights?
III.
Read together, KRS 411.184 and KRS 411.186 establish adequate standards to guide a properly instructed jury, e.g., Pal-more, 2 Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Civil), § 39.15 (1989), in assessing punitive damages in a particular case. See Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 443, n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 2345, n. 6, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). A growing plurality on the United States Supreme Court now believes that punitive damage verdicts rendered by inadequately instructed juries violate substantive due process requirements. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-99, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1604-10, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996); cf. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462-64, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2723-24, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra, 499 U.S. at 18-20, 111 S.Ct. at 1043-44. A reading of these opinions suggests that the common law standard for awarding punitive damages approved in Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., supra, and reaffirmed by the majority opinion herein (Op., p. 263), which was used to instruct the jury in this ease, may no longer pass federal constitutional muster. Thus, in discarding KRS 411.184, we are left with a common law standard for punitive damage verdicts which is protected in perpetuum by the “jural rights” doctrine, but which may well violate the procedural due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and the Fayette Circuit Court and remand this case for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages with directions to instruct the jury in accordance with KRS 411.184 and .186.
.ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09-17-020 (1994); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp.1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp.1995); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/2-1115.05(b) (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 1988 & Supp.1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § ll-l-65(l)(a) (Supp.1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.12 (1995); N.C. GEN STAT. § 1D-I5(b) (1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (Supp.1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West Supp.1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law.Co-op.Supp.1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675 (1986); Jonathan Woodner, Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 1080, 137 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 780 P.2d 566 (1989); Travelers Indent. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me.1985); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn.1992); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104 (Mo.1996) (en banc). One state, Colorado, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in punitive damages cases. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1987).
. American Bar Association, Special Committee on Punitive Damages of the American Bar Association, Section on Litigation, Punitive Damages: A Constructive Analysis 19 (1986).
. American College of Trial Lawyers, Report on punitive Damages of the Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of Justice: Approved by the Board of Regents. 15-16 (1989).
. American Law Institute, 1 Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Reporters' Study 248-49 (1991).
. MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 5 (1996).
. The Jefferson Circuit Court's ruling was reversed on appeal, Louisville Safety-Vault & Trust Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 92 Ky. 233, 17 S.W. 567 (1891), but not until after the convention had concluded its work.
. But see Giuliani v. Guiler, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 318, 326 (1997) (dissenting opinion).