DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge KELLEY.I respectfully dissent. I believe the Majority’s reversal of the trial court’s order sustaining James B. Snyder, Jr.’s (Licensee) appeal from the suspension of his operating privilege by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT), on the basis of primary jurisdiction is erroneous. The Majority concludes that the Port Authority of Allegheny County (Port Authority) Police Officers had the requisite primary jurisdiction pursuant to Section 3303(a) of the Railroad and Street Railway Police Act (Act), 22 Pa.C.S. § 3303(a), to effectuate a traffic stop of Licensee after observing Licensee make an illegal left turn onto a city-owned street. Section 3303(a) provides as follows:
Railroad and street railway policeman shall severally possess and exercise all the powers of a police officer in the city of Philadelphia, in and upon, and in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of, the property of the corporate authority or elsewhere within this Commonwealth while engaged in the discharge of their duties in pursuit of railroad, street railway or transportation system business.
22 Pa.C.S. § 3303(a). As pointed out by the Majority, Section 3303(a) has been interpreted to provide Port Authority police with two different types of jurisdiction to exercise police powers: (1) primary jurisdiction; and (2) extra-territorial jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Firman, 571 Pa. 610, 617, 813 A.2d 643, 647 (2002). Our Supreme Court in Firman described the concept of primary jurisdiction as “authority .... constrained by the geographical area corresponding with its territorial limits.” Id. at 616, 813 A.2d at 647 (emphasis added).
Herein, the Majority determined, based on the undisputed evidence, that the Port Authority Police Officers had the requisite primary jurisdiction because the traffic violation which occurred on a city-owned roadway, Liberty Avenue, was adjacent to Port Authority property, the Wood Street train station, with no apparent intervening obstacles or obstructions between Liberty Avenue and the Wood Street station. Accordingly, the Majority, believing the traffic violation was committed in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of Port Authority property, holds that the Port Authority *764Police Officers had primary jurisdiction to stop Licensee for that violation and, therefore, the traffic stop was legal.1 I disagree that the Port Authority Police Officers had primary jurisdiction.
As correctly noted by the Majority, the General Assembly did not define the clause “in the immediate and adjacent vicinity” and our Supreme Court has not addressed or specifically interpreted the clause “in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of, the property of the corporate authority” as set forth in Section 3303(a) of the Act. The Majority looks to the dictionary definitions of “immediate” and “adjacent” and states that the term “immediate” is commonly defined as “not far apart or distant” and the term “adjacent” is commonly defined as “not distant or far off; nearby but not touching.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 26; 1129 (2002). The Majority relies upon the Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bloom, 979 A.2d 368 (Pa.Super.2009), as support for the holding that the Port Authority Police Officers in this matter had primary jurisdiction to effectuate a legal traffic stop of Licensee. However, I believe that the facts of Bloom actually support a determination herein that the Port Authority Police Officers did not have primary jurisdiction.
In Bloom, the Superior Court determined that the Port Authority Police Officer did have primary jurisdiction to effectuate a traffic stop because the traffic violation occurred in the “immediate and adjacent vicinity” of Port Authority Property. The uncontradicted testimony of the arresting officer established that:
(1) he was patrolling the Wabash Tunnel which is Port Authority property;
(2) the Wabash Tunnel ramp intersects with Woodruff Street which is a municipal street; (3) the traffic light on Wood-ruff Street is triggered by a Port Authority-owned signaling system, located approximately 500 feet from the tunnel, which is activated by cars exiting the Wabash Tunnel; (4) Appellee was traveling on Woodruff Street and failed to stop at the red traffic light; (5) Appellee nearly collided with two vehicles that had just proceeded from the Wabash Tunnel ramp; (6) the officer pursued Appellee’s vehicle and stopped him approximately 150 feet from Port Authority property, and 75 feet from the traffic light. (N.T., 7/29/08, at 5-21).
Bloom, 979 A.2d at 372. The Superior Court concluded that “[t]his evidence [was] sufficient to show that Appellee committed the violation and was stopped in the “immediate and adjacent vicinity” of Port Authority property.” Id.
I believe that the evidence in the present matter is clearly insufficient, as compared to Bloom, to support a determination that the traffic violation was committed in the “immediate and adjacent vicinity” of Port Authority property. First, the Port Authority Police Officers testified that they were conducting a roving patrol of the Port Authority bus routes in the vicinity of the intersection of Wood Street and Sixth Avenue. Therefore, the Police Officers were not patrolling Port Authority property as in Bloom but were patrolling city-owned roadways upon which the Port Authority buses travel. Second, the uncontradicted testimony in Bloom shows that the motorist ran a red traffic light which was triggered by a Port Authority-owned signaling system, located approximately 500 feet from the Port Authority owned Wabash Tunnel, which is activated by cars *765exiting the Wabash Tunnel. Herein, Licensee made an illegal left turn from a city-owned street, Wood Street, onto another city-owned street, Liberty Avenue, which is not controlled by a Port Authority owned signaling system nor do cars enter either Wood Street or Liberty Avenue from Port Authority owned property.
More importantly, however, there is no evidence of record in this matter that shows where the corporate jurisdictional line of the Port Authority begins or ends to definitively mark the application of the “immediate and adjacent vicinity” of Port Authority property. The Majority concludes that the map entered into evidence and relied upon by the Port Authority Police Officers is sufficient to show that the traffic violation occurred in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of Port Authority property. I note that the map entered into evidence is a Google map of the area, not an official map of the City of Pittsburgh. As such, the Google map does not set forth the distance between the Wood Street train station and the site on Liberty Avenue where Licensee made the illegal left turn.2 Ignoring this fact, the Majority believes that because the Port Authority Police Officer indicated that the map depicted the general area and because there are no obstructions or obstacles between the Wood Street train station and the intersection of Wood Street and Liberty Avenue, there is nothing to preclude them from being considered immediate and adjacent to each other.
However, such reasoning begs the question. How close to Port Authority property must a traffic violation occur in order to be within the “immediate and adjacent vicinity” of Port Authority property? The dictionary definitions cited by the Majority clearly do not answer this question. As stated previously herein, our Supreme Court in Firman described the concept of primary jurisdiction as constrained by the geographical area corresponding with its territorial limits. The geographical area of the Wood Street train station is the actual parcel of property housing the building and the territorial limits of the Wood Street train station is the exterior of the building housing the train station. Liberty Avenue is clearly not part of the geographical area or within the territorial limits of Port Authority property. In Bloom, the evidence showed that it was much clearer that the traffic violation occurred in the immediate and adjacent vicinity of Port Authority property or, in other words, the violation occurred within the geographical area corresponding with the Port Authority’s territorial limits. I do not believe the same conclusion can be drawn from the evidence presented in this case.
Accordingly, I would affirm.
. I note that Licensee was actually stopped by the Port Authority Police Officers near the intersection of Seventh Avenue and Penn Avenue.
. The Notes of Testimony reveal that Licensee’s attorney entered "a Google map of the area” into evidence at Exhibit B. See Reproduced Record at 20a-21 a; 52a.